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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the evolution of financial sectors and provides an analysis of 
the linkages among finance, the real economy, and the social structures in which they are 
embedded in the context of the evolution of financial sectors. It analyzes the social and 
economic consequences of an increasingly complex, financialized economy. 
The first chapter examines the “finance-real economy nexus” and adopts a functional 
perspective on the recent evolution of financial sectors. It contends that there is a 
potential trade-off between the efficient allocation of risk and the efficient allocation of 
capital. It distinguishes the efficient allocation of capital from the efficient allocation of risk 
and reveals how financial sectors in developed countries evolved and transformed risk 
allocation into a predominant function. 
The second chapter argues that modern finance serves only certain social groups, which 
are able to privatize liquidity and information. Two categories of market participants profit 
from the present financial system: 1) “Risk allocators”, which are well equipped to profit 
from unstable financial markets characterized by financial bubbles. These are stock 
markets and alternative trading systems, brokers, hedge funds, and high-frequency 
traders. 2) CEOs and owners of financial capital (High Net Worth Individuals and short-
term shareholders) who are satisfied with the output of a financial system with inflated 
financial asset prices. 
The third chapter adopts an institutional economic perspective on the “finance- society 
nexus” against the background of the rapid evolution of financial systems. It examines the 
tremendous development of financial systems in developed economies with respect to 
the very institutions that are intended to support them and advances the hypothesis of a 
“finance-society gap”. 
The fourth chapter attempts to contextualize the “finance-society” nexus and 
demonstrates how the informal institutions of Russian society prevent the emergence of 
an efficient financial sector using the case study of SME financing. If society advances 
too slowly, as it is the case in Russia, or financial sectors do so too quickly, as it is the 
case in Western economies, financial sectors do not perform their role of allocating 
capital efficiently and instead operate at the expense of society. However, in both cases, 
specific groups are able to monopolize their relationships with financial sectors. 
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Introduction 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008, which engendered the worst economic downturn 
since the Great Depression, will have further consequences that have yet to appear. It 
revealed predatory lending and fraudulent underwriting practices in the U.S., the 
existence of massive shadow banking systems, mortgage-backed securities and other 
structured products based on diverse underlying assets, the risks of which were 
incorrectly priced due to faulty risk pricing models. In brief, it revealed the sheer size and 
complexity of the global financial industry. Economists, experts, and CEOs have 
struggled to explain the workings of complex financial deals and how toxic instruments 
can infect other financial institutions. Numerous intermediate events connect the burst of 
the U.S. housing market bubble to the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone and the 
social consequences of the economic downturn. Politics, most likely demagogically 
reflecting the concerns of the public and the press, declared that finance had become 
detached from economic reality.  
The notion that financial sectors are tied to the economic life of societies is intuitive and 
not provocative per se. However, what links financial sectors with the productive economy 
and social spheres? By the same token, it seems evident that the financial crisis 
damaged confidence and trust. However, what type of trust? Trust in the financial sectors 
in which the crisis emerged, trust in a political system unable to design regulations to 
prevent it, or trust in an economic discipline unable to explain or understand, let alone 
forecast, such crises?  
The linkages among finance, the “real economy” and societies are vast but suffer from a 
dearth of academic attention due, in part, to the separation between economics on one 
side and financial economics on the other. Social sciences such as sociology and 
anthropology are, evidently, even further removed from economics. The “finance-real 
economy” linkages have been reduced to the “finance-growth” debate. However, the 
debate over the relationships between the financial and economic sectors is not a new 
one. In the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith had already noted how “the trade of the city of 
Glasgow doubled in about fifteen years after the first erection of the banks there; and that 
the trade of Scotland has more than quadrupled since the first erection of the two public 
banks at Edinburgh” (Smith, 2005:240). However, Schumpeter clarified this relationship 
between finance and economic activity. The debate over the “finance - growth nexus” 
took different forms as it evolved. It first concerned the direction of the relationship: Does 
growth in the financial sectors spur economic development or vice versa? The debate 
then focused on the “components” that comprised financial sectors and positioned banks 
against financial markets. The question was whether market-based financial systems 
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were more conducive to economic growth than were bank-based systems. As this proved 
a difficult question to answer, scholars began to devote greater attention to the legal 
structure underpinning the financial sector and argued that the legal origin and legal 
apparatus are what allow for efficient financial sectors, whether composed of banks or 
financial markets. The study of the links between law and finance gained momentum 
thanks to La Porta et al. (1998) (LLSV hereafter). They argued that shareholder 
protection affects corporate behavior and thus growth. The causal mechanism in their 
1998 article is the following: A country’s legal origin influences corporate law, which 
impacts financial arrangements and then affects corporate behavior. Economic growth 
depends on this legal scaffolding. The various contributions to the overall debate have 
clarified important elements of the equation. While these contributions are valuable, they 
nonetheless provide a static analysis of how finance affects growth. In other words, they 
fail to address the evolution of financial sectors. By the same token, explorations of the 
socio-economic consequences of this evolution fall outside the scope of established 
schools of thought. However, the 2008 crisis revealed that the foundations of mainstream 
disciplines were frail at best, and dangerous at worst. The financial crisis of 2008 is also a 
crisis of academic economics.  
This dissertation examines the evolution of financial sectors and provides an analysis of 
the linkages among finance, the real economy, and the social structures in which they are 
embedded in the context of the evolution of the financial sector. In other words, against 
the contexts of a financial revolution that was silent until 2007 but became loud enough to 
shake the foundations of capitalism. It uses Eichengreen’s definition of international 
financial systems, which also applies to national ones, as a starting point: “The 
international financial system is a dense network of social, economic, and financial 
institutions. As with any complex mechanism, there are limits on the feasible changes to 
any component so long as the others remain in place. It makes no sense to install a jet 
engine on a Cessna Piper Cub. The same is true of the international financial system, 
whose structure is lent inertia by the interaction of its components” (Eichengreen, 
2002:2). 
However, what happens when a jet engine is installed on Cessna Piper Cub? This 
dissertation attempts to answer this question. It analyzes the social and economic 
consequences of an increasingly complex, financialized economy. The first chapter 
examines the “finance-real economy nexus” and adopts a functional perspective on the 
recent evolution of financial sectors. It contends that there is a potential trade-off between 
the efficient allocation of risk and the efficient allocation of capital. It distinguishes the 
efficient allocation of capital from the efficient allocation of risk and reveals how financial 
sectors in developed countries evolved and transformed risk allocation into a predominant 
function. The potential conflict between these two functions can be articulated on different 
levels: At the institutional level, new instruments and services blurred the frontier between 
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market-based and bank-based financial systems, with new actors such as mutual funds, 
hedge funds and investment banks becoming prominent. At the temporal level, short-term 
finance could hinder long-term investment needs. At the geographical level, risk allocation 
is international, whereas capital allocation tends to be national. Finally, regarding lender-
borrower relationships, it seems that a greater concern for risk allocation corresponds to 
the move toward transactional lending and a hardening of information. Paradoxically, 
rumors (including soft information) in financial markets have not disappeared.  
Thus each section concludes that financial sectors pursue risk allocation at the expense 
of capital allocation. As capital allocation is the primary function that financial systems 
should fulfill, one should pay more attention to the economic consequences of the 
inefficient financial systems. Indeed, an inefficient financial system generates high 
opportunity costs. But it also changes the political economy landscape of the linkages 
between finance and the real economy. In other words, it modifies the revenue 
distribution and power relations between the different interests groups. Some actors 
benefit disproportionally more than others from the functional change of financial sectors 
described in chapter one.  
Thus, chapter two takes a closer look at the linkages between financial sectors and the 
real economy, from a political economic perspective. It will identify the interests groups 
that Western financial systems tend to favor. Dembinski (2008) asked whether modern 
finance was a servant or a deceiver. This chapter shows that modern finance is a 
servant, but only for certain interest groups, which are able to privatize liquidity and 
information. Two categories of individuals profit from the present financial system:  
1) “Risk allocators”, which are well equipped to profit from unstable financial markets 
characterized by financial bubbles. These are stock markets and alternative 
trading systems, brokers, hedge funds, and high-frequency traders. 
2) Owners of financial capital (High Net Worth Individuals and short-term 
shareholders) and CEO’s that are satisfied with the output of a financial system 
with inflated financial asset prices. 
The implication of such an analysis is that one must go beyond simple financial 
regulation. Liquidity and information must again become public goods if our financial 
systems are to function not only efficiently but also in the general interest. Thus, politics 
must reinvest in the field of finance, and the institutional authority left to the financial 
industry must be constrained by society. 
So the first part, composed of chapter one and two, looks at the evolution of finance and 
the political economy consequences of that evolution. The first chapter borrows concepts 
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from the financialization literature and start from the idea that finance plays an increasing 
role in the economy in general. Its starting point is indeed Epstein definition of 
financialization as “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial 
actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international 
economies” (Epstein, 2005:3). However, this first part adds to that literature by showing a 
change in function, instead of analyzing the increasing volume (liquidity, debt, 
transactions) of finance. While the literature on financialization has directed scholarly 
attention to the increasing place that finance is taking, the disconnect between finance 
and the real economy has been neglected. This first part thus goes beyond 
financialization and points to a change of the nature of finance to identify the broken 
linkages between finance and the real economy. By the same token, it is argued in 
chapter two that certain interest groups benefit disproportionately more than others 
because of that functional change. In other words, it is the disconnection from finance 
with the real economy that allows some financial actors to extract fees. Some segment of 
the financial industry is rewarded because it does not serve the economy, and not in spite 
of it.  
After discussing the separation of financial sectors and the real economy and its 
redistributive consequences, the second part, chapter three and four, will discuss the 
separation of financial sectors and society and its social consequences. This second part 
borrows from the Institutional Economics literature. North’s definition of institutions 
provides a good starting point to explore the institutional linkages between finance and 
society. Institutions are for him “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interactions” (North, 1991:97). He adds that constraints can be 
formal (constitutions, laws, regulations) and informal (conventions, norms, routines). The 
added value of chapter three is that it applies this concept to the evolution of financial 
sectors. Formal and informal constraints are humanly devised and are thus changed by 
political, economic and social agents. It adopts an institutional economic perspective on 
the “finance-society nexus” against the background of the rapid evolution of financial 
systems. It examines the tremendous development of financial systems in developed 
economies with respect to the very institutions that are intended to support them and 
advances the hypothesis of a “finance-society gap”. If this gap can be observed in 
emerging economies because of underdeveloped institutions, this chapter argues that it 
should also appear in Western economies, due to overdeveloped financial systems. In 
that case, finance is developing at an overly rapid rate, outpacing institutions. Drawing on 
theories from institutional economics, it demonstrates that the informal institutions on 
which financial sectors are based are distinct from societies’ formal institutions. The 
complexity of financial systems then might not only imply a trade-off between the 
allocation of capital and the allocation of risk, as chapter one shows, but also other social 
costs. These costs can emerge either because finance developed too quickly or because 
society is too slow. In both cases, institutional gaps render financial sectors less efficient 
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than they could otherwise be. Indeed some characteristics of Western financial sectors 
also characterize transitional countries such as Russia. There are similarities between the 
social patterns underlying these societies and those underlying advanced financial 
sectors. In both cases, there is an institutional incompatibility between the financial sector 
and the rest of society. 
Therefore, the fourth chapter attempts to contextualize the “finance-society” nexus and 
demonstrates how the informal institutions of Russian society prevent the emergence of 
an efficient financial sector using the case study of SME financing. This Russian case 
study of SME finance reveals how social practices can alter the structure of a financial 
services market. Bluntly, one could argue that society is too slow to allow for a well-
developed financial sector. Former command economies were and in some instances 
remain in transition from communism (or even a feudal economic structure) to market 
economies, but high-income countries are also in transition. The destination, however, is 
unknown. If the Russian transition bred a “Russian style” capitalism (Gustafson, 1999), 
what characterizes current “Western style” capitalism? If society advances too slowly or 
financial sectors do so too quickly, financial sectors do not perform their role of allocating 
capital efficiently and instead operate at the expense of society. However, in both cases, 
specific groups are able to monopolize the relationships with financial sectors.  
It is helpful to remember Eichengreen’s remark on financial systems cited at the 
beginning of the introduction: “The international financial system is a dense network of 
social, economic, and financial institutions. As with any complex mechanism, there are 
limits on the feasible changes to any component so long as the others remain in place 
(Eichengreen, 2002:2). This definition of financial system implies firstly that financial 
systems are not islands. They are part of a broader socio-economic environment made of 
institutions. Secondly, it suggests that the different institutional components of which 
financial systems are made do evolve. This evolution is however limited by the 
institutional equilibrium of the entire socio-economic environment. It determines the cost 
of adaptation. This dissertation identifies economic, political and social limits to financial 
sectors development and show that different socio-economic environments impose 
different costs of adaptation. The size and complexity of financial sector therefore 
concern societies in general and should be publicly debated. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The silent revolution: Trade-offs between allocation of 
risk and allocation of capital 
Recent studies have toyed with the notion that there are limits to the development of 
financial sectors. Arcand et al. (2012) demonstrated that financial depth, measured by the 
credit provided to the private sector as percentage of GDP, has a threshold (80 - 100 
percent) beyond which further financing is associated with less economic growth. In 
2011, it reached 136 percent and 194.4 percent in the E.U. and U.S., respectively (World 
Bank data). Philippon (2013) focused on the efficiency of the financial sector and found 
that the costs of intermediation, historically at approximately 2 percent, increased since 
the 1980s. This is puzzling because improvements in information technologies should 
have reduced these costs. He contended that increases in other financial activities with 
less social value, such as trading, might have outweighed the benefits of IT development 
for intermediation costs. In a similar vein, proponents of the concept of financialization 
contended that financial sectors are increasing in size and taking on a life of their own. 
Financialization refers to “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, 
financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international 
economies” (Epstein, 2005:3).  
Thus, the phenomenon can express itself in terms of an increasing level of debt as a 
percentage of GDP. In the U.S., it rose from 140 percent to 328.6 percent from 1973 to 
2005 (Palley, 2007:7). Duménil and Levy used the ratio of net worth and the ratio of the 
profits of financial corporations to those of non-financial corporations and observed a 
dramatic increase from the mid-1990s onward (Duménil and Lévy, 2005:39). Johnson 
(2009) argued that earnings in financial sectors as a share of corporate profits increased 
from 1983 onward, reaching 181 percent in 2007. In Western countries, the share of 
value added in financial sectors in total value added in the economy increased steadily 
from 4-5 percent in the early 1980s to six to eight percent in 2010 (BIS, 2010).  
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These various measures all indicate an increase in the size of financial sectors, which is 
not without consequences:  
• At the microeconomic level, such an increase can force firms to be immediately 
profitable, preventing them from making useful long-term investments (Albert, 1991), 
which leads to breakdowns in accounting standards and corruption among financial 
analysts (Berenson, 2003). The result is that financial markets have come to dictate 
corporate behavior. This might not be the optimal outcome if financial market behavior 
is short-termist (Palley, 1997) and subject to herd behavior (Palley, 1995).  
• At the mesoeconomic level, financialization has entrepreneurial consequences. On 
the one hand, financial sectors have attracted increasing numbers of science, 
engineering, math and physics graduates because their talents are well-suited to 
design and operate new and complex financial instruments. On the other hand, while 
it may be a coincidence, Kedrosky and Stangler (2011) noted that the financial 
service industry boomed between 2002 and 2006, but “companies founded in 2002 
through 2006 performed just as poorly as those founded during recessions. This 
period also happened to coincide with poor performance in terms of initial public 
offerings” (Kedrosky & Stangler, 2011:12).  
• At the macroeconomic level, financialization arguably increases the inherent potential 
for instability that financial systems generate internally (Minsky, 1986).  
• There are also social consequences: Gini coefficients are increasing more rapidly in 
the most “financialized” Anglo-Saxon countries (Dore, 2008).  
Ultimately, there is little doubt that financial systems have experienced revolutionary 
changes that will be analyzed hereafter. Few studies have examined how changes in 
financial systems might affect the efficiency of capital allocation. That financial innovation 
increases the efficiency of capital allocation is generally taken for granted. However, 
directing capital to investments with the highest rates of return is the primary function of 
financial systems (Levine, 2006). Dembinski and Perritaz (1998) empirically 
demonstrated that “at a time when NYSE companies were losing their advantage over 
non listed non financial companies in terms of combined factor productivity, the financial 
system was granting them ever better financing terms and letting them have an unlimited 
quantity of funds” (Dembinski and Perritaz 1998:17). Paradoxically, the US financial 
system favors listed companies, though their asset productivity has decreased relative to 
that of non-listed, non-financial firms. This demands a more detailed examination and 
analysis because the efficient allocation of capital is the primary function of financial 
sectors, while informational efficiency, which lies at the heart of Efficient Financial Market 
Theory, has thus far received the bulk of academic attention.  
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This chapter first characterizes the change experienced in financial sectors. Second, it 
demonstrates how a functional analysis of the evolution of financial sectors sheds light on 
potential conflicts between the allocation of capital and the allocation of risks. It does so 
at the institutional level, the temporal level, the geographical level and the level of 
individual interaction (borrower-lender relationships). At the institutional level, it is clear 
that market-based financial systems supported by orthodox financial economics have 
become dominant, even if the advantages of bank-based and market-based financial 
systems remain a matter of debate. Second, such a division can be observed at the 
temporal level. The short-term imperatives of the stock market contrast with the long-term 
horizon of the real economy. Third, the geographical level reveals that international 
finance tends to favor risk allocation, whereas capital allocation is national. Finally, 
present-day financial sectors tend to develop transactions, whereas banks have 
traditionally stressed the importance of relationships.  
However, one must note that these levels are all interconnected, and it is difficult to 
strictly separate them. Although some arguments appear redundant, the distinction is 
nevertheless sensible because it allows us to observe the extent of the shift toward the 
risk allocation function mentioned by Allen and Santomero (1998). The strict distinction 
between risk and capital allocation might also appear overly dichotomic (the two are 
highly connected in practice), but it clarifies that the functions of capital allocation and of 
risk allocation can be in conflict.  
1.1.  The evolution of financial sectors: From “boring banking” 
to “fancy finance” 
Krugman’s (2009) turn of phrase captures the essence of the functional change that has 
occurred in the global financial sector in recent decades. The causes of change in the 
financial architecture of developed countries can be attributed to the politics of 
deregulation that began in the late 1970s, advances in telecommunication technologies, 
the emergence of personal computers, and academic work that contributed to establish 
financial economics as a separate discipline. These factors triggered a boom in financial 
innovation. The following are some financial novelties listed by Miller in 1986: Eurodollar 
accounts, eurobonds, sushi bonds, floating-rate bonds, puttable bonds, zero-coupon 
bonds, options, financial futures, options on futures and indexes, and income warrants 
(Miller, 1986). These are now common financial instruments. The following instruments, 
however, might deserve greater attention because they embody the shift that we intend to 
highlight in this chapter. Their primary function is to allocate risks more efficiently. Basic 
swaps - hidden bets on interest rates - and, subsequently, more complex structured notes 
linked to interest rates or currencies began to appear. Mutual funds, insurance 
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companies, pension funds and corporations all purchased these notes. Banks issued 
them, as did U.S. government-supported agencies and corporations: “By issuing 
structured notes, these companies could save a half percent or more in interest costs. 
The companies didn’t really care if the note payments were linked to a complex formula 
involving interest rates or currencies [...] because the investment bank selling the 
structured notes always agreed to hedge the issuer’s risks with swaps” (Partnoys, 
2003:71). 
This period also witnessed a boom in securitization, allowing for the increased use of 
credit derivatives. We now have access to the Collaterized Bond Obligation (CBO) and 
Collaterized Mortgage Obligation (CMO), Asset Back Securities (ABS), Collaterized Debt 
Obligation (CDO) and protection against a possible credit default, Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS). The yields of these instruments depend on which risk tranches they were issued 
from. The senior piece pays less, but is less risky, the mezzanine piece comes next, 
followed by the remaining tranches, down to “nuclear waste”, as insiders term it. The 
central appeal of these instruments is risk allocation, and not investment per se. This 
development was backed by the orthodox view of financial economics, which contends 
that financial innovation is a response to inefficiencies in the financial intermediation 
process and, on balance, “innovations have been almost certainly beneficial for the 
system as a whole” (Watson et al., 1986:10). This perspective holds that securitizing 
previously illiquid assets, such as mortgages, and thus allowing them to be traded on 
secondary markets, will reduce risks through diversification: Unbundling the risks involved 
in the various instruments, “should increase the efficiency of the financial system since 
each element of a deal can be provided and the associated risk taken by the financial 
entity which can do so most efficiently. The increase in the number of separate risks 
should not, in itself, increase the total risk for the system as a whole” (Watson et al., 
1986:10). The rational for this, in Arrow’s words, is that “the possibility of shifting risks, of 
insurance in the broadest sense, permits individuals to engage in risky activities that they 
would not otherwise undertake” (Arrow, 1971:137). This argument ties risk diversification 
to economic growth and provides theoretical support for the development of financial 
markets, which as we will see, perform this task better than bank-based financial 
systems. A clarification should be introduced at this point. Stock markets and financial 
markets are often confused with one another. However, they are two different institutions. 
The first refers to organized and regulated platforms on which stocks (shares) can be 
traded. Bond markets represent capital markets on which capital can be raised. 
Derivatives markets provide instruments to manage risks, the redistribution of which is 
also facilitated by the insurance market. Commodities markets exist to support 
commodities trading, and foreign exchange markets support the currency trading. Money 
markets provide short-term financing. In futures markets, traders exchange forward 
contracts. In all of these markets, which are regulated and structured differently, various 
actors trade diverse financial instruments for financial markets.  
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Figure 1. Fields of entry for graduates of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Another important characteristic is the intensive use of mathematics in finance (Wilmott, 
2000). The increase in the size and complexity of the financial sector has been driven by 
financial innovation. As noted above, financial sectors have been recruiting increasing 
numbers of the graduates of science, engineering, math and physics programs to 
administer new and complex financial instruments. Figure 1 above, taken from Kedroski 
and Stangler (Kedrosky and Stangler, 2011:6), depicts the fields of entry for graduates of 
MIT. The preponderance of the financial sector is clear and embodies the link between 
hard science disciplines, such as physics and mathematics, and finance.  
In a 1900 thesis, Bachelier assumed that the Paris exchange was a game of chance, a 
coin-tossing game in which participants could not predict price movements. The 
Gaussian distribution, however, provides a means of exploiting this ignorance. In the 
absence of new information, the price will not substantially deviate from its starting point, 
which is the current price. Thus, in a world in which data points are independent and each 
one having negligible effect on the others, the variation in prices tends to form a bell-
curve. If individual prices cannot be predicted, the general way in which they move can. 
This is Brownian motion applied to financial market prices. Markowitz then applied 
Bachelier’s conceptualizations to develop Modern Portfolio Theory, which was rapidly 
adopted by Wall Street because the understanding behind it - diversification - now seems 
obvious: Markowitz incorporated the notion of risk by linking it to the variance and 
standard deviation of price movements, in other words, the probability that incorrectly 
predicts the price. The problem was that one had to calculate how each stock fluctuates 
relative to every other stock, and because prices change, this implies a constant 
reevaluation of the covariance of every security. This was a costly exercise for the 
computers available in the 1960s. Sharpe simplified Markowitz’s model and compared an 
individual security with the stock market as a whole, a measure that later became known 
as “beta”.  
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The “beta” measures the sensitivity of an individual stock to the market and as such is a 
mathematical expression of the relationship between risk and reward. The practicality of 
this method was monumental: “A one-hundred-security analysis that took thirty-three 
minutes on an IBM 7090 using Markowitz’ methods needed only thirty seconds Sharpe’s 
way” (Fox, 2009:86). It also contributed to Black and Scholes solving the option-pricing 
puzzle using the measure of non-diversifiable risk given by the beta. At the time, the 
option-trading business was rudimentary and had to be conducted “over-the counter, 
broker to broker. The Chicago Board of Trade was on a project to establish an options 
exchange and Black-Scholes became part of it. Black-Scholes wasn’t just predicting 
options prices. As the house formulae of the brand-new options exchange, it was setting 
them” (Fox 2009:146). The notion of risk progressively became central to modern finance. 
Bachelier introduced statistics into finance, which allowed Markowitz to incorporate the 
notion of risk. Sharpe simplified the notion of risk and linked it to reward. Black and 
Scholes determined how to price it, which is now used by the entire industry. Walter and 
de Pracontal (2009) explained how the Brownian virus spread from Bachelier’s 
dissertation to Wall Street. They demonstrated how American scholars maintained the 
Brownian “philosophy” and applied it to finance using modern statistical tools. Bouleau 
(1998) argued that the widespread use of derivatives and the establishment of markets to 
trade them requires an intense use of mathematics and represents an epistemological 
break. Risk is spread and not only managed, but canceled, through the “thinking of the 
market”. Expert forecasts have less credence than the anticipation of the market as 
expressed through public opinion. It is therefore thus more important to heed the market 
and “listening to the market becomes the main objective reality” (Bouleau, 1998:XV).  
This chapter argues that this epistemological break also corresponds to a distinction 
between two types of efficiency: The efficiency of capital allocation and the efficiency of 
risk allocation. New actors playing a prominent role in financial markets engage in risk 
allocation using sophisticated instruments, while capital allocation seems to play a lesser 
role. Let us consider the three following examples to illustrate the above statement.  
Scoach Switzerland, a secondary market for structured products, now offers three 
structured product indexes (Dickinson, 2010). Such innovation introduces derivatives 
between the initial underlying investment and the final instrument. That it was designed to 
aid investors in assessing the performance of these products clearly demonstrates how 
difficult this can be, even for so-called “sophisticated investors”. On the one hand, this 
innovation improves the risk management function of the financial system, but on the 
other hand, the structure of these notes is highly opaque. Constructing an index on top of 
the note to track its performance might provide the illusion of transparency, while in fact, it 
does nothing to improve the efficiency of capital allocation.  
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Structured notes based on sporting events offer an even more telling example. The World 
Cup is now an occasion for issuers to market structured notes based on the underlying 
assets correlated with the possible victory of a team. It is difficult to develop a theoretical 
case to defend the added value of these sports betting products relative to fixed income 
investments or the bets offered by bookmakers (Breuer et al., 2009). However, it is more 
difficult to identify a link with the capital allocation function that a financial system should 
fulfill.  
The daily and weekly option indexes introduced by the Amsterdam stock exchange in 
2006 and 2008, respectively, have experienced substantial success, to the extent that 
NYSE Euronext is offering weekly options on certain equities. These financial innovations 
can be considered to provide successful and transparent products for investors 
(HedgeWeek, 2010). It might also represent the overwhelming importance of the risk 
allocation function, as daily options are not instruments for allocating capital.  
These examples simply illustrate how innovation in the financial sectors can serve the 
productive economy to greater or lesser extents. To more clearly determine how the 
evolution of the financial sectors might bear on the economy, a functional approach is 
proposed hereafter.  
1.2. A functional perspective on financial sectors 
Intermediaries have becomes facilitators of risk transfers and employ complex 
instruments. Thus, banks’ operations have changed, and trading now occupies the bulk 
of a bank’s efforts. The increased use of securitized loans has altered the lending 
functions performed by banks (Allen and Santomero, 1998). The OECD thus 
recommends that the new definition of Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly 
Measured (FISIM) include the output of financial services resulting from risk management 
and liquidity transformation activities. This indicates that financial products have moved 
beyond traditional deposits and loans (Supaarmorakul, 1995). Allen and Santomero 
(1998) demonstrated that new futures and options markets affected the number of 
intermediaries. Individual equity ownership decreased dramatically in the U.S. from the 
mid-1960s to mid-1990s, while the number of shares held by mutual and closed-funds, 
pension funds and insurance companies increased correspondingly (Allen and 
Santomero, 1998:1498). Here, we propose a functional perspective to analyze this 
change.  
There are six main functions fulfilled by the global financial system that are generally 
recognized in the literature (Crane, 1995, Merton, 1995). These functions provide a 
system for clearing and settling payments, a resource pooling mechanism, a means of 
 20 
transferring economic resources over time and across distances, risk management 
methods, price information and, finally, means of addressing the incentive problems 
arising from asymmetric information. It is possible to gather them under two main groups 
of functions. The first three fall under the category of the traditional form of intermediation, 
which is the channeling of money from savers to borrowers and performs a capital 
allocation function. The other type of functions includes risk management, pricing, and 
information channeling and enabling risk allocation. Employing a clear distinction 
between institutions undertaking these functions is no longer sensible. Banks participate 
in financial markets and have their brokerage desks for stock, bond, commodity, futures 
and derivatives trading. They also have risk management departments. Moreover, asset 
managers, brokers and pension funds participate in the channeling of funds from savers 
to borrowers. Institutional perspectives, taking existing institutions as given, have been 
weakened by these changes, which is why we follow Merton’s advice and focus on 
functions, which are much more stable over time, rather than institutions. For Merton, the 
rational for the use of a functional perspective is based on the replacement of traditional 
financial intermediaries by financial markets as the institutional structure fulfilling the 
system’s functions and logically also argues for functional instead of institutional 
regulation (Merton, 1995:25,26,39). The analytical framework employed here has thus 
been substantially influenced by Merton’s article, but we distance ourselves from Merton 
in the characterization of the shift from traditional intermediaries to financial markets. 
Merton wrote that this shift is accompanied by more transparent institutions. 
Transparency, however, is a complex concept that should be manipulated carefully. 
Financial institutions are not necessarily less opaque because there seems to be more 
available information flowing to financial sectors. In other words, increased information 
does not spontaneously entail transparency. The debate over the added value of Credit 
Rating Agencies illustrates this argument well (Ferri et al., 1999, Posen and Smick, 
2008). There has been a shift in the importance of the functions provided by the financial 
system. As we noted above, Allen and Santomero (1998) contended that there has been 
an increase in another form of financial intermediation that now consists more in the 
facilitation of risk transfers than the channeling of money from savers to borrowers. They 
noted a change in the spectrum of functions that a financial sector provides. However, 
this change has consequences for the efficiency of capital allocation, which is the most 
important type of “efficiency”.  
Aglietta (2008) differentiated among four types of efficiencies. Informational efficiency, 
which is central to the Efficient Financial Market Hypothesis, implies that markets 
instantly absorb new information that is reflected in prices. A second type is the efficiency 
of fundamental valuation, which depends on long-term informational efficiency. A third 
type is the efficiency of risk diversification, which financial innovation arguably enhances, 
and the fourth and final type is allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency is the synthesis 
of the three types of efficiency, which for numerous reasons is very difficult to achieve. 
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Allocative efficiency can be constrained by differences between social and private returns 
or a tension between the short and long term (Aglietta, 2008:48). However, Aglietta noted 
that it is the only form of efficiency that could justify the resources absorbed by financial 
markets. This chapter highlights a potential conflict between the pursuit of risk 
diversification efficiency and allocative efficiency and outlines the different lines along 
which these functions conflict.  
1.3. Risk allocation versus capital allocation: Conflicting 
functions  
Because firms are now required to navigate a more uncertain world, the use of 
derivatives answers a need that they face. The new regime of floating exchange rates 
allowed for endless possibilities for financial innovation in the 1970s, and the risk 
allocation function has thus been favored. The notion of a tension between risk 
management and investment is not new. Keynes had already expressed his concerns 
regarding this dilemma. On the one hand, the “liquidity of investment markets often 
facilitates, though is sometimes impedes, the course of new investment. For the fact that 
each individual investor flatters himself that his commitment is “liquid” (though this cannot 
be true for all investors collectively) calms his nerves and makes him much more willing 
to run a risk. If individual purchases of investments were rendered illiquid, this might 
seriously impede new investment” (Keynes, 1935:133). On the other hand, Keynes also 
warned, “when the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the 
activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill- done” (Keynes, 1935:133).  
Dembinski and Perritaz (1998) quantitatively expressed how poorly the job has actually 
been performed. On the one side, the balance sheet of New York Stock Exchange listed 
companies grew to a substantially greater extent than did US non-listed companies, 
meaning that the listed companies received more financial resources (see figure 2 
below).  
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Figure 2. Annual balance sheet growth of NYSE listed and non-listed companies 
However, the contribution of US-listed companies to US GNP over the past 20 years 
remained constant on the order of 20-23 percent. This highlights what Dembinski and 
Perritaz called a “Paradox of Financial Inefficiency” because the financial system, as a 
whole, allocated much more resources to companies that were not particularly productive. 
Otherwise, their contribution to US GNP would have grown along with their balance 
sheets.  
These empirical findings suggest that the preponderance of stock markets (with the 
benefits they provide with respect to risk management, liquidity and transparency 
provision, and positive effects on corporate governance) might have come at the expense 
of the overall allocative efficiency of the financial system. In other words, the growth of 
stock markets might have led to suboptimal resource allocations.  
To obtain an overview of the conflict between these two financial subsystems, let us 
investigate the division between the risk allocation and capital allocation functions at the 
institutional level, the temporal level, the geographical level and the level of borrower-
creditor relationships.  
Source: (Dembinski and Perritaz, 1998:7)
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1.3.1. Conflicting functions at the institutional level  
Financial markets have gained in importance to the extent that institutional perspectives, 
differentiating between banks and financial markets, are no longer useful because the 
distinction between the two is now blurred. Investment banks, brokers, market makers, 
mutual funds, funds of funds, hedge funds and pension funds have gained increasing 
importance recent decades because a market-based financial system is based on the 
conduct of these activities to a greater extent than traditional banking is. As noted above, 
banks actively participate in financial markets that provide them with the financial 
instruments they invest in, use to develop new products and services and manage risks. 
However, asset managers, brokers and pension funds also participate in the channeling 
of funds from savers to borrowers. The task of private equity funds was traditionally left to 
banks, which now have brokerage departments.  
Nevertheless, although the distinction is no longer clear-cut, this section demonstrates 
that financial markets obey a distinctive logic that favors the allocation of risk rather than 
the allocation of capital. Moreover, the debate over the relative merits of market- and 
bank-based financial systems persists and has recently been shaped by the “law and 
finance” debate, arguing that the different set of laws and institutions - understood in the 
sociological sense of the terms - underpinning any financial system is the important 
consideration (La Porta et al., 1998, Rajan and Zingales, 1998a, Beck and Levine, 2008). 
Banks and financial markets require different institutional environments, and there is 
therefore no single, universal blueprint.  
Let us consider one purported advantage of a market-based system: The incentives to 
search for information because it is easier to profit from it (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). 
Boot and Thakor (1997) outlined the positive purpose markets serve in aggregating 
diffuse information and transmitting it to investors. The relationship-based model, by 
enforcing contracts through power relationships and thus substituting for contracts where 
they are poorly enforced, is said to suppress the price and signal mechanisms that 
contractual systems provide, which was the cause of the Asian crisis (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998b). This emphasizes the centrality of information to the functioning of stock 
markets. The way information is spread lies at the root of the price formation mechanism. 
A key characteristic of financial markets is that the equilibrium generated by markets 
provides valuable information that will be considered in firm decisions. Bank-based 
systems lack this so-called “information feedback”. Because of agency problems, which 
are common in developing economies and lead to moral hazard, the market-generated 
information is not valued. Thus, depending on the informational environment, bank-based 
systems might be more efficient (Tadesse, 2002).  
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The distinctive feature of the logic underlying financial markets is the way in which 
information is conveyed and its importance to the formation of security prices. It is the 
logic underlying the price discovery mechanisms that allows one to argue that financial 
markets exhibit a development threshold beyond which they conflict with the notion of 
investment.  
The price formation mechanism  
If markets are efficient, in the informational sense of the term, they will reflect the 
underlying economy. In other words, the assumption is that markets reflect all available 
information, and hence, when one purchases an asset, a fair price is paid for it. The 
primary difference between financial markets and banks is that markets talk. Markets 
send signals that help participants invest where the investment is most productive. 
Banks, in contrast, rely on experts and economists to analyze and forecast. The 
epistemological rupture that Bouleau (1998) wrote about is the gap between the wisdom 
of crowds and expert analysis. From a financial economics perspective, this new 
approach had no choice but to prove that markets are an efficient black box, in the sense 
that the signals received and transmitted are the best reflection of a firm’s fundamentals. 
Philosophically, this new paradigm requires scholars to ask whether what markets say is 
reality or reflects reality.  
However, Efficient Financial Market Theory (EFMT), which underlies the arguments in 
favor of market-based financial systems, is very controversial. The world depicted by 
EFMT is not one in which the future is entirely predictable. The knowledge requirement of 
EFMT is that “what is known is not what will happen for certain, but the risk of it 
happening, which is measurable” (Skidelsky, 2009:38). Thus, the risks attached to 
underlying assets are reflected by past available information reflected in the price of the 
corresponding financial instruments. However, EFMT has been critiqued from several 
perspectives.  
Behavioral finance holds assumptions that are in direct contradiction with financial 
orthodoxy, the principal one being that investors do not behave rationally in their 
investment decisions because they are subject to several biases that cause them to 
assess probabilities subjectively (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The anomalies 
discovered by Kahneman and Tversky were initially rejected by orthodox financial 
economics because they were deemed anomalies, in other words, exceptions that 
confirmed the rule. Intelligent investors arbitraging abnormal prices would eventually force 
uninformed investors out of the market and drive prices back to their fundamental values.  
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However, even assuming that most market participants are rational and have full 
information, the presence of noise traders - investors only having access to irrelevant 
information and acting as if it were relevant - could disrupt the price signal mechanisms 
provided by markets. De Long et al. (1990) reassessed the arguments advanced by 
EFMT proponents by suggesting that rational participants are reluctant to trade against 
noise traders because noise itself creates additional risk. Noise traders create “their own 
space and they can earn higher expected return from their own destabilizing influence, 
not because they perform the useful social function of bearing fundamental risks” (De 
Long et al., 1990: 706).  
Figure 3 below represents the intellectual edifice necessary to argue that financial 
markets provide investors with accurate signals. As noted above, this edifice has been 
questioned by the behavioral finance and the noise trader literature. Additionally, post-
Keynesian perspectives have consistently been critical of the neo-classical assumptions 
on which EFMT rests. Moreover, an important body of literature has repeatedly criticized 
the statistical and mathematical models used to describe and construct financial markets 
(Mandelbrot and Hudson, 2004, Walter and de Pracontal, 2009). 
 
Figure 3. The edifice of the Efficient Market Theory Hypothesis 
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We are thus forced to conclude that it is far from certain that financial markets outperform 
traditional banks in allocating capital. Since Keynes, Minsky and the birth of behavioral 
finance, financial markets have grown in size and complexity, and if anything, it is even 
more difficult to know what currently determines stock price formation. Keynes likened the 
stock market to a beauty contest. Fund managers attempt to conform to some benchmark 
established by the industry and tend to consider the same type of information (Mosley, 
2000), therefore demonstrating that it is better to be wrong with everyone else than to be 
right alone. In other words, financial markets could perform well at reflecting the average 
opinion, but the process leading to price formation does not appear to be adapted to 
capital allocation. It is the result of numerous interactions among various players, and it is 
difficult to determine what role remains for fundamental economic parameters.  
The four types of actors that Aglietta (2008) lists - market makers, financial market actors, 
noise traders, and institutional investors - do not appear to account for economic 
fundamentals. Market makers are fundamentalists but must integrate the effects of other 
actors on price movements. The second group of actors buys and sells on financial 
markets for liquidity reasons and is thus not interested in market fundamentals. The third 
group, the so-called noise traders, buys and sells based on baseless information. The 
actions of this group tend to reinforce the current trend, which they employed to make 
their investment decisions. The last group contains institutional investors managing large 
pension funds. Their concern is risk diversification because they need to be certain that 
the value of their portfolio does not fall below a certain minimum (Aglietta, 2008).  
Moreover, these actors are immersed in a constant flow of financial information that is not 
necessarily conducive to capital allocation efficiency (Shiller, 2000, Akerlof and Shiller, 
2009). Mainstream financial economists have also dismissed feedback theories, which 
account for the fact that past price increases can generate expectations of further 
increases, though evidence of such phenomena dates to the tulip mania. They also 
recognize the role that the financial news industry plays in allowing for irrational 
exuberance. Financial media stories no longer explain the facts; they became the 
fundamentals (Shiller, 2000). “Buy on the rumors, sell on the news” is a trader’s proverb 
and describes a strategy of exploiting an observed phenomenon: Security price 
movements around the date of an anticipated event (Peterson, 2002). Thus, 
overconfidence, herd behavior and epidemics have entered the descriptive vocabulary of 
financial market movements (Shiller, 2000). Moreover, there is evidence that behavioral 
biases exist across cultures, contexts and even species (Chen et al., 2006). Although the 
focus is on the individual and how decision-making processes are constrained by 
numerous biases, the behavioral economics literature seems to echo the old argument, 
defended most famously by Le Bon (1896), that collective behavior tends to be extreme. 
According to this literature, the judgment of crowds is always intellectually inferior to the 
judgment of the individual. Interestingly, Surowiecki (2004) attempted to provide a counter 
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argument but conceded nonetheless that there are essential conditions that are 
necessary for crowds “to work”: Independence and diversity.  
Moreover, increasing the flow of information is not necessarily conducive to improved 
decision making. Numerous studies have demonstrated how additional information 
weakens the decision making process (Andreassen, 1987, Redelmeier and Shafir, 1995, 
Bernartzi and Thaler, 1998). Studying investment research, Treynor (1987) concluded, 
“the more persuasive a published opinion is, the more damage it does for market 
efficiency” (Treynor, 1987:51). Demonstrating how public information is overemphasized, 
Allen et al. (2003) reached a similar conclusion. Prices are driven away from their 
fundamentals because market participants attempt to predict others’ forecasts (Keynes’ 
beauty contest) and thus favor public information over private information. An excessive 
reliance on public information causes overreactions in asset prices. Rational choice 
theory does not account for the multiple biases that influence decision making. However, 
their very existence indicates a “paradox of choice” (Schwartz, 2004), which could imply 
that there is a limit to the number of choices individuals are able to make. The few studies 
cited above demonstrated that this paradox might well apply to information. That some 
information is good does not imply that more information is better.  
It is not only necessary to consider the sheer flow of information but also its complexity. 
Complexity contributes to the development of extreme events in the financial system 
(Landeau, 2008, Landeau, 2009). Financial innovation can lead to a loss of information 
(Gorton, 2008). Complex financial innovation can exacerbate asymmetric information 
problems, which explains why even sophisticated players evaluate these instruments 
quite differently. The variance in the valuation of complex derivatives can easily reach 17 
percent (Bernardo and Cornell, 1997). The concept of computational complexity used to 
define the practical limits of computers can or cannot do also helps to demonstrate that 
complexity per se entails costs. “It suggests that derivative contracts could contain 
information that is in plain view yet cannot be understood with any foreseeable amount of 
computational effort” (Arora et al., 2010:50). 
From that perspective, it appears that financial markets are not systems designed in a 
manner that is well suited to the efficient allocation of capital. Given the pricing systems 
and complex mathematical foundations of a financial market, it might be more appropriate 
for risk allocation. If an institutional distinction between bank- and market-based financial 
systems is obsolete, this is also because the logic of market-based finance became 
dominant. Financial institutions such as funds (mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds) 
brokerage desks and trading desks, and risk management departments have become 
more important. These financial market participants have certain investment strategies 
that relate differently to time and place. Neither the time horizon nor the geographical 
ranges of investment opportunities of high-frequency trading are identical to those of a 
pension fund. The following two sections focus on these two elements - time and space - 
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and will demonstrate how recent developments in finance favor short-term over long-term 
considerations and are concomitant with international diversification. These 
developments, at both the temporal and geographical levels, reveal the greater 
importance of risk allocation relative to capital allocation.  
1.3.2. Conflicting functions at the temporal level: Short-term versus long-
term  
This section first explicates how the notion of risk used in financial economics eliminates 
long-term horizons and restates how this particular notion of risk (rather than the notion of 
uncertainty) is central to financial markets. Then, it reveals how the short-term behavior of 
financial market actors affects long-term investment. Finally, it considers how this 
behavior came to dominate firm management and how this is contrary to long-term 
growth.  
Knight was the first to depart from classical economics by distinguishing between risk, 
which can be measured, and uncertainty: “The practical difference between the two 
categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in the former the distribution of the outcome in a 
group of instances is known (either through calculation a priori or from the statistics of 
past experience), while in the case of uncertainty, this is not true, the reason being in 
general that it is impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with 
is in a high degree unique” (Knight, 1921:233). 
This view of uncertainty expresses the inability to link an uncertain future event to 
historical information. Risk can be measured because a class of past events is sufficiently 
homogeneous to be probabilistically attached to a future one; it is thus a question of the 
“degree of assimability of classes securable or, stated inversely, the degree of 
uniqueness of various kinds of business contingencies” (Knight, 1921:247). However, 
even distinguished from the notion of risk, to which probability can be associated, 
Knight’s notion of uncertainty in not the Keynesian one.  
Figure 4 below, taken from Davidson (2002:54), depicts how economic reality is 
perceived by the different theories. The colored arrows on the right were added to 
demonstrate how these theories relate to the notion of time. In an ergodic world, in which 
uncertainty is quantifiable and institutions need not be included in economic theory, only 
the short run is predetermined. The path of economic development is known, and human 
actions and the social devices that they design do not interfere with it. In the second type 
of economic reality, law and rules serve to facilitate coordination or reduce asymmetric 
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information, for example. Only the third type of economic reality includes a long-term 
horizon and thereby accepts true uncertainty in the Keynesian sense of the term.  
  
Figure 4. Conceptualizations of external economic reality (time horizon added by the author) 
The goal here is not to write a philosophical treatise on uncertainty, but to show how 
neoclassical economic assumptions, on which financial economics rests, have eliminated 
the long-term perspective. Neoclassical economics assumes that economic phenomenon 
happen in an ergodic world. It assumes that the process generating change is the same 
over time and since it is impossible to draw samples from the future, one can use 
averages from past observations. It cannot be very different from future outcomes. 
However, these predictions can be accurate only on a very short time horizon. Financial 
economics emerged as a discipline with these neoclassical hypotheses. As mentioned 
earlier, the development of financial economics is intimately related to the law of normal 
distribution. Price changes are independent from each other, but the process generating 
these changes does not evolve and follow the proportion of the bell curve. In other words, 
prices might be erratic and follow a Brownian motion or a random walk, but financial 
economic still assume that, in the short run, it is possible to know where particles are 
likely to move. Ironically, these assumptions became less realistic as financial markets 
developed and volatility increased. Now that instability is the necessary condition on 
which the business models the most powerful players of the financial industry rest, it 
became increasingly clear that the ergodic assumptions that laid the intellectual 
foundation of financial economics, even if practically useful, are hiding the wild 
movements of the markets. In any case, the consequences of the “Brownian philosophy” 
Source: (Davidson, 2002:54)
Short run
Concept of external economic reality
                                                                 Concept  Example of theories using this postulate
A. Immutable reality                  (an ergodic system) 1. Classical perfect certainty models  
                      Type 1 in the short run, the future is  2. Actuarial certainty equivalents, e.g., 
                predetermined and known to the people rational expectations models 
                                                            in the model 3. New Classical models
                                                                                4. Some New Keynesian 
                        Type 2 in the short run, the future is 1. Savage’s expected utility theory
                       predetermined but is not completely 2. Some Austrian theories
                  know to all people in the model due to  3. Some New Keynesian models, e.g., 
                     some limitation in the cost of human  asymmetric information and coordination
                   information processing and computing failure theories
                                                                      power 4. Chaos, sunspot and bubble theories
B. Transmutable or creative reality                           1. Keynes’s General Theory 
                (a nonergodic system) Some aspects of 2. Post Keynesian monetary theory
       the economic future will be created by human 3. Post-1974 writings of Sir John Hicks
                             action today and/or in the future 4. G.L.S. Shackle’s crucial experiments analysis
                                                                                5. Old Institutionalist theories
Table 3.1. from Davidson 2002, p. 54
Long run
 30 
applied to financial markets is that, in the short run, uncertainty is nothing more than 
calculable risk. 
For Keynes, conversely, money was a convention, a “store of value” that was necessary 
because the future is uncertain. It was “a subtle device for linking the present to the 
future” (Skidelsky, 2009:78). The neoclassical perspective did not incorporate Knight’s 
distinction between risk and uncertainty, with the consequence that any uncertain event 
becomes a calculable risk. It is necessary to regard economic reality from this 
perspective to construct an option pricing model. 
However, financial markets are also characterized by a short-term notion of time due to 
the various market participants and their strategies. Keynes’ beauty contest insight also 
concerns how various market participants relate to time: “Investment based on genuine 
long-term expectation is so difficult...as to be scarcely practicable. He who attempts it 
must surely...run greater risks than he who tries to guess better than the crowd how the 
crowd will behave” (Keynes, 1935:157). A number of studies captured this tension 
between short- and long-term investments. It is of crucial importance to assess how 
costly it is for rational participants to hold their positions, as theoretical arguments 
supporting the efficiency of financial markets are based on the stabilizing power of 
rational actors. 
As noted above, an environment including noise and positive feedback traders may be 
biased against long-term trading horizons (Shleifer and Vishny, 1990, De Long et al., 
1990). By the same token, Froot et al. (1992) demonstrate that short-term speculators 
often tend to trade on very poor data or information bearing no relationship with 
fundamentals. Moreover, these traders tend to exclusively focus on a single source of 
information, echoing Mosley’s (2000) observations. This negatively affects information 
quality and leads to less-informed allocational decisions. In a similar vein, Hirota and 
Sunder (2006), using a laboratory experiment, found that investors’ time horizons affect 
the formation of stock prices. Long-term investors use backward induction, and prices 
tend to converge to their fundamental levels. Short-term investors, however, when leaving 
the market, consider the prices of securities and do not consider future dividends. Prices 
are then no longer anchored to dividends. Thus, in markets with a majority of short-term 
traders, the impact and frequency of the failure of backward induction are greater, and 
this increases the likelihood that prices will deviate from their fundamentals, which fuels 
bubbles. The findings of Hirota and Sunder suggest that the time horizon of investment is 
important for asset pricing (which is ignored by standard theories) and long-term 
investors are crucial for the stabilization of market prices. 
High-frequency trading (HFT), the fairness and social benefits of which are in question, is 
at the center of an ongoing regulatory debate. However, HFT is the most vivid example 
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illustrating the functional tension between risk and capital allocation in the present 
financial system. “HFT is a type of investment strategy whereby stocks are rapidly bought 
and sold by a computer algorithm and held for a very short period, usually seconds or 
milliseconds” (Brogaard, 2010:1). Algorithmic trading (AT), occasionally confused with 
HFT, refers to an automatic trading process using computers. According to Brogaard’s 
estimates, HFT is involved in 77 percent of the dollar-volume traded in U.S. equities. By 
the same token, observers claim that buy-and-hold strategies, or long-term investments 
based on economic fundamentals, are dead (Kim, 2009, Cox, 2010). The literature on the 
impact of this technological change on financial market quality finds that HFT positively 
affects market quality measures such as short-term volatility, spread and the depth of the 
limit order book (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2011) or contributes to price discovery and 
provides better bid and offer quotes (Brogaard, 2010). By the same token, AT improves 
liquidity and information availability (Hendershott and Riordan, 2009, Hendershott et al., 
2011). 
These studies find that high-speed investment strategies improve market quality; 
however, this is only defined in terms of liquidity. The gap between risk allocation and 
capital allocation is flagrant in this respect. Can an approach still be considered an 
“investment” strategy when securities are held for less than a second? While the studies 
above show that HFT and AT do not reduce market quality defined in terms of liquidity, 
the link between these parameters and the efficiency of capital allocation is not 
theoretically, let alone empirically, proven. The benefit of an investment strategy involved 
in half of the dollar-volume traded in U.S. equities could certainly support the price 
discovery process, but this does not imply that it allocates capital efficiently. Furthermore, 
the abovementioned authors seem to imply that, provided that the market generates 
accurate prices, the remaining market participants will use the information to direct their 
investments accordingly, while behavioral finance findings mitigate this assumption. 
The negative spillovers of short-term investment strategies also must be considered. The 
focus on quarterly “numbers” led to breakdowns in accounting standards and corrupted 
financial analysts (Berenson, 2003). Crotty (2005) argued that the change in corporate 
behavior is part of a neoliberal paradox: Non-financial corporations have become 
constrained by a shift from patient finance oriented toward long-term growth to short-term 
finance conditioned by financial markets. It shortened their horizons and changed 
managerial incentives. This shift forced managers to devote an increasing share of their 
cash flows to financial agents. Thus, the short-term behavior of market participants 
compelled the real economy to adopt their behavior. However, their notion of time does 
not fit economic reality. The stock market in particular obliges a firm to be immediately 
profitable and the “tyranny of the quarterly report”, in Michel Albert’s words, might force 
companies to reduce expenses conducive to long-term growth. Fears of IPOs have 
induced firms to adopt defensive strategies and hire armies of lawyers. Such behavior 
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and strategies make little sense from an economic and industrial perspective (Albert, 
1991). However, if the time horizon has contracted, there are compelling arguments for 
the inverse movement at the geographical level. Finance has become quicker and more 
international. 
1.3.3. Conflicting functions at the geographical level: international risk 
 diversification versus domestic investment  
This section illustrates the increased importance of risk allocation relative to capital 
allocation at the international level. In other words, the rise of global finance and 
international financial integration has favored risk allocation to a greater extent than 
capital allocation. That finance is global is tied to international risk sharing. The end of the 
Bretton Woods system is intimately connected to risk management. The Mundell-Fleming 
model demonstrated that it is impossible for the free movement of capital, fixed exchange 
rates and independent monetary policy to coexist. Thus, the pegged-rate regime had to 
be sacrificed if capital were to move freely. The free movement of capital entails a 
preoccupation with exchange rate risks, which has to be added to the other types of risks 
(interest rate risks, market risks and idiosyncratic risks). Thus, it is logical that financial 
liberalization coincides with floating exchange rates, which demand risks management 
services. Financial liberalization primarily concerns the privatization of risk management 
that, until the early 1970s, was embedded in the pegged exchange rate regime. Capital 
allocation efficiency is rarely mentioned in debates on financial globalization, the primary 
arguments of which concern risk sharing.  
If theories of risk diversification are valid for the development of national financial 
markets, risk diversification should also be promoted internationally. Markowitz 
demonstrated that diversification reduced risks. However, adding securities to a portfolio 
only decreases risk to a certain extent. The remaining threshold represents the market 
risks, and one way to reduce these risks is to trade on the international market. Grubel 
(1968) long ago noted that incorporating foreign securities would reduce the risk of an 
investment portfolio. Despite the potential gain from international diversification, investors 
tend to retain surprisingly large volumes of domestic shares in their portfolios. This home 
bias was first documented by French and Poterba (1991). However, Coeurdacier and 
Guibaud (2011) recently noted that when investors hedge their positions, they do so 
correctly by diversifying their foreign equity holdings toward countries exhibiting low 
correlations with their own. Sorensen et al. (2007) demonstrated that home bias and risk 
sharing are inversely related. When home bias decreases, risk sharing increases. They 
more generally demonstrated that financial integration, if measured by the ratio of foreign 
assets to GDP, is closely related to risk sharing. Deregulation, capital account 
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liberalization and advances in communication technologies have supported financial 
integration. In addition to these factors, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) include financial 
innovation, which has also been an important driver in recent years. However, as we 
noted above, financial innovations are related to risk allocation or regulatory arbitrage. 
Among the structural changes driving international capital flows to emerging markets 
analyzed by an IMF report (IMF, 1997), nearly all are related to risk diversification and 
risk management. The growing importance of institutional investors led to their 
participation in emerging markets for diversification purposes. Second, institutional 
investors’ desire to hedge exposure is linked to securitization, which involves an 
increased use of direct debt and equity markets. Third, the development of financial 
economics and risk pricing methods meant that risk could be traded and managed more 
precisely, and finally, the revolution in information technologies has facilitated more sound 
analyses of credit and market risks. This IMF reports suggests that the cause of capital 
flow in emerging countries is not capital investment, but risk management. Berger et al. 
(2011) noted, for example, that frontier markets offer excellent international diversification 
opportunities because these markets are not correlated with developed and emerging 
ones. Dicle et al. (2010) conducted a similar study on India and concluded, by contrast, 
that India was well integrated with international equity markets, thereby reducing the 
potential benefits of diversification.  
From a neoclassical perspective, financial liberalization has primarily been supported by 
the potential for risk diversification. Stock market liberalization is supposed to spur 
economic growth because enhanced risk sharing reduces the cost of equity capital 
(Henry, 2000, Bekaert et al., 2005). If the most important function of capital markets at 
the domestic level is pooling savings to be efficiently allocated elsewhere, at the 
international level, the function of capital markets is to pool risks assured by a diversity of 
financial instruments (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004:6). The primary function of world capital 
market is international risk diversification: “A basic function of a world capital market is to 
allow countries with imperfectly correlated income risks to trade them thereby reducing 
the global cross-sectional variability in per capita consumption levels” (Obstfeld and 
Taylor, 2004:6). Equity market liberalization is thus intended to increase growth via 
international risk sharing, which smoothes consumption growth (Bekaert et al., 2006). 
This was the Washington consensus argument for financial liberalization, and while this 
view has been criticized and empirical evidence indicates that financial liberalization has 
not been beneficial in all contexts, the emphasis on risk sharing is telling. In a study 
questioning the benefits of full financial integration, Stiglitz (2010) demonstrated that it 
might not be desirable because risk diversification does not deliver its intended benefits in 
a world rife with externalities and different institutional, informational and R&D structures. 
These studies indicate that risk allocation and international financial integration are 
intimately associated and risk lies at the center of the academic debate over international 
financial integration. To the best of our knowledge, no empirical study investigates the 
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motivations of global portfolio managers. Do most of them primarily invest abroad for risk 
diversification purposes? Most institutional investors have a part of their assets under 
management hedged internally and the primary purpose of this strategy is risk 
diversification. Whether risk diversification is generally more important for these actors 
than capital allocation remains difficult to determine, but one can note that the risk 
diversification function has been institutionalized.  
One can cite empirical studies on the geography of investments as indirect evidence that 
international finance is more concerned with risk diversification and other factors than 
with performance. In a seminal paper, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) explored the 
relationship between geography and investment and found that mutual fund managers 
were earning higher returns in geographically proximate investments. They established a 
positive relationship between local investment and performance, thereby suggesting that 
distance and information are related. The relationship between space and information 
(and therefore performance) that they established had been outside the framework of 
financial economics. It subsequently gave rise to numerous other papers. However, the 
evidence is mixed, and the topic is widely debated. Dvorak (2005) differentiated between 
domestic and foreign investors and between local and global brokerages. He found that a 
combination of local knowledge and global expertise is the most beneficial. That is, 
domestic investors that are clients of global brokerage houses enjoy higher profits than 
foreign investors who are clients of global brokerages. Bae et al. (2008) examined the 
precision of the earnings forecasts of analysts in 32 countries and found that local ones 
performed better than foreign ones. Teo (2009) established a significant relationship 
between geographically proximate investments and abnormal returns for hedge funds. 
Moreover, linguistic distance has a similar effect, which lends further credence to the 
argument that hedge funds profit from being near their investments. 
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Figure 5. Development of market shares by domicile of HF management 
Interestingly, Teo notes that the majority of hedge funds are concentrated in the U.S, as 
the graph from Meier and Anhorn (2010) demonstrates (see figure 5 above).  
There is a clear geographical asymmetry. While the majority of capital is managed in the 
U.S., hedge funds invest globally. Why are more hedge funds not located near their 
investments? Teo (2009) found that distant hedge funds charge higher fees and establish 
longer redemption periods than hedge funds nearer to their investments. They also have 
better access to capital. “Distant funds, by being close to their investor base in developed 
markets (large institutions, pension funds, and endowment), trade investment 
performance for better access to capital” (Teo, 2009: 3535). This phenomenon does not 
prove that risk allocation is the primary concern of distant hedge funds but instead 
indicates that capital allocation is the least of their concerns. If the efficient allocation of 
capital were the primary function of these institutions, as financial economics maintains, 
more hedge funds would be located near their investments, instead of near their 
investors.  
1.3.4. The contradiction in the banking industry: Transactions versus 
 relations 
This section analyzes the increase in use of financial instruments based on transactions 
rather than relationships. This transition corresponds to a hardening of information. 
Source: (Meier and Anhorn, 2010:7) Meier’s and Anhorn’s own calculation based on Eurohedge database
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II.  Universe of SHF in Switzerland 
1. Swiss Single Hedge Funds in a global context  
 
Fig. 1: Global hedge funds 
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Industry size  
According to International Financial Services London (IFSL), in 2009 assets under 
management of the global hedge fund industry increased by 13% to USD 1,700 
billion, following a 30% decline in the previous year. The pace of redemptions slowed 
down compared to 2008. The 19% return in 2009 represented the best performance 
over the last decade, thus compensating the USD 85 billion in net outflows. The 
number of hedge funds totalled 9,400 at the end of 2009, representing a reduction of 
more than 1,000 from the peak reached two years ago. Three quarters of the total 
number of funds were single manager hedge funds. 
 
Location of hedge fund management….. 
Hedge funds are predominantly managed from onshore locations. The USA is by far 
the leading location for management of hedge fund assets. However, as illustrated 
by Fig. 2, its market share has decreased by 7% over the past four years.  
 
Fig. 2: Development of market shares for domiciles of HF management 
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However, one should not ignore the persistent role of rumors - a type of soft information - 
in financial markets. Hard information can be reduced to a series of numbers, while soft 
information “cannot be directly verified by anyone other than by the agent who produces 
the information” (Stein, 2002:1892). Thus it is important to recall that while a distinction is 
made here between hard and soft information, modern financial markets might have 
blurred it. However, we return to this concern and the phenomenon of rumors below. 
Suffice it to say for the present that financial markets, which officially rely on hard 
information, allow the pricing of a variety of financial products, especially complex risk 
management instruments. Financial markets’ official, hard information is used to design 
other financial instruments or can be computed and then used as input in algorithmic and 
high-frequency trading. The functional shift toward risk allocation also corresponds to the 
increase in transaction volume, which is also fueled by consistent declines in transaction 
costs. Day trading and high frequency trading are in part possible because transaction 
costs have been dramatically reduced. This change can be perceived from a bank 
income perspective. The income structure of banks in the U.S. has changed, with non-
interest income now accounting for 47 percent of total industry operating income. For 
every $1 of interest income, the banking industry generates just under $1 of non-interest 
income. The share of non-interest income has doubled over the past two decades 
(DeYoung and Rice, 2004:35-38). This structural change had a more substantial impact 
on large banks than on small ones. Non-interest income is a phenomenon of large banks, 
accounting for 50 percent of total operating income, while for the average bank, it only 
represents one-fifth. Size also affects the composition of non-interest income itself. Large 
banks derive a disproportionate volume of fees from securitizing, mortgage servicing and 
credit card loans, while the average bank generate fees from deposit funding (the 
checking accounts of households and SMEs) (DeYoung and Rice, 2004:41).  
The financial innovation that triggered an explosion of credit derivatives has numerous 
advantages. From the perspective of orthodox financial economics, securitization creates 
a secondary market for loans that provides increased liquidity. It enhances risk 
management by unbundling credit risks, thereby allowing them to be more efficiently 
distributed. However, securitization and secondary loan markets allow banks to unbundle 
risks, thus separating balance sheet management from borrower relationship 
management. This fostered a shift from relationship lending toward transaction lending, 
echoing the functional shift from capital allocation to risk allocation. Credit derivatives are 
potentially beneficial because they allow for a separation between loan funding and 
origination and the allocation of the credit risk attached to the loan. While the effects of 
credit derivatives remain ambiguous at the bank level (Gibson and Murawski, 2008) and 
are a concern with respect to systemic risk (Kiff et al., 2009), secondary loan markets and 
risk unbundling also imply that a loan’s originator does not engage in monitoring. The 
originating bank no longer assesses the creditworthiness of the borrower, despite 
generally being best positioned to do so. This creates a moral hazard problem because 
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risk-monitoring incentives are reduced (Kiff and Morrow, 2000, Rule, 2001). Monitoring 
can be left to the market, but this implies that the price signal function of markets 
accurately reflects the fundamental credit risk, which as we have observed, is far from 
clear. Moral hazard could be reduced if the bank had an incentive to develop long-term 
business relationships with borrowers, and rating borrowers could attenuate asymmetric 
information. That is why the top beneficiaries of transition from relationship banking are 
large banks (Effenberger, 2003). However, SMEs are unlikely to be rated, and developing 
lasting relationships with SME is a characteristic of specialized banks. The type of effects 
that the increased use of credit derivatives will have on SME lending thus remains 
unknown (Effenberger, 2003).  
There is an extensive literature on the importance of SME in job creation, innovation and 
entrepreneurship, and SMEs have traditionally been financed by banks because their 
opaqueness prevents them from raising capital on public markets. Against this 
background, it becomes essential to place the financial innovation occurring in recent 
decades within the context of SME financing. Has this move toward transactions altered 
relationship lending? Let us define relationship lending, in keeping with Boot (2000) as 
the provision of financial services by a financial intermediary that: “invest[s] in obtaining 
customer-specific information often proprietary in nature and that evaluates the 
profitability of these investments through multiple interactions with the same customer 
over time and/or across products” (Boot, 2000:10). Improved access to information 
seems a crucial aspect of relationship lending (Elsas, 2005). There is a substantial 
literature demonstrating the uniqueness of bank loans, beginning with James (1987), who 
underlined in 1987 that bank loans helped to resolve adverse selection problems for 
companies undervalued by public markets. Moreover, commitment-based finance is 
highly useful in periods of uncertainty (James and Smith, 2000). The contractual features 
of relationship lending, which allow for flexibility and discretion, including collateral 
requirements and the use of covenants, facilitate implicit long-term contracting (Boot, 
2000). Additionally, repeated interactions have the potential to reduce loan spread by 10-
17 basis points (Bharath et al., 2011). These benefits of relationship lending are 
controversial, however, because there is also evidence of a lock-in effect due to the 
informational advantages of banks once the relationship is established. Relationship 
banking could provide banks with incentives to extract rents in the form of higher interest 
rates (Schenone, 2010).  
If relationship lending is indeed special, it is important to determine whether the financial 
revolution of recent decades affects it and, if so, how. Petersen and Rajan highlight a 
trade-off echoing that this chapter attempts to address: Long-term relationships and 
competition in credit markets might conflict (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). By the same 
token, Beck et al. (2008) demonstrated that financial development, when proxied by 
private credit from financial institutions to the economy, has disproportionately beneficial 
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effects on SMEs. However, they find that stock market development does not affect 
SMEs, confirming the importance of banks for SMEs (Beck et al., 2008).  
The characteristic distinguishing relationship- from transaction-based lending is not that 
the first only may apply to opaque borrowers but that it uses soft information, whereas all 
other transaction-based technologies use hard information. We briefly explain the 
difference between these types of information and demonstrate that the trade-off between 
risk and capital allocation can take the form of hard versus soft information.  
As mentioned above, hard information can be reduced to a series of numbers, while soft 
information “cannot be directly verified by anyone other than by the agent who produces 
the information” (Stein, 2002:1892). Because of organizational diseconomies, large banks 
are better positioned to exploit hard information, whereas small ones are advantaged in 
the treatment of soft information. Against the background of financial innovation, it is 
unsurprising that financial innovation, which was accompanied by this hardening of 
information, has benefited large firms.  
This hardening of soft information increased large banks’ ability to process data and 
eventually led to greater bank productivity. This process is the cause of the increase in 
the distance between small firms and their lenders in the U.S., according to Petersen and 
Rajan (2000). Consequently, distance is less an indicator of creditworthiness than it was 
previously, meaning that small firms located at a substantial distance from lenders now 
enjoy wider access to credit. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010), conversely, demonstrated 
that distance still matters. Borrower-lender proximity is conducive to soft information 
gathering, which results in a trade-off between the availability of credit and its price. They 
found that nearby firms might enjoy easier access to credit, however at a higher interest 
rate, everything else being equal. In a recent study, they also noted the use and role of 
soft information during the loan origination process, which led to reduced credit loss.  
Therefore, on the one hand, the hardening of soft information (which is concomitant with 
the functional shift from capital allocation to risk allocation) provides for increased credit 
availability for SMEs by reducing the distance between borrowers and lenders or making 
new lending technologies adapted to opaque firms available. On the other hand, it seems 
that the special character of soft information affects the cost of credit. The hardening of 
information in the borrower-lender relationship forces one to ask whether availability is 
more important than affordability. Moreover, the replacement of soft by hard information 
has limitations, as it implies a loss of information and information can never be reduced to 
numbers alone. As behavioral finance shows, financial markets are also driven by human 
psychology, biases, and stories, and accounting practices can be adapted to meet the 
quarterly requirements of markets (Berenson, 2003). In weak legal and judicial 
environments, relationship lending, which primarily relies on soft information, is the most 
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appropriate lending technology (Rajan and Zingales, 2003, Ergungor, 2004, Berger and 
Udell, 2006). 
Goetzmann et al. (2004), in a study of intellectual property pricing in the market for 
screenplays, identified a dynamic that is also central to financial markets. The quality of 
scripts is too complex to be summarized by objective information alone. However, their 
empirical study demonstrates that screenplays with a substantial soft information 
component are underpriced relative to harder information screenplays proxied by, for 
example, reputation. Soft information is regarded as a risk factor. Thus, for risk 
management purposes, capital is allocated to films with authors that are more famous 
rather than ones that might be of higher quality but are written by less-known writers.  
However, it would be misleading to argue that financial markets rely on hard information 
alone. Studies on the impact of rumors on financial markets are not new (Pound and 
Zeckhauser, 1990, DiFonzo and Bordia, 1997). In a more recent analysis, Oberlechner 
and Hocking (2004) presented empirical findings regarding the type of information used 
by market participants. Their survey reveals the circular character of information. Of the 
journalists surveyed, 87 percent believe that market participants can influence news 
providers, 75 percent agreed that media and participants are more interdependent than 
before, 67 percent believe that instant reporting has gained in importance at the expense 
of in-depth analysis, and 59 percent mentioned an increased in reporting unverified news 
resulting from advances in new technologies. “Foreign exchange traders and financial 
wire journalists mutually rate each other as the most important information source. The 
most important information sources of wire journalists, their personal contacts at 
commercial banks, are also the main customers of the financial wire services. 
Consequently, information of the news services often consists of trading participants’ 
perceptions and interpretations of the market, which are fed back to the traders in the 
market” (Oberlechner and Hocking, 2004:417). This new relationship between the 
financial news media and market participants explains, according to Oberlechner and 
Hocking, the role played by rumors. Recent developments in financial markets have 
blurred the distinctions between news and rumors and between market reality and market 
potential. Market participants have to consider rumors to be valid information because the 
rest of the market will also move in response to them. The rumors then become the 
underlying information. In light of such empirical investigations one must question the 
clear-cut distinction made between hard and soft information. Is hard information based 
on rumors still hard information?  
 40 
Conclusion  
This first chapter attempted to demonstrate the existence of a trade-off between the 
allocation of risk and the allocation of capital. At an institutional level, the price formation 
mechanism aggregating decentralized opinions that makes financial markets efficient at 
pricing risks might not lead to efficient capital allocations. The intellectual edifice upon 
which this price discovery mechanism relies is deeply and fundamentally flawed, its 
neoclassical foundations are unrealistic, the models it employs rely upon Brownian 
motion and a Gaussian distribution, which has repeatedly proven ill-suited to the wild 
movements of financial markets. Moreover, behavioral finance reveals how human 
behavior complicates the simple reality upon which financial economics is based.  
At the risk of oversimplifying, one can argue that the logic of risk allocation requires 
international diversification, whereas capital allocation rests on domestic and local 
knowledge. Finally, the financial revolution is associated with the rise of financial 
instruments based on transactional rather than relationship lending. This is facilitated by a 
hardening of information that also allows the transfer of borrower risk away from the 
lender. This advantages large banks over small ones. The consequences for SME 
finance remain unclear, as it stands between what appears to be two financial 
subsystems, a dominant one built on the logic of financial markets, the function of which 
has become the efficient allocation of risks, and another, much smaller, one performing 
the traditional role of allocating capital from savers to borrowers.  
The concept of risk has replaced the concept of capital at the center of financial systems. 
This chapter argued that modern financial markets can be now characterized as made 
essentially of short-term transactions through financial markets at the international level. 
Financial markets composed of these won’t allocate capital in the same way as financial 
markets made of long-term relationships between banks and firms at the national level. 
International short-term financial market transactions might be very efficient to allocate 
risks, but fail to provide the right kind of intermediation for investments. The beauty 
contest nature of the functioning of financial markets is amplified by the fact that it is 
happening on a global scale on a short-term time horizon. These are the essential 
elements of modern finance, which allow overinvestment in certain sector. For instance, 
the IT industry at the turn of the millennia and the U.S. real estate sector until 2008. 
However, financial systems which rest on these elements will favor different interest 
groups.  As we will see, this paradigm shift toward risk allocation implies more than a 
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simple and neutral “financial market liberalization”. Indeed, the business of spreading 
risks can be viewed as a value chain, and the next chapter argues that liquidity and 
information can be considered as the primary input used to supply other actors and 
clients with sophisticated financial instruments. In this new “liberated” market for risk 
allocation, liquidity and information are used by some players for their own benefit to 
allocate risk, but also to create it. The last chapter differentiates between the allocation of 
capital and the allocation of risk and the next one shows the redistributive consequences 
of it. But one should also note that the process of allocating risk is so profitable for some 
players that risk creation is part of their business model. Indeed, some “investments” 
strategy based on High Frequency Trading and financial instruments such as structured 
product and Credit Default Swaps are very profitable instruments to manufacture and 
distribute, but they also add on systemic risks, which economies and societies at large 
have to bear. Thus, focusing on risk allocation should not hide the fact that some actors 
have incentives to create risk, because their “raison d’être” rest on financial market 
instability. The next chapter will precisely attempt to show how this new market for risk 
allocation and risk creation benefit certain actors and disadvantage others. It shows the 
political economic side of the evolution of financial sector just described. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The political economy of a silent revolution 
Chapter one described a fundamental shift within financial sectors in several respects 
(institutional, temporal, geographical, relational). It argued that risk allocation grew in 
importance relative to capital allocation. This issue has consequences beyond financial 
stability and systemic risk. It reveals significant economic, political and social changes. A 
stringent re-regulation of financial sectors will only address the symptoms and not the 
causes. Ad-hoc regulations are patchy and occasionally contribute to uncertainty and 
systemic risk. Regulatory risks and the concerns they entail for financial firms are 
troubling signs of the paradoxical nature of complex regulation. To avoid these pitfalls and 
most importantly to prevent the debate on reforming finance from being circumscribed to 
regulation alone, one must adopt a political economic perspective. Only by addressing 
the issues mentioned in the previous chapter in such a manner will one be able to 
consider aspects beyond regulation. There is more to the story of the “silent revolution” 
that liberated financial sectors than a simple tale of financial liberalization. It is the story of 
a silent privatization also enabled by political and social liberalization that must be 
analyzed. Too few political economic analyses have attempted to connect the factors 
driving this silent revolution and even fewer identifying who this process benefited. As 
stated in the previous chapters, the literature has assumed that the development of 
financial sectors is beneficial to economic growth. The debate centered on which financial 
systems (banks versus markets) were performing better. Only recently have certain 
studies dared to argue that a financial sector could be detrimental if developed beyond a 
certain size (Arcand et al., 2012, Philippon, 2012). The literature on financialization 
(Epstein, 2005, Palley, 2007, Dore, 2008) describes the growing importance of finance, 
but fails to analyze its consequences from a political economy perspective. The literature 
on corporate governance continues to experience difficulties in considering these issues 
outside of the  “agency problem” framework and thus fails to recognize the links with the 
evolution of financial sectors over the past 30 years (Collison et al., 2014). This chapter 
attempts to fill these gaps.  
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There are notable exceptions that must be mentioned here: First, Kripper (2010) showed 
how the state attempted to resolve the social dilemma of economic stagnation, first 
through inflation and, when it became obvious that this approach would not work, through 
finance. She revealed how “the turn to finance offered policymakers a resolution of the 
dilemmas posed by declining affluence not because policy makers successfully 
transferred the task of imposing discipline to the market, but because the market failed to 
impose the discipline that policymakers sought” (Krippner, 2010:447). Undisciplined 
financial markets provided expanded credit, which allowed states to avoid, until now, the 
distributional problems posed by capital. Krippner shows how difficult political choices, 
which became more difficult to make in a low-growth environment, were avoided by 
artificially inflating the size of the pie. The turn to finance was not a “natural move” that 
any market economy reaches when sufficiently developed nor was it by design. It was 
simply an ad hoc response to inflation. In other words, governments believed that 
financial markets would perform better in distributing scarce financial resources. “The 
U.S. economy made the transition from a system in which credit flows were subject to 
strict controls internally and externally to one in which all such constraints had been 
removed” (Krippner, 2010:467). Krippner’s analysis demonstrated how the U.S. 
government eased the difficult task of distributing credit but fails to note that it created 
new possibilities of making money through money alone or who benefited from this new 
arrangement. This is the purpose of this chapter.  
The financial sector of Western economies, this new market for risk allocation, relies on 
myriad intermediaries who all participate in the creation of liquidity, thus making the entire 
system rather unstable. Some branches of the financial industry benefit from this 
instability and securities inflation, but their interests are also aligned with those of short-
term shareholders. This latter category is better defined in the coming paragraph, but for 
the present, by “shareholder”, it is meant the direct or indirect owners of financial capital 
(High Net Worth Individuals and Ultra High Net Worth Individuals (HNWI/UHNWI), 
corporations and financial institutions) and not the owner of a firm managing such capital 
or SME shareholders. The second contribution that inspired this chapter must be 
mentioned in this regard: Lysandrou (2011) shed some light on the demand side of 
securities creation that preceded the 2008 financial crisis. In their search for high yields, 
hedge funds pressured the rest of the fund industry and signaled to the banking industry 
the need to create securities as a store of value. He demonstrated that securities were 
created as stores of wealth for high net worth individuals. In other words, security creation 
and inflation are profitable for certain investors, namely the owners of financial capital 
expecting high yields. This category of individuals can protect their assets and exit their 
investments at will. This chapter attempts to extend this logic to the operations of the 
financial sector during what are considered “normal times” and not only focus on the 
years preceding the 2008 financial crisis, as Lysandrou (2011) did.  
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In other words, this chapter hopes to fill the gap between Krippner’s analysis of policy 
choices to turning toward finance and Lysandrou’s political economic explanation of the 
2008 crisis. This chapter attempts to reveal how these two perspectives are connected 
through the specific evolution of financial sectors and how the obsession with complexity 
and liquidity profits a minority of investors and certain branches of the financial industry. It 
proposes a political economy of modern financial sectors, which are characterized by 
liquidity, irrational behavior, and the prioritization of risk-allocation over capital allocation 
and short-term transactions over long-term relationships. As such, it reveals how what 
some have termed financial capitalism in the Western world favored certain groups at the 
expense of others. Finally, one must mention Algietta and Rébérioux (2004), who offered 
such an account of the excesses of modern capitalism but remained highly focused on 
the rise of the shareholder value and its effect on operations of corporations and the 
perceptions societies have of them. Alghietta and Rébérioux returned politics to 
understandings of the corporation; this chapter will attempt to return politics to 
understandings of the current operations of the financial system.  
The implication of such an analysis suggests that one must go beyond simple financial 
regulation because, as we will see, certain dynamics encouraging the contemporary 
finance-led economy are located outside the financial industry. The obvious conclusion is 
that politics must reinvest the field of finance and the institutional power available to the 
financial industry must be constrained by society.  
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As figure 6 above tries to illustrate, this chapter lays out a political economy of liquidity 
and information and shows the demand and supply side of this market for risk allocation 
that rests on liquidity and information. It argues that short-term liquidity and volatile 
markets profit to certain market participants first and foremost. On the supply side, one 
finds what we termed  “risk-allocators” (hedge funds, high frequency traders and some 
stock markets). While these actors have the means to address and profit from high 
volatility and liquidity, this is not true of other more “traditional” financial players (pension 
funds, retail investors, small banks). On the demand side, liquidity and market data allow 
High Net Worth Individual to enjoy sophisticated products with tailored risk and yield 
approach.  Also, liquidity and market data are necessary to align the interests of short-
term shareholders with those of top management. Moreover, it gives short-term 
shareholders the opportunity to exit at any moment. As a result, the enterprise is 
redefined, as the “downsize and distribute” model of management shows.  
While the modern financial system as a whole appears to be an unstable machine, it 
nonetheless produces high yields for rentiers and shareholders. An unstable and fragile 
financial system, with all of the consequences that this entails for the economy, are the 
corollary of the unrealistically high yields demanded by the owners of financial capital. 
Thus two categories of interests groups profit from the present financial system:  
•  The “risk allocators”, well equipped to profit from the unstable financial bubble 
economy. These are stock markets and alternative trading systems, brokers, hedge 
funds, and high frequency traders. It is those business depends on liquidity and 
information as raw material.  
•  CEOs and top executives, whose managerial decisions in favor of short-term 
shareholders are influenced by a normative discourse on shareholder values and 
generous compensation scheme. Owners of financial capital (High Net Worth 
Individuals and short-term shareholders), satisfied with the output of a financial 
system that inflates financial asset prices.  
The point here is not to provide an exhaustive list of the institutions with an interest in the 
present operations of modern financial markets. It is difficult, for example, to include all of 
the pension funds, investing on the behalf of many different types of rentiers, in one group 
or the other. But the central argument is that these two categories, however ill-defined, 
managed to privatize the, until recently, public goods that were liquidity and standardized 
information. They are realizing impressive earnings from these two salient features of 
modern markets. Liquidity and standardized information are the foundations of modern 
financial markets, without which they could not be short-term, transactional or 
international. This new environment benefits these two interests groups at the expense of 
others and society in general. Pension funds, buy and hold investors, retail investors, 
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traditional banks, and alternative banks such as cooperative and agricultural banks are 
not thriving in this environment. Traditional intermediaries - banks and stock markets – 
have also lost their historical importance. 
Liquidity benefits certain shareholders, who have been able to pressure firms to extract 
high yields and provide them with additional exit options, thereby reducing the risk of their 
investments. Liquidity allows the issuance of complex financial products that generate 
fees, but it is also necessary for hedge funds and high-frequency trading firms to thrive. 
Liquidity is logically associated with short-term horizons (long-term liquidity is an 
oxymoron), and modern liquid markets provide short-term liquidity. The possibility of 
quitting an investment at any time entails the possibility to exit an investment sooner 
rather than later. It thus follows that some actors favor short-term profitability at the 
expense of long-term investments. 
The availability of recurrent, standardized information is then a precondition for a liquid 
short-term market. How can investors have the possibility to exit if they cannot review 
their investments relative to others? The commoditization of securities demands 
harmonization among the various evaluation methods. This is what Orléan termed “a 
convention” (Orléan, 1989). Thus short-term liquidity and standardized information are the 
salient features of the modern financial sector that align the interests of the risk-
allocators, on the one hand, with those of rentiers, short-term shareholders and CEOs on 
the other. As observed below, the ideology of shareholder value, which places 
shareholders above all other stakeholders, creditors and employees, is concomitant with 
the financialization of industry. 
Moreover, these various interests groups are favored by central bank policy. On the one 
hand, the new creed central banks have embraced - inflation targeting - supports the 
owners of financial capital. On the other hand, low inflation and low interest rates also 
represent the perfect ingredients for the development of a financial bubble economy and 
inspire innovation in financial products. The Great Moderation for the real economy, but 
Irrational Exuberance for the financial sectors.  
Thus, the remainder of this chapter examines how liquidity and information combine the 
interests of the risk-allocators and those of the owners of financial capital. The 
commoditization of liquidity and information described below is eroding the public 
infrastructure necessary for markets to function properly and blurring the distinction 
between private and public good.  The absence of the criteria of non-excludability and 
nonrivalrous consumption, which are the defining characteristics of public goods, is clear.  
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These two features of financial markets have been driven even further by the 
macroeconomic policies of the Great Moderation and Irrational Exuberance, which are 
also analyzed below.  
2.1. Liquid market: Private or public good?  
2.1.1. Liquid market for the risk-allocators 
The obsession with liquidity has changed stock markets, thus rendering the debate over a 
“bank-based versus market-based financial system” obsolete. The stock markets 
considered in the debate are not identical to present-day stock markets, which more 
resemble a system of liquidity pooling. The logic behind these markets and their basic 
mode of operation, however, remained the same: A multitude of participants evaluate 
securities by integrating all available information, in contrast to a banking system that 
operates in greater proximity to its clients. A broad, general definition of liquidity is 
adopted here, namely, the possibility markets afford to easily, quickly and inexpensively 
sell an asset. It connotes a promise of reversibility. So there is an intimate relationship 
between liquidity and speed of transactions. The opportunity for market participants to 
sell their shares at any time entails constant trading. Thus, on the one hand, short-term 
transactions allow markets to be liquid. On the other hand, constant trading entails 
constant changes in prices. Speed is thus even more relevant in markets with 
continuously changing prices. From that perspective, the desire for zero-latency is a 
consequence of liquidity. In what follows, we observe that the privatization of liquidity 
happens through (1) the re-organization of the stock market industry (2) the speed of 
transaction that allows predatory practices to manipulate markets and change the 
informal rules of the game that any market needs to function efficiently and (3) the 
volatility induced by liquidity (understood here as greater price flexibility) that only benefits 
certain financial actors.  
Changes in the market for stock markets 
Clearly, the organization of contemporary stock markets bears no relation to that of the 
past. They are fragmented into sub-markets, dark pools and other Alternative Trading 
Systems (ATS) and Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTF) in Europe. These “non-public” 
markets allow financial institutions to anonymously execute large orders. They can 
thereby avoid the impact of their trades because neither their identity nor the size of the 
trade is known before full execution. In Europe, trading of shares in these dark pools of 
rose by 45 percent in the months from May to October 2013 and accounts for 
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approximately 8 percent of stock trading. The corresponding figure is 16 percent in the 
U.S. (Stafford, 2013). Defenders of these MTF have voiced concerns regarding possible 
EU regulation, arguing that 8 percent is not a sufficient volume to justify more regulation. 
Some experts contend that concerns regarding increased trading on MTF amounting to 
only 8 percent in Europe are exaggerated. However, Europe contains numerous 
exchanges, some of which are relatively more important. A closer examination indicates 
that dark pools should be subject to regulation. Off-exchange trading accounts for 
approximately 36 percent of the total volume in the U.K., the main financial center in 
Europe, where the majority of firms choose to be listed. The corresponding figures are 14 
percent in Germany and France and 8.5 percent in Switzerland (Stafford, 2013). Trading 
on non-regulated exchanges such as the alternative venues mentioned above suddenly 
take on greater importance if one recalls that such venues represent more than one-third 
of trades in the U.K.  
Moreover, who is trading on these venues is more important than the volume of it. The 
majority of institutional investors choose to execute their trades in these venues 
according to Puaar (2013). This is the most alarming observation, considering the 
relationships between alternative venues and high-frequency trading and brokerage firms. 
Arnuk and Saluzzi (2012) demonstrated that dark pools sell information to HFT firms, and 
hence, their algorithms can exploit the order flows of institutional investors. These authors 
also denounced brokerage firms selling proprietary algorithms to their institutional clients 
to predict their trading patterns. These intermediaries are not “at the service” of 
institutional investors; they are exploiting these institutions’ lack of understanding of this 
new system of liquidity pooling. Because these new trading venues do not publish pre-
trade information, institutional investors can trade large volumes of shares without 
affecting their prices. But in doing so, they become the prey of some players who are able 
to “game the system” by taking advantage of the sequence of institutional investors’ 
orders. Money is being made not from the investment itself, but from extracting rents from 
others’ trading flow, echoing a parasite - host relationship.  “Money that used to be made 
mostly through commissions is now made through trading around that order flow”, as 
Arnuk and Saluzzi noted (2012:15). 
That institutional investors prefer trading in the “dark” when the entire logic of exchanges 
rests on the diffusion of transparent information should serve as a warning that this 
paradoxical quest for liquidity might have reached a limit. Moreover, the proliferation of 
alternative venues has other direct negative consequences.  
First, they make the existence of products based on assets traded on regular exchanges 
problematic because the volume traded in alternative pools is not considered. Exchange 
traded funds (ETF) that are issued by financial companies and can be bought and sold on 
a daily basis, akin to a typical security, are such products. It is another striking feature of 
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a security-pooling financial system. ETF are designed to gain exposure to certain assets 
without actually necessitating a direct investment in them. Thus, an ETF can track stocks, 
indexes, currencies, or commodities, but one can also be issued to represent the inverse 
of the asset that it tracks, in the case of an inverse ETF, or be designed to be more 
sensitive to market fluctuations in the case of a leveraged ETF. The growth of ETF is 
staggering: The number of institutional investors that reported employing ETF increased 
from 154 institutions in 14 countries in 1997 to 3,367 institutions located in 50 countries in 
2012 (Fuhr, 2013).  
Second, these alternative venues have driven traditional stock exchanges to compete for 
clients in ways that are detrimental to the overall system. Certain “lit” exchanges are 
offering rebates to liquidity “makers” and charging fees to liquidity “takers”. This model 
introduced an incentive for brokerage firms to route their clients’ orders to the exchanges 
offering the best rebate to the broker and not those offering the best price for their clients. 
Thus, both the exchanges and the brokers benefit from the current model at the expense 
of investors (Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2012). 
The business of collocation is an excellent illustration of this phenomenon. Exchanges 
found a way to attract liquidity by renting spaces near their servers to allow certain 
liquidity providers to trade more rapidly than others. As a case in point, NASDAQ no 
longer considers itself a stock exchange. Robert Waghorne, senior vice president of 
European Markets Technology for NASDAQ, declared: “We are really a technology 
company. It’s the core engine for all of our business. We can trade anything, anywhere 
on the planet” (Miller, 2011). 
The technological revolution and the emergence of alternative trading systems forced 
stock exchanges to adapt to a new and complex environment and has had profound 
effects on the corporate organization of stock exchanges. Amidst financial liberalization, 
they demutualized to obtain greater operational freedom, hasten decision making 
processes, avoid institutional gridlock and reduce conflicts of interest (Brito Ramos, 2002, 
Aggarwal and Dahiya, 2006). Stock exchanges were formerly owned by their members, 
but since the 1990s, they began to be demutualized, thus separating trading and 
ownership rights. During the mid-1990s, only 10 percent of the World Federation of 
Exchanges (WFE) was for-profit organizations. Fewer than 10 years later, for-profit 
exchanges accounted for 63% of WFE members (Brito Ramos, 2002:3). The main stock 
exchanges not only demutualized their ownership but also went public by listing the stock 
exchanges themselves. However, empirical evidence on the benefits of demutualization 
does not provide a clear picture. Serifsoy (2005) found that demutualization does not 
allow for greater flexibility and listing does not translate into greater productivity or 
efficiency. Jaquillat (2006), conversely, found that listed stock markets are more profitable 
than their unlisted peers while also exhibiting lower transaction costs. 
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Profits and operating costs alone, however, have never been a measure of productivity. 
Moreover, this focus on profitability forces one to consider the possibility of conflicts 
between the owners of stock exchanges and investors. Separating the traders from the 
ownership rights of exchanges allows for the possibility of conflicts between investors and 
exchange shareholders. Arnuk and Saluzzi (2012) recognized that the exchanges’ race 
for liquidity was underpinned by serious conflicts that must be addressed: 
“Demutualization changed the ownership of the exchanges from a member-owned, 
nonprofit organization to a shareholder-owned, for-profit corporation. What was once 
thought of as a quasi-government utility-type organization would now be a bottom-line 
driven publicly traded, shareholder-focused company. The old method of having 
members vote on proposals and rule changes would be abolished. Exchanges would now 
make decisions by executives who reported to the board of directors who served the 
shareholders. Unfortunately, as we have seen all too often, shareholder interests and 
investor interests are not always the same” (Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2012:74). The 
demutualization of stock markets is a further means of institutionalizing the 
commoditization of liquidity and information. The mere possibility of conflict between 
shareholders in stock markets and the investor community as a whole demonstrates that 
the quality of prices is not the prime concern of stock markets. 
The political economy question of the profitability of stock markets and who benefits from 
them is unavoidable because financial sectors are central to the functioning of a healthy 
market economy. Argawaal and Dahiya concluded that “given the potential conflicts of 
interests between shareholders of exchanges and their consumers it will be interesting to 
see how these conflicts are resolved. So far the financial performance of listed 
exchanges has been quite strong. However, if there are periods in the future when for-
profit exchanges face major financial difficulties then will they be allowed to go bankrupt 
like any other listed company?” (Aggarwal and Dahiya, 2006:15). 
This is a question that modern economies have to answer. Are stock market an important 
infrastructure, like bridges and highway, for economic development or is it just a 
“technological company” like any other ones? The profound change of stock market 
organization is relevant, if stock markets are not just like any other firms. In this regards, 
the trading speed, which is discussed hereafter, is also important. 
The speed of transactions 
High-frequency trading was previously mentioned as an example of a market so 
characterized by short-term perspectives that it hampers capital allocation. A certain 
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amount of time is necessary for any allocation to occur. The definition of Brogaard, “HFT 
is a type of investment strategy whereby stocks are rapidly bought and sold by a 
computer algorithm and held for a very short period, usually seconds or milliseconds” 
(Brogaard, 2010:1), is therefore contradictory. The contribution that HFT makes to the 
traditional function of financial sector - capital allocation - is clearly null. Indeed, much of 
the academic debate related to HFT concerns its contribution to the infrastructure 
supporting the financial sector (liquidity, price discovery mechanism, volatility). 
In 2012, HFT was responsible for half of the shares traded on U.S. markets and 40 
percent of the value traded on European markets (WEF, 2013). This is, in itself, a 
problem because the effect that these “strategies” have on “normal” trading is unclear. 
However, apart from this consideration, the rise of HFT establishes a clear division within 
the financial industry: The sophisticated players with the access to the technology, 
information and understandings of the operations of this highly short-term liquidity pool 
and the remaining, more simple players, who are bound to lose to the former group. 
Faster-acting players who are able to “beat the market” have enjoyed the social 
legitimacy accorded by free market principles. This allowed the emergence of predatory 
trading strategies designed to profit from other player’s orders. Latency arbitrage, for 
example, exploits the common volume weighted average price (VWAP) formulas of 
institutional investors. HFT computers are able to detect these simple algorithms and, due 
to latency arbitrage, know that there is an order moving a quote higher. The HFT 
computer speeds ahead, purchases all available stocks and then serves as the 
counterparty to the institutional investor and offers a higher price. The institutional 
algorithm, driven by volume, is forced to purchase the shares at 0.01 or 0.02 per share 
higher than was initially publicly quoted. These strategies are designed to profit from 
large, simple institutional and retail investors. “Layering”, “spoofing” and “momentum 
ignition” are all pernicious strategies to lure normal participants and obtain profits at their 
expense. As if this were not enough, certain strategies exploit the market itself.  
Let us consider the case of the “Dr. Evil” trade managed by Citigroup. It was programmed 
to sell a significant volume of bonds. In one minute, it sold EUR 13 billion worth of 119 
European governments’ bonds across the platforms of the Rome-based exchange, the 
same volume that the entire market would trade on a given day. The program 
repurchased EUR 4 billion one hour later, making a profit of EUR 18.2 million (Gomes, 
2013). A similar program, called “the hammer”, was designed by Optiver, a high-
frequency trading firm active in oil commodity trading. Optiver engaged in a practice 
known as “banging the close”. The program was designed to purchase a large volume of 
oil futures just before the close of the market and thus establish momentum. It took the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 5 years, from 2007 to 2012, to prove that this 
procedure had been manipulating the market. The algorithm that Optiver used was 
simple. Those currently in use are much more sophisticated (Lelièvre and Pilet, 2013:79). 
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What these “investment strategies” indicate is that the “gentlemen’s agreement” that 
seemed to prevail among market participants to play by the rules has been severely 
weakened. The rapid gains that speed and technology allow certain actors to make 
outweigh the importance of the seemingly old-fashioned, informal rules of fair play. 
However, these informal rules that establish the boundaries of fair trading allow the 
market to operate. These examples provide excellent illustrations of how damaging these 
practices can be and why the debate needs to shift from competition to fairness: They 
compromise the very existence of a market in the first place. 
It is clear that any market and, perhaps financial ones most of all, requires basic elements 
of fairness to attract participants. Equal access for all and fair rules of the game are more 
important than liquidity. However, it is difficult to change the status quo when certain 
players profit so much from it. Predatory trading alone is estimated to generate, from 
institutional and retail investors’ asset under management, approximately $1.5 to 3 billion 
annually (Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2009). 
Instability as a result of increasing speed and liquidity 
Speed made the establishment of such practices possible. However, the speed of 
transactions is intimately linked to liquidity.  It is only sensible in an environment with 
continuously changing prices, that is, with constant trading. For a market to be liquid, 
individuals must be constantly buying and selling. This implies that financial assets are 
held at very short-term horizons. Thus, the liquidity of modern financial markets rests on 
the two pillars of very rapid transactions with respect to both their execution and maturity. 
This provides flexibility, but it also destabilizes the entire structure. In finance terms, 
volatility is the movement of prices relative to their historical values. Volatility is here 
understood, in its general sense, as the quality of something unstable and fluctuating. 
Liquidity increases volatility in the market because it increases the number of prices that 
market participants can “discover”. On a daily basis, myriad financial intermediaries profit 
from fluctuating markets. If prices were stable, high-frequency trading, algorithmic trading, 
hedge funds and arbitragers would have no reason to exist.  However, as a society, how 
many different prices do we need each day for a single share?  
From a long term persective, liquid markets are more vulnerable to financial news and 
trends. In only six years, from 2000 to 2006, Western financial markets rushed into 
information technology and then over-invested in real estate.  Liquid markets are more 
easily affected by irrational exuberance. This is when markets are excessively liquid that 
“market sentiments” and “market mood” are important. Keynes cautioned against 
financial markets based on short-term expectations: “The professional investor is forced 
to concern himself with the anticipation of impending changes, in the news or in the 
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atmosphere, of the kind of which experience shows that the mass psychology of the 
market is most influenced. This is the inevitable result of investment markets organized 
with a view to so-called “liquidity” (Keynes, 1935:155). These market swings, which are 
completely disconnected from economic fundamentals, disproportionately benefit the risk-
allocators who are well equipped to handle highly unstable financial bubbles. This 
provides the opportunity to sell all sorts of financial products. Stock markets have become 
so unpredictable and detached from economic fundamentals that betting on natural 
disasters has become an alternative. “Catastrophe bonds” are sold by reinsurers outside 
their industry and highly valued by investors because they are uncorrelated with 
traditional financial markets (Dizzard, 2013). 
Finally, liquidity breeds instability because liquidity is, as a whole, an illusion. It is peculiar 
to contend that markets are liquid, as only individual investments, considered separately 
from society, can be. If no one wants to purchase, as the last “liquidity” crisis 
demonstrated, the market ceases to function.  Keynes’ view on liquidity is again pertinent: 
“Of the maxims of orthodox finance none, surely, is more anti-social than the fetish of 
liquidity, the doctrine that it is a positive virtue on the part of investment institutions to 
concentrate their resources upon the holding of 'liquid' securities. It forgets that there is 
no such thing as liquidity of investment for the community as a whole. The social object of 
skilled investment should be to defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance which 
envelop our future. The actual, private object of the most skilled investment today is 'to 
beat the gun', as the Americans so well express it, to outwit the crowd, and to pass the 
bad, or depreciating, half-crown to the other fellow.” (Keynes, 1935:155).  This fetish for 
liquidity allows investors and other participants to forget that they are all playing a game 
of musical chairs. When the music stops, one is left with the “burning theatre scenario”.  
Thus the triad of “liquidity - speed of transaction – short-term maturity” is an engine of 
instability. The reorganization of trading platforms, predatory practices, market swings 
induced by news or rumors and flash crashes worsened by robot trading are the new 
conditions imposed by this triad. For shareholders, the contraction of time has taken the 
form of quarterly reports. These provide shareholders an exit window, which thereby 
pressures firms to be financially profitable in the short run, whereas shareholders can exit 
whenever they wish under the normative guarantee that they will be able to sell their 
shares.  
2.1.2. Liquid market for short-term shareholders and CEOs 
Liquid markets and the commoditization of securities benefit risk allocators. However, it 
also allowed for new forms of corporate control, shifting the balance of power to the 
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advantage of short-term shareholders and CEOs. Liquid markets are the necessary 
condition for financial markets to control corporations. The separation of ownership and 
control, which began in the 1920s in the U.S., cannot be not truly effective without liquid 
markets for shares. Absent such markets, shareholders cannot maximize the benefits of 
this separation. Liquid markets, with a diverse and diffuse shareholder base, are needed 
to reconcile the contradictory principles of the separation of control and ownership and 
the maximization of shareholder value. The Law and Economics approach, which 
considers the firm to be a nexus of contracts and not an entity in itself, provided a 
coherent intellectual framework to justify the maximization of shareholder value. The 
alignment of shareholder interests with those of directors is achieved through a heavy 
reliance on managerial compensation schemes and stock options. Institutions, such as 
auditors, ratings agencies, market regulators, are partly established to protect the 
investors’ interests.  
However, all of the institutional machinery rests on the existence of liquid markets, 
without which the separation of control and ownership could not be effective. The 
shareholder value model of corporate governance gained hegemony over the holistic, 
stakeholder approach to corporate governance once financial liberalization reforms were 
implemented in the 1970s. The increasing importance of mutual funds and pension funds 
in the 1970s and 1980s provided a definitive push to the shareholder value ideology, and 
the prioritization of shareholder value was easily accepted. It is mutual funds and pension 
funds who implemented a series of practices to coordinate the votes of minority voters, 
proxy voting and voting guidelines (Orléan, 1999:216).  
This phenomenon has not been confined to the U.S. The supremacy of shareholder value 
principles is clear in light of the evolution of corporate law in the European Union. 
Financial market integration and capital market liberalization slowly became the 
framework for the incorporation of corporate governance. “Whereas company law and 
financial and securities market regulation had been distinct regulatory fields under the 
programme of company law harmonisation, with the integration of financial markets 
corporate governance regulation was more and more seen as subject to capital and 
financial market imperatives” (Horn, 2011:2011). 
The institutional infrastructure necessary to achieve shareholders’ objectives, which 
valorize their participation by maximizing their profits from dividend payouts and 
increasing stock prizes (Orléan, 1999:214), has been established slowly since the 1970s 
and was fully implemented by the turn of the new millennium. 
The increasing importance of shareholders within firms is reflected in the increasing 
shares of profits devoted to dividends. In the U.S., dividends amounted to 24.7 percent of 
the profits of non-financial firms in 1980 and reached 50.1% in 1990. As profits increased 
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throughout the 1990s, dividends stabilized at approximately 50%. When profits began to 
decline at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium, dividends 
continued to grow as a share of profits, reaching 87.3 percent in 2003 (Aglietta and 
Rébérioux, 2004:57). The same phenomenon has been observed in France. From the 
1960s to the 1990s, dividends evolved in inverse proportion to interest paid to creditors, 
which peaked in 1981 and decreased thereafter. Thus, dividends increased at the 
expense of banks following an “optimal” path from 1998 to 2003, with low levels of firm 
indebtedness and increasing profits and margins. Dividends continued to rise after 2003, 
when margins began to shrink. From 2003 until the present, firms have had to cope with 
the absurd situation of having to pay greater dividends than their profits allow. In other 
words, firm went into debt to pay their shareholders (Cordonnier and Van de Velde, 
2009).  
Within the enterprise, the equilibrium between liquid and immobilized goods has been 
disrupted. Shareholders, through the substantial power of pension and mutual funds, 
have been able to translate their financial power into political power within the structure of 
the enterprise, thereby according them priority over other stakeholders. This does not 
imply that the dividends paid to shareholders were taken from employee wages. In 
France and elsewhere in Western Europe and the U.S., the wage to profit ratio remained 
constant throughout the last century. It has stagnated at approximately 65 percent. 
However, it would be a mistake to reduce political issues within enterprises to a class 
struggle between employees and shareholders. As noted above, the growth in dividends 
in France in the 1990s corresponds to a reduction in the capacity of firms to finance 
themselves (Cotis, 2009). Enterprises are also devoting increasingly smaller shares of 
their profits to investment. Indeed, the ratio of investment to profits is clearly decreasing 
in Germany, France, the U.K. and the U.S. (Stockhammer, 2006, Stockhammer, 2007).  
However, the ideology of the shareholder supremacy is not even in the interests of the 
shareholder themselves, once one recognizes that this is not a homogeneous group. It is 
this very notion of a hypothetically coherent group of individuals “owning” a corporation 
(whereas, as demonstrated below, from a legal perspective, companies do not belong to 
shareholders) that strengthened the shareholder-oriented model. Real persons ultimately 
hold stocks either directly or indirectly through mutual or pension funds. Real persons 
have various investment time frames and diverse expectations and ethical values. In 
other words, shareholders have different interests. This perspective is richer than the 
overly simplistic “shareholder versus stakeholder” dichotomy and allows us to realize that 
the shareholder value model is detrimental to shareholders themselves. Short-term 
shareholders, who are increasingly powerful in contemporary stock markets, encourage 
short-term results, thereby clashing with the interests of long-term investors, who plan to 
hold their stocks for numerous years. Towards whose interest is the shareholder value 
model oriented? “The conventional shareholder-primacy ideology “solves” the problem of 
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inter-shareholder conflict by simply assuming  - without explanation or justification - that 
the only shareholder whose interests count is the shareholder who is short-sighed, 
opportunistic, undiversified, and without a conscience. This approach keeps public 
corporations from doing their best for either their investors or society as a whole.” (Stout, 
2012:10).  The conflict between the interests of the short-sighted shareholder and those 
of shareholders with longer time horizons are manifested through the management 
mechanisms, which devote excessive attention to stock market expectations. Financing 
firms through stock markets with the goal of maximizing shareholder value entails making 
managerial decisions using a set of indicators that conflict with the other possible 
interests of a firm.  
We examined how technology and increased competition affected the financial industry. 
Banking, as we know, changed substantially, as did stock markets, where the race for 
liquidity is at the heart of the development model. However, the picture would not be 
complete absent another key element of modern financial markets, without which neither 
liquidity nor the speed of transactions would advantage the interest groups mentioned 
above: Standardized information.  
2.2. Standardized information: Private or public good?  
2.2.1. Standardized information for the risk-allocators 
Against the background of financial market development, the line between private and 
public goods with respect to standardized information also seems to be blurred. Within 
the financial sphere, information is considered the primary raw material for HFT firms and 
hedge funds, and there are increasing opportunities for these firms to obtain this 
information first (as in the case of collocation) or, more rarely, exclusively (as in the case 
with dark pool data theft).  Clearly this is a type of insider trading. Information is delivered 
to a handful of persons who can exploit it before it becomes public. High-frequency 
trading achieves the same end, albeit using technology. That insider trading is harmful to 
the efficient functioning of the market is clear, and hence, one fails to see why the excuse 
of financial innovation allows for practices that are considered theft in other contexts.  
It is impossible to develop algorithms without a huge flow of data, hence the importance 
of liquidity. Stock market quotes have become a commodity that can be bought and 
processed. Financial economics tends to view financial market information as the final 
output of the financial market, one that investors and CFOs can use to make decisions. 
However, this perspective might no longer apply when the data from certain platforms are 
 57 
sold to the swiftest and most sophisticated participants who trade before the rest of the 
public. They are able to do so because they have the technological means to be quicker 
but also because the flow of information is standardized. Information, in this form, even if 
it is not exclusively sold to particular players, advantages some more than others. Risk 
allocators need hard information. It is inconvenient to apply mathematical formulas to 
prices and shift risks using soft information that accounts for the context. The 
securitization “value” chain could not exist without the constant flow of hard information 
that financial markets produce. In this light, hard information must be regarded not as the 
final output but as an input in a chain of intermediation in the securitization process.  
Thus, within the financial sector, hard and standardized information facilitated 
commoditization (as with every other product) and is used by risk allocators - high-
frequency traders, hedge funds, and the various intermediaries involved in the 
securitization process - as an input. However, outside the financial industry, this constant 
flow of financial information is also useful for shareholders, who now have access to 
constant market evaluations and can in this way review their investments and decide to 
exit. Simply by knowing whether firms will meet their expectations every quarter reduces 
the risk associated with shareholders’ investments. 
2.2.2. Standardized information for short-term shareholders and CEOs 
However, establishing quarterly assessments to compare firm performance with market 
expectations also relies on standardized information. There is no legal obligation to meet 
these expectations, but there are normative ones, and norms rely on conventions 
(Orléan, 1989). Several ratios can be used to measure the “value” of a firm depending on 
the perspective adopted. Approaching firms from a stock market perspective, Earnings 
Per Share (EPS) and the Price-to-Earnings Ratio (PER) are equity ratios that are 
considered measures of value, albeit contested ones. Economic and financial profitability 
ratios are more accepted. This category includes Return on Assets (ROA) and the Return 
on Equity (ROE), the financial profitability ratios that best represent the shareholder 
perspective. These standard ratios have long been in use. However, Lordon (2000) writes 
that shareholder values is actually conceptualized using a series of intellectual 
innovations developed by consulting groups, such as the Total Shareholder Return of the 
Total Business Return. One can note the erosion of formal public standards in contrast to 
the rise in private valuation methods. This also represents a type of privatization of 
information (which is supposed to be public, if the firm is listed). One measure in 
particular deserves our attention because it has become dominant in the field of practice 
and discourse: Economic Value Added (EVA), which the consulting cabinet Stewart &Co 
managed to impose as the most representative definition of shareholder value. EVA is 
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established as an alternative to accounting systems. The net result obtained from 
accounting methods does not indicate the correct remuneration of the shareholder, which 
is what EVA does. “The correct remuneration is one that can be expected from another 
investment with similar risks. In other words, the costs of capital are an opportunity costs” 
(my translation) (Lordon, 2000:122). EVA is defined as the profit after all funders 
(creditors and shareholders) have been repaid at the cost of capital. More precisely, it is 
the difference between the Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT) and the cost of 
capital, which can be known by multiplying the invested capital with the Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital (WACC), because debt has not the same price as equity. If the 
cost of debt is predetermined and fixed, the cost of equity is more complicated to 
calculate. Returns are not set in advance and one must estimate it using models. The 
most common one is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). CAPM rests on a series of 
unrealistic assumptions, such as unlimited borrowing under the risk free rate of interest 
and trade without transactions costs with all information known to all investors at the 
same time. The model thus predicts that the appropriate rate of return of an asset is equal 
to a risk premium (the value of risk) added to the expected return of a risk-free asset (the 
time value of money). The risk premium is composed of the beta multiplied by the market 
risk. The beta is a measure of the systemic risk (non-diversifiable) of a security in 
comparison to the market as whole. It measures the tendency of an asset to follow the 
market. The market risk is the difference between the return of a risk-free asset and the 
expected market return. 
There is conceptual problem with EVA: It implies that a firm is profitable only when there 
are additional benefits to the owners, after having covered all operational costs and the 
costs of capital. It is usually a characteristic of undervalued firms only (Jones and Lowry, 
2006). Moreover, its notion of economic profits determines a value that is already, by 
definition, above the cost of capital. Indeed, EVA claims to represent “shareholder value”, 
that is, the value that the shareholder should receive after having repaid all funders. 
Shareholders are compensated twice, once with the minimum guaranteed return and a 
second time with the EVA, in other words, the surplus that should exist once all funders 
have been reimbursed. 
But EVA provides shareholders with a guaranteed minimum return by contending that 
firms only generate added value if shareholders are remunerated “correctly”, that is, 
based on the cost of capital and, consequently, independent of the firm’s accounting 
performance. We can now see how EVA relies on financial market data and how, through 
the beta, it introduces a risk sensitive measure derived from this data into enterprise 
management.  
So it is not only a measure of value, but becomes a measure of performance, part of the 
Value-based Management approach which aligns the interests of shareholders with the 
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interest of the management. It constraints management, but through the logic of financial 
markets, which tends to increase the shortsightedness of managers. Indeed, it is high 
earnings today that are rewarded, not high earnings tomorrow. Thus, it is the interests of 
shortsighted shareholders and the top management that are aligned.  
The innovation of such a concept is also political. It reorganizes power relations by stating 
how the added value should be shared, while removing shareholder’s risks - the reason 
that shareholders exist in the first place - from the equation. Financial capital is not 
involved in production, but with EVA, it also does not assume the risk of investment. The 
shareholder is legally the owner of a company operating an enterprise, but from a risk 
perspective, enjoys the status of a creditor financing it. Top management learned the 
rules of the “shareholder maximization” game and is able to extract high compensations 
from it. Top percentile revenues have been receiving an increasing part the national 
revenue in Anglo-Saxon countries as well as in continental Europe and Japan, albeit at 
lower pace. This part increased by about 12 points in the U.S. and approximately 6 points 
in the U.K., while it rose by 2 or 3 point in Europe and Japan (Piketty, 2013). The 
differences between rich countries in the growth of revenue inequality cannot be 
explained by an increase in marginal productivity. Different institutional norms of 
corporate governance provide probably a better explanation for these differences, but do 
explain the fact that top executive salary rose everywhere in rich countries. To 
understand the overall increase in top managers compensations, the shift to neo-
liberalism and the institutional linkages binding companies with financial markets seems 
to bring a better answer. Different contract designs generate differences in CEO revenue, 
but how these compensations are justified in the first place? Since Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001) showed that CEOs are paid for luck, i.e. for reasons external to the 
firm that they manage, academics have been paying attention to corporate governance 
flaws (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004) and contract design (Chaigeau & Sahuguet, 2014) to 
explain the pay-for-luck phenomenon. They however fail to view the enterprise as 
something more than an addition of contracts and overlook the influence of short-term 
shareholders and financial markets.  
The rise of stock repurchase (which increases the company’s stock prices) and evolution 
from a “retain and reinvest” regime to a “downsize and distribute” one are not natural 
phenomenon, but the result of an implicit coalition between short-term shareholders and 
top managers whose interest are tied by ideas and practices representing the neo-liberal 
ideology. From this point of view, it is clear that enterprises are more than simple web of 
contracts between separated individuals but are also the locus of conflicts of interest and 
that these conflicts affect business investments (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000). 
Because capital is rare and should be allocated efficiently, the financial industry adopted 
“risk” as a measure of efficiency, thereby inverting the financial industry’s function by 
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awarding primacy to risk allocation. EVA is sensible from this “risk efficiency” perspective. 
However, the socio-economic reality implies different types of efficiencies at various 
levels. The efficiency of risk allocation is important to owners of financial capital, but, if 
taken to its extreme, it might come at the expense of the productive efficiency of a firm. 
How many opportunities for entrepreneurial ventures or investments in growth have been 
missed simply because economic value added was exclusive defined from the 
perspective of shareholder value? 
The emergence of EVA is evident in the evolution of accounting standards and functions. 
There has long been an empirical diversity in national accounting systems, influenced by 
two large schools of thought. Following the dynamic method, called historical costs by 
Anglo Saxon accountants, these assume that the prices of physical and financial capital 
cannot vary for reasons exclusively linked to the activity of the enterprise in which they 
are used. Assets enter the balance sheet at their historical costs, and their prices vary 
depending on their use. The static approach to accounting stems from the wish to protect 
and valorize creditor’s interests. Assets are evaluated according to their current market 
prices, not their historical costs. The uses that an enterprise can put its assets to are less 
important than what these assets are worth in the event of liquidation. 
The rise of capital markets, the need to manage cash flows and the distrust of traditional 
accounting methods have revived the static approach, now clothed in the notion of 
shareholder value (Aglietta and Rébérioux, 2004). 
This is now the dominant approach in developed economies, and the international norms 
established reflect the privileged position acquired by shareholders. The accounting 
system is now at the service of the efficient functioning of capital markets, and the same 
concern regarding its efficient use underlies the logic behind current accounting 
standards. The concepts of “market value” and “value in use” are the pillars of this new 
system. It informs investors of the market value of firm assets and the actualized cash 
flow obtained from the use of these assets. Thus the “value in use”  is introduced to 
eliminate opportunity costs and ensure capital is employed the most efficiently. However, 
by appealing to the market and anticipating future profits and interest rates, this 
accounting system does not reflect the activity of an enterprise, but what the market 
believes it will be (Aglietta and Rébérioux, 2004). When asset prices cannot be estimated 
because markets are insufficiently liquid, one can resort to theoretical models, which can 
be private. Here again, one can note the existence of private models to interpret public 
information. 
That the financial sector should be privatized and liberalized does not imply that the 
public information required for this industry to operate normally should also be privatized. 
The perverse effects of credit ratings issued by semi-official, but private, agencies are a 
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good example. Here also, information is standardized to better inform creditors, but it is 
so abstract that it is stripped of its meaning. However, credit ratings are fundamental 
elements of the Basel II and III regulatory framework.  An important element of the 
financial sector that should provide added value for creditors and the rest of the economy 
seems primarily serve the interests of a few: Credit ratings agencies and market 
participants that are able to use their information as an input in the securitization process 
to rate Special Purpose Vehicles and increase the prices of securities. 
One must also note the extent to which the entire financial system, from High Frequency 
Trading to accounting standards, depends on liquidity. This is why it would be more 
appropriate to regard the 2008 financial crisis as “not simply a particularly intense liquidity 
crisis, but is also a crisis of liquidity as the principle governing the organization of the 
credit system in the form of the financial market” (Amato and Fantacci, 2012:25). As 
observed below, and as Amato and Fantacci argue, we must determine an exit from the 
realm of liquidity. This chapter has attempted to highlight that organizing the financial 
system around liquidity and standard information is not to the disadvantage of all. The 
following section argues that not only the structure of the financial system benefits a 
minority of players but also that the macroeconomic context of the past 30 years has 
amplified the structural advantages of these actors.  
Some markets will never be liquid. Innovation, by definition, cannot be immediately priced 
by existing markets. However, if one manages risk by assuming a liquid market to 
determine the cost of exiting, one is not assuming her/his role as an investor. 
Lysandrou (2011) demonstrated how hedge funds (the supply side) adapted to the 
demands of incredibly wealthy owners of financial capital and this collusion was central to 
the most recent financial crisis. We extended his analysis and advance the argument that 
the entire financial sector now serves the interests of the enormously wealthy individuals. 
That the present financial system generates crisis after crisis is only one issue among 
many. The changing nature of financial markets is a political concern when it is able to 
influence the way in which corporations and ownership are conceived. The change from a 
fordist regime to a one in which corporations downsize and distribute (Lazonick and 
O'Sullivan, 2000) is a political issue because it has redistributive consequences. 
2.3. Macroeconomic conditions 
This analysis began by addressing the changing nature of financial markets and 
attempted to illustrate how this evolution benefits certain participants over others, but 
macroeconomic conditions have yet to be addressed. As Piketty showed, macroeconomic 
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factors, such as inflation, long-term growth and demographic trends, are important in 
explaining the revival of private wealth. From a long-term, historical perspective, earnings 
on capital have consistently been higher than earnings from revenues and economic 
growth. However, the macroeconomic conditions of the past 15 years, coupled with the 
evolution of the financial sector, lie at the roots of rising inequality in developed countries 
(Piketty, 2013). Inequality in France has been increasing since the 1980s, and since the 
1990s, one can observe a clear rise in very high salaries, which is a new phenomenon in 
France. The highest 0.1 percent of salaries has increased to such an extent over ten 
years that their purchasing power has increased by more than 50 percent (Piketty, 
2013:459). Conversely, the purchasing power of middle-class Americans stagnated, while 
the wealthiest 1 percent absorbed approximately 60 percent of the total economic growth 
in the U.S. over the 30 years preceding the 2008 crisis (Piketty, 2013:469). That the rise 
in inequality - forcing modest-income households into debt while paper assets inflate - 
should be considered a cause of the 2008 crisis is an increasingly accepted thesis 
(Kumhof and Rancière, 2010, Goda, 2013). 
The growth in financial assets since the 1980s is so staggering that it is difficult to blame 
the 2008 crisis on the so-called “Asian savings glut” (Palma, 2009). In his words, “The 
bottom line is that while Asia’s reserves grew by US$2.2 trillion between 1997 and 2007, 
the overall stock of financial assets grew by US$140 trillion (US$ at 2007 values). As a 
result, by 2007 the overall Asian ‘savings glut’ was equivalent to less than 1 per cent of 
the global stock of financial assets (at the time, equity, bonds and bank assets were 
worth US$241 trillion)” (Palma, 2009:5). 
The rise of neoliberalism lies behind this tremendous polarization of income that is 
responsible for the enormous increase in liquidity in the U.S. In this regard, Palma 
adopted a Foucauldian perspective that contrasts neoliberalism with classical economics. 
Neoliberalism is not the retreat of the state to allow the market to function “naturally”, but 
rather a form of “governmentability” by which the state adopts the mechanisms of the 
market because of a fear of itself, a “phobia of the state”. The state is not distinct from 
markets, but symbiotic with them (Foucault, 2004). From this perspective, the 
reintroduction of risk and uncertainty in economies overly constrained by welfare 
institutions is beneficial (international capital coordination, closed capital accounts, stable 
exchange rates, unemployment benefits). “What some capitalists, politicians and 
intellectual networks thought best for capitalist development was that capital should 
regain the upper hand via an economic environment that was permanently unstable and 
highly insecure for the majority of the population and the state” (Palma, 2009:30). For 
neo-liberals, the state must facilitate this unstable and uncertain environment in which 
capital has the upper hand. Thus, neoliberalism is not simply deregulation; it is a selective 
form of deregulation and the outcome of political decisions (Stockhammer, 2007).  
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That financial sectors and the myriad innovations and products they generate have 
tremendously profited from this unstable environment is indisputable. While states 
decided to deregulate financial markets, financial markets provided the mechanisms and 
instruments for financial capital to disproportionately benefit at the expense of the real 
economy. One need simply consider the chain of intermediaries involved in securitization: 
“Little did the average mortgage-owner know that on top of his family he also had an 
ever-increasing army of rentiers, legal advisors and accountants to feed. And as so many 
mouths were eating from the same hand, volume was the only way to boost profits – 
according to data compiled by Morgan Stanley, sales of CDOs worldwide reached 
US$503 billion in 2006, a fivefold increase in three years, leading to an overall stock of 
US$2 trillion” (Palma, 2009:50). Palma’s approach is interesting to the extent that it 
considers deep structural factors and recognizes the state as a major facilitator of the 
rent-seeking behaviors of financial intermediaries. In this light, the macroeconomic 
policies of the past 30 years represent a partnership among several actors: “The 
architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the 
financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the 
preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual 
networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left.” (Palma, 
2009:1). One important player is absent from this political economic analysis: Central 
banks. The following section is devoted to the role of central banking in allowing this 
environment that has been exceptionally favorable to financial intermediaries and 
financial asset rentiers. 
2.3.1. Central banking 
Central bankers had to take unprecedented measures (asset purchases labeled 
quantitative easing) to contain the crisis and save economic growth. The stabilization of 
the conditions in financial markets should give rise to concerns that inflation might result 
and interest rates should be raised (Giles, 2014) while others warn of the risks of 
deflation (Economist, 2013). It is surprising that concerns of inflation are voiced at all 
because inflation declined sharply worldwide in 2013 (King, 2014). This obsession with 
inflation has a 30-year history and has been the primary focus of central banks. It is 
important to briefly explain how this came to be. 
Following Milton Friedman and Robert Lucas, mainstream neo-liberal macroeconomists 
in the 1980s began to believe that the inflation rate was the only parameter that could be 
controlled by monetary policy in the long run. Therefore, price stability became the raison 
d’être of central banks, primarily achieved through inflation targeting. This theory is 
strengthened by the notion that unemployment has a “natural” rate, below which it sparks 
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inflation. Thus, at the beginning of the 1980s, maintaining sufficiently high interest rates, 
even at the expense of high unemployment was praised by neoliberal economists and 
politicians. Thus it is an idea presented as the truth that has led to real political decisions: 
The ECB is charter-bound to maintain price stability at all costs (Galbraith, 1999). 
However, there is no consensus regarding the “natural rate of unemployment” doctrine, 
and it is not supported by empirical evidence. Moreover, there are many other 
disinflationary factors to explain the slower growth and modest inflation of the past 30 
years: “Tighter fiscal policy, policy to promote greater labor “flexibility” (anti-union policy), 
globalization and increased competition from low wage countries, reduction of welfare 
and other social spending, balance of payment constraints resulting from pegged 
exchange rates (unification of European economies, pegged exchange rates among Latin 
American nations), negative demand shocks in the aftermath of exchange rate and debt 
crises (Asian Tigers, Latin American nations), and so on.” (Wray, 2007:18). 
Combating inflation took the form of a standard policy framework: Inflation targeting (the 
inflation-targeting framework ITF), which emphasizes transparency and an explicit long-
run inflation target. The 2008 crisis has not altered the overriding goal of inflation 
targeting, even though it added the function of safeguarding financial stability (Reichlin 
and Baldwin, 2013). However, an important development is worth noting. The 2008 
financial crisis necessitated the intervention of central banks into financial markets. A 
report by the Official Monetary and Financial Institution Forum indicates that a cluster of 
central banks have become the main players on global stock markets. The People’s Bank 
of China, which comprises many institutions, is the largest public sector holder of 
equities. In Europe, the Swiss National Bank has a 15 percent equity portfolio. The 
Danish central bank held an equity quota worth USD 500 million in 2013 (Atkins, 2014). 
This shows the limits of financial capitalism: Central bank are responsible for financial 
stability and so have to respond to financial crisis by intervening in financial markets, 
thereby risking fueling equity bubbles.  At the same time, they are still independent from 
governments and politics and keep their inflation targeting framework. Central bank 
independence from government was sought so as to prevent government mingling into 
monetary policy. Now that their role has expanded beyond that, isn’t it reasonable to 
question the mantra of central bank independence again? 
The notion that central bankers are above politicians and free of ideological influences 
needs to be mitigated. Central bankers’ decisions are not made in a political and 
ideological vacuum. However, the inflation-targeting framework insists that central banks 
be more independent and more accountable. Epstein (2002:7) noted a logical 
contradiction here because if central banks are independent, they are only accountable to 
themselves. He goes on to state that the contradiction is resolved in the sense that 
central banks have become accountable to financial markets instead of their 
governments and citizens (Epstein, 2002:8). In a similar vein, Buiter (2006) argued that 
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operational independence necessitates such substantial requirements (political, technical, 
financial, security of tenure and of terms of employment) that, if achieved, it would not be 
substantively accountable. This is, to varying degrees, the status of most developed 
nations’ central banks. Monetary policy’s narrow focus on inflation linked to 
unemployment is one of the unquestioned tenets of macroeconomic policy in OCDE 
countries. For Stockhammer (2007:7), this redefinition of monetary policy is a salient 
feature of the new finance-dominated regime. 
The redefinition of monetary policy has placed price stability above all other possible 
goals. The notion that there is a “natural rate” of unemployment implies that it is pointless 
to attempt to reduce it. An inflation target of approximately 2 percent is now widely 
accepted as an obvious, “natural” standard. The technicality of monetary policy makes it 
appear as if this rate is neutral, with identical effects on all. However, inflation targeting is 
far from neutral, both politically and economically and, socially, from a redistributive 
perspective. It is not the aim of this chapter to review the inflation targeting literature and 
the effects of monetary policies, but simply to expose a few points to demonstrate that 
central bank independence should not be taken for granted, as it has real consequences. 
In addition to unemployment, this redefinition has other distributive consequences. First, 
low inflation advantages creditors over debtors. Moreover, in a macroeconomic context of 
low demographic and economic growth, it also entails that low inflation favors capital over 
wages, thereby exacerbating inequality (Piketty, 2013).  The macroeconomic context of 
the past 15 years has provided even further advantages for rentiers when one considers 
that, on the one hand, inflation has remained under control in terms of prices, but on the 
other hand, it had migrated to assets. The Great Moderation corresponds to a period of 
low inflation and reduced output volatility, arguably ending business cycles. However, it 
simultaneously witnessed Irrational Exuberance in financial markets. 
This period was a characterized by conventional monetary policy, in that both inflation 
and interest rates were low. Low inflation and high interest rates have traditionally been in 
the interests of creditors, but the past 15 years tell us a different story: That of “asset 
inflation”. U.S. policy makers believed that they had found a way to depoliticize the 
complicated task of distributing capital among competing social groups by relegating the 
task to the market. However, the newly deregulated market failed, and instead of 
allocating scarce capital, it increased it and inflation remained high. In 1979, Volker, chair 
of the US Federal Reserve, raised interest rates in a decisive attempt to reduce inflation. 
“But while Volker’s punitive monetary regime did not restrict the growth of credit, high 
interest rates did suppress inflation by drawing capital out of the productive economy and 
into financial markets. Critically, with inflation vanquished to the financial markets  - where 
it was not visible (or conceptualized) as such - the state would no longer confront 
seemingly impossible trade-offs between imposing austerity and facing ever mounting 
price pressures” (Krippner, 2010:464). Asset inflation is now clearly visible: Wealth 
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creation “à la Greenspan” induced an increase of net worth per capita on average by 
approximately $400’000 between 1982 and 2007. By mid-2009, it had regressed to its 
1992 level (Palma, 2009:48). It is equally clear that the developed world finds itself in a 
bubble economy. 
Perez’s analysis (2003) of the different stages of technology-driven interaction between 
financial capital and production capital is most appropriate to the current situation in 
developed economies. Following the emergence of a new technology, there is an excess 
of financial capital, too few good opportunities and the tremendous gains observed in the 
new industries set a standard. Financial capital, instead of funding old, unsophisticated 
enterprises, begins to imagine sophisticated instruments to make money from money.  
This represents the beginnings of the decoupling of finance from the real economy, which 
signals a phase of bubbles and frenzy.  Financial capital now establishes its own 
conditions, criteria and norms for production capital. Entrepreneurs and managers in the 
real economy conform to these dictates to attract the funding from what now increasingly 
resembles a casino. New financial instruments are imagined as ways to generate money, 
and the line between dividends and earnings and capital is increasingly blurred. The 
divorce between financial capital and production capital is complete: “For those pursuing 
the accumulation of wealth, the higher profits possible in the financial sphere discourage 
direct engagement in productive activities, except those related to the newest and most 
dynamic technologies, and attract even more money towards finance. This increases the 
disparity between the mass of money vying for high returns in the financial system and 
the actual aggregate rhythm of wealth creation in the production and trade of goods and 
services. The resulting inflation of asset prices generates unwarranted capital gains 
completely divorced from the profits and dividends of the real economy represented in 
them” (Perez, 2003:111). 
Considering technological revolution as an element fueling bubbles should not prevent to 
remember that the current phase of bubble economy is also the result of policies and has 
consequences for the distribution of wealth. Such an environment offers the owners of 
financial capital numerous opportunities and access to the financial instruments required 
to make money on capital gains and dividends, rather than earnings alone. Asset price 
inflation raises property prices, without influencing wages or consumer prices. As the 
saying goes, the bubble economy allows the rentiers to have their cake and eat it too. 
The growing importance of capital gains in this regime of wealth generation forced central 
bankers to hold interest rates low. “The reason is the increasing importance of capital 
gains in the wealth accumulation of finance and “industry”. Hence, while price inflation is 
still out, “asset inflation” is definitely in – very in. This is why, in recent years, capitalists 
on both Wall Street and main street and, everywhere around the world, are very wary of 
increases in interest rates. They fear that interest rate increases would burst the asset 
inflation bubble, and, in fact, their fear does not seem to have been misplaced. 
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Financialization and asset price inflation may be a temporary state of affairs. But it might 
also represent a new era in the political economy of finance.” (Epstein, 2002:18) 
Following an interval of 11 years after Epstein’s article and a financial crisis with global 
consequences that exposed the flaws of the system, some dared to voice their concerns 
regarding the dangers of this “silent financial revolution”. However, debunking the myths 
of neoliberal ideology (shareholder value primacy, Efficient Financial Market Theory) and 
exposing the shortcomings of mainstream financial economics will be a time-consuming 
task, especially when there are powerful vested interests in the status quo. Thus, 
developed economies need not only to reform their financial sectors but also to 
implement an entire shift in policy. The question is not whether there ought to be more or 
less regulation, a financial stability board, or some new responsibilities for central banks 
to manage bubbles. These are ad hoc responses. What seems necessary is a set of 
policies that prevent some interests groups from holding up the interactions between 
finance and the real economy. The basic elements of that relationship - liquidity and 
information - cannot be privatized at the systemic advantage of the same few actors. 
2.4. Policies 
A political economic analysis of the “finance and society” relationship allows one to 
observe the larger picture. As this chapter has attempted to demonstrate, there are some 
players for whom different rules of the game apply with respect to their relationship with 
finance. Against this background, one can contend that a series of ad hoc regulations will 
not repair the broken financial markets of developed economies. What is needed is a 
coherent set of new policies. The above analysis revealed three areas of reform:  
• Making liquidity a public good 
• Making public information a public good 
• Redefining the relationship between the financial sector and the state 
One should add here that these proposed reforms are most likely to be implemented at 
the regional and international levels. The focus of the following set of policies is not 
national because even if some differences persist across the financial systems of OECD 
countries, financial globalization has homogenized best practices and policies and 
banking regulation. Moreover, stock markets have also merged, erasing national 
differences.  
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2.4.1. Making liquidity a public good 
The rents that some financial sector actors are able to extract and the profits that some 
are able to accrue at the expense of others stem from this obsession with liquidity in the 
financial system, which, as we have observed earlier, is considered a commodity. It 
becomes clear that the commoditization of the basic elements that allow actors to play 
the game leads to different rules of the game, thereby destroying the very foundation of 
what makes market economies an efficient system of resource allocation. To limit the 
commoditization of liquidity, stock markets need to be remutualized and Alternative 
Trading Systems (ATS) (Multilateral Trading Facilities in Europe) should be closed.  
The arguments for the demutualization of stock exchanges assume that they are simply 
companies similar to all others. However, it is obvious that they are not. An institution with 
the function of reflecting the real and fair prices of shares in economic ventures is a public 
good and should be considered one to induce as many diverse investors and firms to be 
listed as possible. The efficiency of a stock exchange is not what is important. It is its 
contribution to the efficiency of the overall financial system in allocating capital. Ironically, 
ensuring that stock markets reflect economic reality to the greatest extent as possible and 
only perform this function will attract liquidity and not vice versa. Re-mutualizing stock 
exchanges and making them not-for-profit institutions when they have already been 
privatized would signal that fair access for all investors is the priority, not the profitability 
of exchanges. Mutualized not-for-profit stock exchanges will have fewer incentives to 
offer liquidity rebates to attract financial players.   
This cannot be achieved unless Alternative Trading Venues are closed. One argument for 
the establishment of alternative trading venues is to increase competition, thereby forcing 
traditional venues to decrease trading costs. In encouraging competition among various 
venues, advocates of stock exchange liberalization implicitly admit that the primary 
function of stock markets is not to provide fair and just prices for their listed firms, but to 
increase profitability for the owners of stock exchanges. It becomes clear that it is not 
possible to have both. The latest accounts denouncing the unethical practices that the 
proliferation of trading venues and the privatization of stock exchanges have allowed to 
emerge reveal this distinctly. Moreover, the argument defending the existence of these 
alternative trading venues is that they are dark pools of liquidity. In these non-lit markets, 
institutional investors can trade large blocks of share without attracting the attention of the 
market and driving prices up or down. This inconvenience, which would not exist if 
institutional investors could trade their shares slowly, must be weighted against the 
additional problems created by ATS: A non-transparent price formation mechanism, 
conflicts of interest causing ATS to sell information to attract liquidity, the predatory 
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practices allowing certain players to profit from the fact that others are trading, and the 
still unknown influence of ATS quotation systems on lit market prices.  
The European Commission decided to regulate alternative trading venues, proposing a 
trading cap for any one stock of 4 percent per venue or 8 percent on a European-market-
wide basis. The EU commission is also concerned with the effects of dark liquidity (these 
platforms do not publicly display their orders) on the price discovery of publicly lit markets 
and thus insisted on pre-trade and post-trade transparency (Puaar, 2013). While the 
European Commission’s concern evinces a willingness to “light up” alternative venues 
and limit their growth, it will not resolve the problem of conflicts of interest and the 
detrimental effects of differently regulated exchanges competing against one another for 
liquidity. Reducing the number of ATS does not resolve the question of principle that is 
the existence of predatory algorithms, which prey on institutional investors’ trading 
patterns. It is clear that such practices have to be made illegal. This topic is mentioned 
below, as it is related to the general position of the state with respect to financial market 
practices.  
Imposing speed limits on transactions logically follows nearly immediately from the 
above. It is another means of avoiding the privatization of liquidity that high-frequency 
trading has enjoyed. Trading at the speed of light only profits those who are able to locate 
their servers near the exchange. The argument that high-frequency trading adds liquidity 
to markets has repeatedly been proven empirically incorrect. Market liquidity vanishes 
once HFT firms consider trading to be excessively risky. Trading speed limits would slow 
the pace of transactions and restore fair access to stock markets for every type of 
investor. By the same token, the collocation of servers should not be permitted. 
Collocation is a means for stock markets to make money and again demonstrates that 
not-for-profit exchanges are needed.  
Finally, it is important to address the issues of corporate governance and the primacy of 
shareholder value. Quarterly reports and managerial practices emphasizing share 
performance in stock markets serves to divert and privatize liquidity, which is a common 
good for enterprises and therefore the rest of society. It seems there is little that 
regulation can achieve in this regard because, as noted above, shareholder value is a 
myth. Academics, experts, universities and politicians should strive to debunk these 
preconceived notions that contradict corporate laws and corporate economics, as Stout 
(2012) has done. From a legal perspective, directors have no legal responsibility to 
maximize returns to shareholders. That the directors of public companies can be sued for 
failing to maximize shareholder wealth is a fable. As long as directors do not seize a 
firm’s assets for themselves, they enjoy substantial autonomy in their decisions. It is 
important to recognize that increasing shareholder value is not a legal obligation, but a 
managerial choice. This choice relies on the following false premise in economic theory 
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that considerably weakens the principal-agent model. First, shareholder do not own 
corporations, they own shares of a stock, that is, a contract that affords them limited 
rights, similar to any other bondholder, supplier or employee. Second, shareholders are 
not the residual claimants in corporations. This notion has its roots in bankruptcy law, 
which considers the subject of dead companies and not living ones. Finally, shareholders 
do not hire the board of directors. The board of directors exists prior to and independently 
of shareholders. Thus, it is a normative view of corporate economics that imposes the 
maximization of shareholder returns in the short-term, as it is believed that this will 
improve firm performance. As Stout wrote (2012), this is clearly disproven by empirical 
evidence. Thus, it appears that corporate law and economics  consider liquidity to be a 
public good, which neo-liberal ideology has managed to privatize. Corporations require 
capital, which cannot be reclaimed by shareholders whenever a performance measure 
indicates that they can (performance measures, as we have observed, are biased in 
whom they favor). There should be additional studies demonstrating the advantages, for 
the shareholders, of firms being able to control their assets. This would reduce 
shareholder opportunism and increase stakeholders’ incentives to invest. That is, after all, 
in the shareholders’ interest (Stout, 2012).   
As noted above, if one considers the 2008-2009 crisis a crisis of the principle of 
liquidity governing financial markets (Amato & Fantacci, 2012: 25), rethinking the role 
of liquidity, and ultimately money, should be on the agenda. At the core of the problem is 
the dual function that money assumes: On the one hand, it is a measure of value, which 
is used to settle transactions. On the other hand, it is a store of value, which is 
accumulated. These two functions of money correspond to two functions of banks. As 
banks issue money, they offer payment and settlement services and simultaneously issue 
credit. To provide credit to the maximum of individuals and assume that all risks can be 
controlled, money in the form of credit has been made as liquid as possible. Credit was 
sold on financial markets, even to those who did not deserve it, as some have noted 
(Amato and Fantacci, 2012:31), as if it were any other kind of product, at the end of a 
complex process of securitization, which is the commoditization of money. However, the 
commoditization of money in the form of credit jeopardized money’s ultimate function: 
That of settling debts. “Finance has to do with settlement, the end of a transaction. The 
end of finance, understood as its purpose, is a meeting between debtor and creditor in 
which their relationship can come to an end” (Amato and Fantacci, 2012 49). A creditor 
who is never able to settle his obligation is never free, with all of the social implications 
that accompany consistently being indebted. Greenspan once remarked that the more 
debt workers have, the less free they would feel to strike (Amato and Fantacci, 
2012:227).  
Whereas Amato and Fantacci analyzed the importance of liquidity from an historical 
perspective, the same conclusion can be reached from the post-Keynesian perspective of 
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“endogenous money”. This branch of monetary economics aegues that, contrary to the 
money multiplier theory, banks endogenously create money through loans, which in turn 
create deposit mechanisms. These mechanisms, whereby reserves are sought after 
loans have been made, and not vice versa (Rossi, 2010), does not constrain banks, 
which have the opportunity to increase their loan portfolios to a considerably greater 
extent than their available income. As Rossi showed, the result is a massive flow of 
liquidity into financial and real estate sectors, as was the case in the years leading to the 
2007 crisis, thus creating bubbles (Rossi, 2010). A the heart of the problem lies a 
structural flaw in the banking sector, which is amplified by modern financial practices, 
financial liberalization and technology and does not differentiate between money spent on 
the real sector and money spent on financial assets and real estate. In Rossi’s words, 
“the monetary circuits of produced income (which has purchasing power because of the 
underlying production of real goods and services) are supplemented by monetary circuits 
of bank deposits that have no purchasing power originally, because they are not issued 
as a result of production. These bank deposits absorb therefore by osmosis a part of [the] 
purchasing power of produced income” (Rossi, 2010:416).  
As Rossi proposes, one means of resolving the structural tension between the conflicting 
roles of banks in money creation would be to record the various purposes of money in 
separate departments. That would protect the function of money as a measure of the 
value of economic activity. Separating the uses of money as credit and as a measure of 
economic transactions (payment) in terms of accounting would then make it possible to 
associate the amount spent in the financial market to the deposit created by the issuance 
of money for real, value added production and economic activity. In other words, the loan-
creates-deposit mechanisms would not be operative in such a refined framework. This 
would considerably weaken the fetish for liquidity praised by financial markets. As such, 
this reveals one of the institutional means of escaping this fetishization of liquidity.  
At the international level, another approach to strengthening the role of money as a 
means of payment would be to provide a true international settlement facility and an 
international currency, which would serve as a unit of account. The current situation, 
which has been in place since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, is a non-
system that elicits exchange rate volatility and results in countries managing international 
reserves as if money were any other type of tradable commodity. The establishment of an 
international settlement institution and an international monetary system would ensure 
that “within countries all payments are finalized in local currencies, while between 
currency areas all payments are finalized through the emission of international money as 
a vehicle of those real goods, services, or financial assets that move beyond a monetary 
space’s borders” (Rossi, 2009: 16). In other words, these institutions, which were already 
proposed by Keynes in 1944 (Rossi, 2010, Amato and Fantacci, 2012) and recently 
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recalled by the Governor of the People’s Bank of China (Xiaochan, 2009) would proceed 
in much the same manner central banks do in their national areas.  
Another means of avoiding the privatization of liquidity by shareholders is to advance 
reforms to prevent the privatization of information. 
2.4.2. Making public information a public good 
Neo-liberal ideology was able to circumvent corporate law and corporate economics to 
impose a normative view of the primacy of shareholder value, but liquidity cannot be 
extracted from firms without the privatization of standard information. As noted above, the 
mark-to-market approach attempts to value each component of an enterprise, considered 
separately from one another, to inform shareholders of the true and just value of their 
investments. Accounting has ceased to be a tool to steer enterprises on the sea of 
economic hardship and opportunity and has become the shareholders’ compass for 
measuring the performance of their investments. This approach to accounting is as 
biased by ideology as the approach used by Soviet economies that subdued accounting 
to central planning. In both cases, the value that accounting can produce does not remain 
within the enterprise but flows outward to either shareholders or the state. In both 
instances, society as a whole loses. Thus there is a serious need to rethink accounting 
models and standards such as the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS), 
proposed by the International Accounting Standard Board (IASC), an institutional 
evolution of which reflects a transition away from the accounting profession (Aglietta and 
Rébérioux, 2004:165).  
Private models and ratios that have been proposed by consulting companies, such as 
the Economic Value Added (EVA) and the others that Lordon (2000) analyzed, should 
be banned from quarterly reports and other accounting reporting. Under the disguise of 
technicality, these measures are not neutral and clearly favor one party. The enterprise is 
a political arena in which the interests of all parties should be considered in equilibrium if 
it is to be efficient. That also includes long-term shareholders, who have been ignored by 
proponents of models such as EVA.  
Regarding stock market data, what constitutes private and public data should be 
clearly differentiated. Information that is already private, such as non-displayable 
orders, should remain so. Stock exchanges and alternative venues leaking private data to 
the High-Frequency Trading industry, as appears to have been and may remain the case, 
should be illegal (Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2012:115). Such behavior is already banned in other 
economic sectors, and there is no reason that stock markets should constitute an 
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exception. “How would you react if other types of financial institutions sold similar data? 
Would it be okay if a bank sold information about to whom you wrote checks? Would it be 
okay if Visa/MasterCard sold information about what you bought? Would it be okay if the 
telephone company sold information about who you called?” (Arnuk and Saluzzi, 
2012:123). By the same token, data resulting from actual trades on stock exchanges 
should be processed and displayed before quotes produced by HFT interference. 
Because of collocation and private data feeds, HFT firms are able to produce quotes that 
are faster, and hence more accurate, than the actual public Securities Information 
Processor (SIP).  
One way to privatize information is to make it complex. Therefore, transparency is 
considered important. It does not add to regulatory costs or have distortionary effects and 
is key to consumer protection. It is imperative to inform clients of the risks attached to the 
financial products in which they are investing. However, transparency is not necessarily 
linked to the amount of information provided, but to the way in which this information is 
conveyed. In that regard,  approaches to transparency need to be refined. As Guiso 
(2010) wrote, “the main problem with disclosure is that it takes for granted that investors 
are able to understand what is disclosed and its implications in terms of incentives” 
(Guiso, 2010:17). Therefore, Guiso proposed the introduction of a system of third-party 
ratings based on a “fairness index”, the operation of which would be understandable to 
the typical bank customer. The “bank-fairness index” would measure the bank’s ability 
and reliability to advise inexperienced investors. In that respect, one should rethink the 
distinction between unsophisticated and sophisticated investors and the amount of 
information provided to these two categories of actors. Paradoxically, sophisticated 
investors who are able to understand the risks of their investments should require 
additional information, whereas unsophisticated investors might not know how to interpret 
the information provided. Also, the commission costs included in financial products 
should be disclosed, to allow clients to evaluate the potential conflicts of interest that 
financial institutions have in selling products created by other issuers. Mutual funds 
should also disclose the brokerage commission and custodian fees in their prospectuses 
(Guiso, 2010).  
Finally, the manipulation of public information via algorithms specifically designed to drive 
market quotes up or down, as in the case of Citigroup’s “Dr. Evil program” mentioned 
above, must be severely legally punished. These practices are harmful to the market 
itself. While concepts such as Social Corporate Responsibility have gained traction in 
recent years, it is important to emphasize that it is also a matter of Corporate Market 
Responsibility (Gomes, 2013). Financial companies need to establish internal 
mechanisms and an appropriate culture to avoid these types of behavior. This 
demonstrates that some financial market actors believe that stealing public resources is 
the new rule of the game. Was it the influence of technology, adding distance and 
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anonymity that changed the moral equation underlying these behaviors? The 
development of illegal downloading spurred by the proliferation of the Internet clearly 
demonstrates how technology can deteriorate moral standards.   
The direct manipulation of public information, as in the case of the LIBOR and FOREX 
scandals, is more troubling. The forex trading probe, for example, has its own topic on the 
Financial Times’ website,1 which provides a notion of the extent of the manipulation. 
These two cases are more serious in that they involve financial market actors, who 
should normally compete against one another, conspiring against the state and the 
general public. Joshi (2013) highlighted how reciprocal relationships allowed such 
cooperation to take place: “Traders and brokers often promised to repay the submitters‘ 
favours in some way. This was a two-way relationship that submitters knew would benefit 
them in the future, or had already produced dividends in the past” (Joshi, 2013:20). It is 
difficult to not perceive a similar pattern in the operation of former Soviet economies. As 
chapter three revealed, the culture of reciprocity and relationship-based deals implies an 
evident loss of efficiency, but it also erodes state standards and symbols. The state 
monopoly in issuing money is the result of a long and hard-won political battle. 
Counterfeiting money is a criminal offense, not a regulatory breach, in most countries. 
The 18 security features of Swiss bills exist to ensure that counterfeiting is not possible, 
and the laws for those who attempt to do so send clear signals. Why is information 
manipulation, which has similar effects to counterfeiting, not treated in the same was? Do 
the LIBOR and FOREX cases reflect the process of financial markets eroding state 
monetary sovereignty and imposing a new, universal standard based on tradable 
securities (Orléan, 1999)? 
These two massive, global frauds reflect states’ permissive stance toward financial 
sectors. No regulation will be effective unless there is a profound policy shift to reframe 
the relationship between the financial sector and the state. 
2.4.3. Redefining the relationship between the financial sector and the state 
In analyzing the bubble economy and how rentiers benefit from it, Palma (2009) observes 
that it is sustained by the state. “Accordingly, for classical liberalism the state and the 
markets each have their own space, separate from one another. For neo-liberalism, in 
contrast, the distinction between the space of the state and that of the markets 
disappears; so the state (and everything else) should be mapped out as a function (or as 
a sub-set) of unregulated markets” (Palma, 2009:33). From the neo-liberal perspective, 
                                                
1 See http://www.ft.com/intl/topics/themes/Forex_trading_probes 
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the market is the optimal form of social organization, and market failures are not inherent, 
but accidental to the system; the question thus becomes how best to adapt political 
power, discourses and practices to this new creed. Following Foucault, this new 
interaction between politics and market principles gives rise to a new form of 
“governmentability”. In this new configuration of power, financial market de-regulation is 
actually market-friendly re-regulation. Assuming that markets are not composed of 
persons, the proponents of neo-liberal regulations elude the political question of who 
benefits from market-friendly re-regulation. In what follows, we propose that states should 
seek to restore their authority vis-à-vis financial sectors by initiating a policy shift that 
clarifies their position toward financial sectors. 
Introducing simplicity in financial regulation 
There is a fierce debate over government intervention in the economy, but as Zingales 
(2004) argued, one should consider the problem of intervention to be a continuum and 
not two opposing choices between government intervention and laissez-faire. To what 
extent could the government regulate the financial industry by simply defining what can 
be owned (and thus traded) and what cannot? In this regard, a case-by-case approach to 
highly complex instruments would be sensible. Short selling, for example, was temporarily 
banned for varying lengths of time in several countries, and no one raised concerns that 
governmental intervention would kill innovation. By the same token, stock markets can be 
closed in response to extreme events and then reopen. The proposition of a time ceiling 
for financial orders (addressing the many concerns associated with high-frequency 
trading) is somewhat different and reflects an issue of political philosophy: Should the 
government impose a limit on innovation? That is, of course, provided that one regards 
high frequency trading as a real innovation with clear social benefits. However, this is 
akin to arguing that societies should not impose speed limits on highways for fear of 
undermining the innovation potential of the automobile industry. To continue the 
metaphor, a speed limit on a highway is a very simple and clear rule that prohibits driving 
at excessive speeds. Thus there is perhaps a place for government intervention 
before the moment of financial regulation, simply by defining what is possible. This 
type of regulations would be a component of a comprehensive, Keynesian model of 
financial regulation, as proposed by Canova (2009). Higher margin requirements in 
lending, as Canova argued, would draw a bright distinction and reconnect the risks of 
lending to the borrower. It would be as simple as not allowing unsafe vehicles. He argued 
that “without such discipline - without traffic lights, stop signs, and an occasional toll booth 
in the financial marketplace - those with privileged positions in the marketplace will follow 
their incentives to become overleveraged and to gamble with other people’s money. They 
will continue to present a moral hazard to the marketplace as a result of their ability to 
benefit from bailouts and hidden subsidies” (Canova, 2009:393). This type of government 
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action should obviously be coordinated at the international level to address issues of 
financial industry competition. 
Taxing complexity also appears to be a straightforward solution: “There is a case for 
taxing complexity directly at its source. Recent events have redemonstrated the problems 
that arise in risk-managing large, complex financial firms with multiple models and 
management information systems. They make the world’s largest banks, arguably, too 
big to manage. At present, no explicit regulatory charge is levied on those complexity 
externalities. Doing so would help protect the system against failure, while providing 
explicit incentives to simplify balance sheets” (Haldane, 2012:22). This is the perspective 
from which the much-debated Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) or Financial Service Tax 
(FST) should be approached.   
By the same token, there is a need to increase taxes on High Net Worth Individuals 
(HNWI), who are the primary clients of hedge funds. As we have observed, the financial 
revolution allowed rentiers to accumulate and concentrate unprecedented amounts of 
wealth, especially in the form of paper money. This created pressure on hedge funds to 
find ways to obtain higher returns, as regulated stock markets can only absorb a certain 
volume (Lysandrou, 2011). A tax on HNWI would slow the process of accumulation and 
potentially decrease the pressure for security on the demand side. 
Regarding the concern that firms have become “too big to regulate”, “banking supervisors 
would be well advised to leave as little as possible to management discretion and to go 
for bold, simple rules that are easy to understand and possible to enforce” (Augar, 2012). 
Zingales proposed, for example, to increase the penalty for fraud. Increasing the costs 
of fraud relative to its potential benefits provides effective incentives to not engage in 
fraud and would be costless (Zingales, 2004). Similarly, whistle blowers should be 
rewarded. Zingales rightly noted that all of the fraud in recent years could not have 
occurred without the knowledge of numerous employees. Rewarding whistle blowers 
would compensate them for the risk that they take because without it, alerting regulators 
to the irregularities of their employers and colleagues is too costly. Such a system would 
create competitive enforcement. Another set of simple measures would seek to 
strengthen internal control and encourage improved corporate governance. 
Regulatory policies and corporate governance are complementary, and the success of 
the former depends on a culture of the latter (Lumpkin, 2009). Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CRS), even if used by firms as window dressing, has been widely 
accepted among multinationals, and a corporate governance culture that suggests that 
employees should care about their clients is clearly in the direct interest of economic 
entities. Thus, educating a client, for example, could be a component of a CRS agenda 
for large banks, especially regarding sophisticated products. Addressing certain issues at 
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the corporate governance level could also be a means of altering moral standards in the 
financial sector. 
Central banking 
A genuine shift in governmental policies with respect to the financial industry would 
logically include certain measures to reposition central banks vis-à-vis governments, that 
is, to rethink their “independence” and the set of measures necessary to contain inflation. 
This would demand a profound change in academic circles and the ways in which 
economic ideas influence policies. It is not the purpose of this thesis to review the vast 
and diverse literature on central banking, but one can nevertheless question two central 
notions structuring modern central banking: Its assumed independence and the 
presupposed natural rate of unemployment.  
First, it is important to recognize the linkages between financial sectors and central 
banking. That interest rates were kept low to avoid bursting the asset bubble that led to 
the 2008 global crisis is now beyond doubt. Thus, it is perhaps time to challenge certain 
fundaments that central banking took under the neo-liberal form of governance. It is 
important to challenge these fundaments because the current reform program aims at 
making central banks the managers of economies prone to boom and busts because of 
its ties to financial sectors. However, the episodes of the Great Moderation/Irrational 
Exuberance taught us that regulatory capture is not restricted to micro regulation. 
Macroeconomic policies can also be captured. According to Palley (2011), this is an 
understudied topic. As mentioned above, central banks are neither impervious to group-
think nor free of ideology. Therefore, the concept of central bank independence needs to 
be reviewed. Independence from government and populist pressures on monetary policy 
does not necessarily translate into independence from financial market pressures.  
Second, it is crucial to question the “natural rate of unemployment” theory that targets an 
inflation rate of approximately 2 percent, which has weak theoretical and empirical 
foundations (Galbraith, 1999, Epstein, 2002, Palley, 2011). Inflation targets can be raised, 
especially during recessions, when deflation poses a greater threat that real price 
increases. A 4-5 percent inflation target would be perfectly acceptable and equilibrate the 
distributional effect of monetary policy. 
Rethinking financial development  
Rethinking financial development forces one to reconsider the poorly named process of 
financial innovation. Poorly named because most of the “innovative” financial instruments 
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developed in recent decades are not true examples of innovation and, according to 
Partnoys (2003), have been designed for regulatory arbitrage purposes. Such a mandate 
for this new state agency would help link the regulatory structure to innovative activities, 
one challenge of financial regulation according to Lumpkin (2009). He provided an 
overview of the regulatory framework in most OECD countries, which entails the following 
activities: “1) licensing, registration, and prudential supervision of some categories of 
financial institutions; 2) disclosure requirements for public offerings of securities; 3) 
authorization and oversight of securities markets; 4) regulatory and supervisory 
procedures governing the management of financial distress events and the restructuring 
or exit of insolvent financial institutions; 5) regulation of anti-competitive market structures 
and takeover activity; and 6) regulation of market conduct.” (Lumpkin, 2009:12). These 
activities have to be linked to processes of financial innovation. Ultimately, in most other 
industries, before innovations enter markets, it is necessary to demonstrate that they are 
not harmful to consumers.  
Thus, financial development has to be considered against the background of financial 
innovation and complexity and the costs they produce. These costs are reflected (in red) 
in a modified version of the Financial Development Index designed by Roubini and 
Bilodeau (2008), as figure 7 below shows. As it became quite obvious for other economic 
phenomena (economic growth or financial liberalization), a financial development index 
should include “qualitative” elements to capture the quality of financial development. Such 
a costs approach would question financial development as an unconditionally beneficial 
process.  
 
Figure 7. Composition of the financial development index (costs of financial development added in red by the 
author) 
5
1.
1:
 T
he
 F
in
an
ci
al
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t I
nd
ex
Figure 1: Composition of the Financial Development Index
Source: World Economic Forum
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(Please see the essay by Ross Levine in Chapter 1.2 for a full 
discussion of this topic)
Financial development has a disproportionately positive impact
on an economy’s poor. This occurs because better-developed
financial markets reduce the importance of parental wealth on
the income of the next generation by providing access to capi-
tal, intensifying competition, and by expanding economic oppor-
tunities.
The level of human capital of an individual depends par-
tially on schooling. Schooling is costly in terms of school fees,
the higher cost of housing in school districts with high quality
schools, and the opportunity cost from lost wages. Thus, fami-
lies and individuals must raise the funds necessary to achieve a
high level of human capital through schooling. When financial
markets are highly developed, individuals of high ability but low
means can borrow the necessary funds to attain the same
advanced qualifications of people whose parents have greater
financial means. When markets are not developed, children of
wealthy parents, regardless of their ability, will have access to
schooling that high-ability individuals of poorer parents will not.
For example, this can occur when the banking sector is too
highly concentrated and not competitive enough.
Similarly, wages and wealth generation can be related to
entrepreneurial successes. To succeed in an entrepreneurial
endeavour, individuals need capital to start or expand their
businesses. In a well-developed financial market, individuals
will be able to find lenders or investors to fund their ventures
based solely on their merits as business propositions. However,
in underdeveloped markets, potential lenders and investors will
be unlikely to fund a business proposal by people who do not
have families with sufficient wealth to post collateral for the
loan. In the absence of well-developed financial markets, capi-
tal will not flow to the best business ideas, and people who do
not come from wealthy families will be shut out of entrepre-
neurial opportunities. 
Wealthy families have the means to fund schooling and
entrepreneurial activity, or the connections to access these
funds in the markets regardless of the level of development of
financial markets. However, well-developed financial markets
that distribute capital on the basis of ability or on the merits of a
business proposal are essential for the poor to have access to
those same opportunities. If markets function well, both rich
and poor have access to capital and scarce resources are
assigned where they will have the greatest returns, thereby
increasing wealth in the whole society. 
Box 1: Finance, growth, and the poor
The Financial Development Report 2008 © 2008 World Economic Forum
Informal institutions
Social costs
Formal institutions 
Costs of regulation
Endogenous 
costs
formal and informal complexity
Source: World Economic Forum, (Roubini and Bilodeau, 2008:5)
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What are the consequences of having large and deep financial sectors selling 
instruments that are so complex that professional wealth managers have to ask 
consultants before purchasing them? The regulatory and social costs have to be 
considered because they will impact the output (size, depth and access) that Roubini and 
Bilodeau selected as their definition of financial development. Finally, it should also 
include a measure of the complexity of the financial sector. The obvious problem is to 
agree on a definition of complexity, but a practical approach would be to use a survey and 
solicit the opinions of market participants and investors. What is important is not whether 
a financial instrument is complex in absolute terms, but whether industry professionals 
can manage such complexity. From this perspective, accessibility would be measured by 
the number of persons who feel confident enough to use it. If financial literacy is a 
recognized factor that is important for the development of inclusive financial sectors, one 
must determine whether, in light of the extraordinarily pace of financial innovation in 
recent years, the financial literacy of market participants has also become an issue. This 
could serve as a sort of ``barometer of complexity".  
Additional regulation, responding to the lack of confidence in the solvency of financial 
institutions, is not necessarily the solution. While it can provide short-term solutions when 
markets are prone to panic, it does not address certain fundamental flaws in modern 
financial sectors that this dissertation has attempted to highlight. At worst, this could 
increase uncertainty through pro-cyclicality and systemic risk. Financial regulation seems 
trapped in a vicious cycle in which additional regulation entails further uncertainty and 
risk, which increases distrust and thereby increases the demand for regulation. Zingales’ 
(2004) notion of a governmental body dedicated to the analysis of the costs and benefits 
of new regulation could be a means of escaping this negative spiral, but it should also be 
coupled with a reflection on which types of costs should be considered. This could be an 
occasion to more clearly define the purpose of financial development. The main challenge 
of regulation is to balance private propensities for risk-taking, which should not be zero 
because such activity provides substantial benefits for society, and the disastrous social 
costs of instability. A perspective that accounts for social costs could help maintain 
equilibrium. This social component of regulation stems from the common good that 
finance provides to society, and the protection of this common good should be a policy 
concern.  
Few studies have analyzed how financial market participants cope in a low-trust 
environment, and it is necessary to empirically understand the link between certain norms 
and rules, their impacts on financial sectors, the interactions they produce and how these 
are materialized as outcomes. Understanding this would be important for financial 
institutions with respect to the best practice policies they are establishing, the moral 
standards that they attempt to encourage and the training of sales and relationship 
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managers who are in direct contact with clients. It is also relevant for policy making 
because it would clarify the link between trust and regulation.  
In this regards, a closer look at the LIBOR scandal is valuable.  “The lesson of Libor,” 
Yglesias wrote in Slate Magazine, “is that regulators need to recognize that bankers have 
cast aside the clubby values of yore, and they need to respond in kind. Banks will try to 
abide by the letter of the law, but where loopholes exist, they’ll be ruthlessly exploited 
through dishonest means if necessary and the financial cops need to have a 
fundamentally suspicious attitude toward the regulated entities” (Yglesias, 2012). The 
LIBOR scandal offers a glimpse of the broken relationship between regulators and the 
regulated. However, responding to dishonesty with increased suspicion is treating the 
symptoms and not the root cause of the disease. If the respectable bankers of the past 
are gone, regulators should find ways to promote incentives such that finance becomes 
honest again. There is a solid theoretical basis for markets functioning absent any sort of 
legal enforcement (Tesler, 1980, Klein and Keith, 1981, Boot and Thakor, 1997). 
However, for contracts to enforce themselves, participants need to value reputational 
capital to a greater extent than financial capital. The invisible hand of the market is 
effective, provided that participants are disciplined and evolve in a structure in which they 
will lose much more by cheating than by abiding by their words. Quinn’s study of 
goldsmith-bankers in the late seventeenth century revealed that cooperation emerged 
endogenously among them through self- interest supported by a certain social structure: 
“In lacking a formal institutional structure governing acceptance and clearing, goldsmith-
bankers evince how economic incentives, supported by apprenticeship, proximity, and 
social ties, shaped an early modern banking network integral to the Financial Revolution” 
(Quinn, 1997:414). 
In a similar vein, Stringham (2003) demonstrated how securities trading in seventeenth 
century Amsterdam developed outside the legal structure of the era. Complex financial 
transactions occurred in Amsterdam though they had no legal support because there 
were sufficient market incentives to favor that behavior. Stringham showed that 
stockbrokers relied on the discipline of continuous dealings and reputation alone. Basing 
his findings from the report of a Jewish merchant dealing in Amsterdam, De la Vega’s 
Confusion de Confusiones, Stringham wrote: “At the Amsterdam Bourse each broker had 
to work to get business. Capitalists and merchants were able to make the trade 
themselves so they would only choose to go to the broker and pay his fee if they were 
getting value out such an arrangement” (Stringham, 2003:336). Surprisingly, he did not 
mention another element at work in this context: Learning. The clients of Amsterdam 
stock-brokers were able to conduct trades themselves, if they wished to do so. Examining 
the historical records documenting the last three decades of the seventeenth century, 
Carlos et al. (1998) described how learning enabled the London stock market to emerge. 
“Each transaction provided the basis for the growth of knowledge capital that could be 
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thought of, in part, as a public good available in the coffee houses of the period” (Carlos 
et al., 1998:320). From this vantage point, it is the knowledge of the market and the 
learning process among agents that allowed the London Stock Exchange to emerge. It 
was formally created by the establishment of the Bank of England and all of the other 
laws strengthening private property that were passed in the wake of the Glorious 
Revolution, but learning had to occur first. “Individual investors learned how to make (and 
lose) money in ways that did not directly involve productive processes. They learned how 
to share risk in commercial and financial endeavors; how to buy and sell, and where to 
buy and sell. They learned about the financial rewards and losses they could incur. 
Concomitant with this was the learning by specialized brokers who managed the trade 
during these early years. The goldsmith bankers increased their expertise in the equity 
section of the market” (Carlos et al., 1998:342).  
These examples of financial markets development show that it is necessary to consider 
the institutional and social context in which finance sectors develop. The costs of financial 
market development will depend on specific institutional settings. In other words, the 
interplays between institutions, defined after North (1989) mentioned in the subsequent 
chapters, and financial sectors are worth exploring. The main argument of the following 
and final two chapters is that it is in these interstices, between institutions and finance, 
that one can locate the conditions for the efficient functioning of financial sectors. Thus, 
chapter three will consider the institutional and social costs of financial sector 
development, while chapter four will use the case of SME finance in Russia to show the 
importance social structure underpinning financial system. 
Conclusion  
This chapter showed that three notions of time coexist: Firstly, the nearly speed-of-light 
transactions of the most sophisticated players who use financial markets to prey on other, 
“weaker” players. Secondly, short-term horizon binds the interests of short-term 
shareholders, whose claim on firms in terms of financial profitability are not realistic, with 
those of top managers, who are using the notion of shareholder value to justify asset 
stripping and share buy back. Finally, the longer time horizon of the enterprises that 
financial capitalism seems to consider irrelevant. Some financial market participants profit 
enormously from this new financial market system, while short-term shareholders’ 
interests and CEOs are protected. This clash of temporality stems from the obsession 
with liquidity that is the hallmark of financial market development over the past 30 years 
supported by the increasing speed of transactions. Short-term transactions allow markets 
to be more liquid. 
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It is as though exchanges are not seeking actual clients whom they can serve, but simply 
liquidity providers. The question of the nature of a financial intermediary and in whose 
best interests it has to operate is no longer important provided that the shareholders in 
the companies operating the stock market are able to profit. Does this mean that the 
question of conflicts of interest can be eluded provided that stock exchanges are 
financially healthy? If stock exchanges do not operate in the interest of the investors first, 
do they then not lose their very purpose? Would a hospital in which patient health is not 
placed before all other concerns still be called a hospital? In other words, one must ask 
whether the profound changes that affected the stock market over the last 30 years did 
not affect its very nature and the nature of finance itself. 
Information only becomes public when it is delayed. This might not have been a problem 
when transaction speed was not particularly important, but execution times are currently 
measured in milliseconds, which alters the public nature of financial market output. Data 
are provided by the various trading venues, stock markets or alternative trading systems, 
and substantial fees are extracted from these data. This privatizes information that is 
supposed to be public but only becomes public after having passed through the servers 
and trading venues of the most sophisticated players. Even then, it is filtered by the 
financial media and financial analysts, which amplifies price movements. As noted in 
chapter one, this is symptomatic of a new relationship between financial markets and the 
financial news industry, one that confuses market reality with market potential. Here 
again, the drive for more transparent and standardized data has profited the same 
players whose businesses thrive on liquidity. 
By the same token, the supremacy of liquidity and shareholder value narrowed the real 
nature of the shareholder to an unconscious, short-sighed, opportunistic individual. One 
can well argue that a shareholder who does not support the risk of his/her investment, 
either because his/her investment time frame is less than a second or because ideology 
managed to obscure the legal and economic reality of a corporation, is no longer a 
shareholder. While shareholders should be those who take on the risk of entrepreneurial 
ventures, financial markets provide them with a free “exit opportunity”. This “exit 
opportunity”, sustained by the production of financial information, is changing the nature 
of shareholder involvement in the firm. It is inverting economic logic. Not only has the 
share received by shareholders increased over the past 30 years, even as profits have 
decreased, it also became unthinkable that shareholders should receive less. As 
mentioned earlier, firms borrowed money to maintain shareholder satisfaction (and stock 
market quotations) at high levels by leveraging their economic activities with debt. 
As mentioned, there are some attempts to determine whether the financial sectors of 
developed economies were oversized. Recent studies have toyed with the notion of limits 
to the development of financial sectors. Arcand et al. (2012) demonstrated that financial 
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depth, measured by the amount of credit provided to the private sector as percentage of 
GDP, has a threshold (80 - 100 percent) beyond which additional finance is associated 
with reduced economic growth. Philippon (2012) focused on the efficiency of the financial 
sector and found that the costs of intermediation, historically at approximately 2 percent, 
have increased since the 1980s. This dissertation reveals that while these measures 
might be useful, one must analyze the importance of financial sectors political economy 
perspective. If the entire machine seems to work for shareholders when auditors, ratings 
agencies and market regulators serve as watchdogs for the shareholders’ interests, it is 
important to recall that this institutional infrastructure that privileges shareholders is the 
result of political decisions and not a natural evolution.  
The mediation of the confrontation between various efficiencies is a political issue and 
should not be left to market forces alone, just as environmental efficiency (which 
occasionally contradicts economic productive efficiency) can be protected by state 
environmental standards. It is not the case that simply because capital is and should be a 
private good that the profitability of entire economic systems should be defined by the 
profitability of capital alone. Similarly, privately owned chemical plants cannot define 
environmental standards. The efficiency of risk allocation is important to owners of 
financial capital, but, if taken to its extreme, it might come at the expense of the economic 
productive efficiency of a firm. How many opportunities for entrepreneurial ventures or 
investments in growth have been missed simply because economic value added was 
exclusively defined from the perspective of shareholder value?  
These are questions that cannot be ignored under the justification that financial markets 
are the best available means of allocating capital efficiently and financial market 
efficiency is the only form of efficiency that matters. The hegemony of neoliberalism does 
not summon the end of capital. Bell famously wrote in 1978, “The problem of capital - of 
raising it and spending it - is still very much with us, in the advanced industrial societies 
as well as the underdeveloped economies. In economic fact, it will always be with us.” 
(Bell, 1978:230). This dissertation has attempted to demonstrate that this problem cannot 
be resolved based on the efficiency of financial systems alone because financial systems 
are evolving and financial systems are a part of broader institutional structures that 
influence the way financial systems operate. It is, modestly, a reminder of D. Bell’s 
corollary questions:  How much do we want to spend and for whom? Krippner’s political 
economy of financial liberalization showed that politics decided to let financial sectors 
answer that question to avoid political damage. By letting finance developed into a huge 
and complex risk distribution mechanism, the political costs that Bell’s question entails 
have been swept under the carpet until now, but others have emerged. 
The development of financial markets has favored some financial institutions using 
strategies that imply increasingly complex instruments and short-term horizons, which 
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can impede economic growth. These institutions also benefit the most from international 
financial liberalization. Financial information circulates among financial journalists and 
market participants who know one another and only reaches outside investors after a 
series of feedback loops (Oberlechner and Hocking, 2004). Thus, certain groups of 
market participants have access to data and information unavailable to outside circles. 
This is an ironic development, as one of the primarily advantages of financial markets 
over banks was the more efficient spread of information. The conflict of interest and the 
recurrent instances of scandals and frauds involving listed firms and a series of 
informational intermediaries (ratings agencies, financial analysts, the finance media, 
auditing companies) indicates the manipulation of information. The LIBOR scandals of 
2011-2012 are the most symptomatic of a financial system functioning with different rules 
for certain participants.  
So as complex finance develops its own set of rules, it also processes data and 
information in a manner that is less accessible to the rest of society. That is what chapter 
three will argue. The informal norms it developed conflict with financial regulations and 
the informal norms of the rest of society.  
What are the social consequences of such a transition? How is the institutional structure 
(from a sociological perspective) adapting to it? How are the formal and informal rules, 
norms and routines governing the financial sector changing?  
The following chapter attempts to address these questions. After having discussed the 
consequences of financial sectors developing separately from the economy, the next 
chapter will articulate the consequences of a financial sector developing separately from 
society.  
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CHAPTER 3 
The “finance – society nexus”: When finance is too 
quick 
Asking the questions concluding chapter one entails admitting that financial sectors 
evolve and do so within the broad institutional structures of societies. In chapter three, we 
will describe the formal (rules and regulations) and informal (norms and habits) 
institutional frameworks among SMEs and those connecting them to the banking sector in 
Russia. In many transitional and emerging economies, financial sectors do not develop at 
the same pace as formal and informal institutions. As chapter three shows, this affects 
the relationship between the productive economy and the financial sector. The formal 
rules of the game function well but do not correspond to informal norms. The weight of 
informal constraints affects the operations of a reformed financial sector (on paper). 
Simply put, society is too slow. However, what are the consequences when financial 
sectors evolve too rapidly relative to society? This “finance-society gap” can be observed 
in emerging economies due to underdeveloped institutions, but it also appears in Western 
economies, due to overdeveloped financial sectors. The tremendous developments in the 
financial sectors of developed economies have exerted pressures on the very institutions 
that are intended to support them. Thus, as financial systems became increasingly 
complex, there might not only be a trade-off between the allocation of capital and the 
allocation of risk but also other costs. In that case, finance is developing too rapidly, 
thereby rendering institutions obsolete. This second chapter examines the social costs of 
large and complex financial sectors.  
In other words, this chapter will extend the intense debate over “too big to fail” (TBTF) 
institutions to an arguably “too complex to be beneficial” financial system. The issue of 
“too big to fail” (TBTF) has received substantial attention of late. From bailouts to 
scandals, the international financial media have used TBTF to describe financial 
institutions that state could not afford to let fail and then summarized the difficulty of 
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regulating these institutions through the catchphrase “too big to regulate”. The latest 
scandal involving HSBC demonstrated that certain banks were even “too big to jail”. This 
chapter adopts the unfortunate evolution of the journalistic terms used to described large 
banks but does so for the entire financial sector, as figure 8 below depicts.  
Thus, it first presents the issue of TBTF. It is, ultimately, an important component of the 
social costs of a financial system. The second section briefly cites certain benefits that 
complex modern finance has generated. Modern financial systems are not only large but 
also complex and thus display numerous additional advantages beyond the simple 
economies of scale obtained by megabanks.  
 
Figure 8. The costs of large financial sectors: An institutional perspective 
However, these benefits come at a cost. The costs of a financial system that is “too 
complex to be beneficial” are manifold and embedded in the social fabric of which 
financial sectors are a part. This chapter categorizes these costs into formal ones (costs 
of regulation) and informal ones. The implicit subsidies and bailout funds that distressed 
financial institutions received constitute just the top of the iceberg. Just as the 
insufficiently developed institutions of emerging economies are unable to properly support 
their financial sectors, the financial sectors of developed economies have pursued 
innovation to such an extent that institutions have had difficulty adapting. Thus, the third 
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section analyzes the regulatory issues (formal institutional costs) associated with such 
innovation. It examines how complex financial sectors transfer the burden of complexity 
onto formal institutions, namely the regulatory framework. Regulations have direct and 
indirect costs, but they also distort markets and affect societies, while maximizing the 
welfare of society is their primary concern. However, Institutional Economics reminds us 
that formal institutions alone are insufficient. Norms and habits also must be considered 
too. Are modern financial systems destroying the social basis on which formal rules rely 
and that ultimately allow efficient transactions to take place? The fourth section attempts 
to determine how complex finance affects informal institutions. Complex financial sectors, 
for example, provide increased opportunities for fraud, which has a direct impact on the 
level of trust that societies have in the financial sector. These types of effects must be 
acknowledged as a consequence of complex finance.  
3.1. From “too big to fail” to “too complex to regulate”  
The recent crisis of 2008-2010 demonstrated that the sheer size of certain financial 
institutions can be detrimental. The social costs of TBTF institutions are first realized in 
the implicit subsidy that governments provide to megabanks, free of charge. There are 
several approaches that obtain different estimates of these costs. A recent paper by 
Jacewitz and Pogach (2013) revealed a risk premium gap of approximately 45 basis 
points between the largest and other banks. The interest paid on money market deposit 
accounts is lower for large banks than it is for smaller banks, even after controlling for 
balance sheet risk and market conditions.  
This gap of 45 basis points could be attributed to a TBTF subsidy. Kane (2013) calculated 
this subsidy using an option pricing approach. The implicit safety net provided to large 
financial institutions can be considered a taxpayer’s put sold by financial institutions to 
governments. Systemic risk can then be conceived as a portfolio of taxpayer puts. 
Haldane (2010) suggested a simple proxy. Ratings agencies provide both “standalone” 
and “support” ratings because they account for expected government support when 
analyzing large banks. By the same token, ratings are on average lower for small UK 
banks than they are for large UK banks. One can then associate the difference in ratings 
to the yields paid on banks’ bonds and then scale this difference by the value of each 
bank’s rating-sensitive liabilities. The expected support that governments provide free of 
charge thus reduces large banks’ funding costs, but the costs of this insurance are paid 
by society. The forgone subsidy is not spent elsewhere.  
Boyd and Heitz (2011) adopted a slightly different approach, beginning with the extreme 
assumption that the last crisis was entirely due to large banks. They then calculated the 
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costs of the 2007-2009 crisis based on a loss of real per capita output for the US of only 
37.8 percent. They then estimated the benefit of economies of scale, which amounts to 
approximately 24 percent of base year per capita output. These figures result from an 
intentionally biased assumption that overestimated the benefits of economies of scale 
and underestimated the costs of the crisis. Even under these assumptions, costs exceed 
benefits at a ratio of 1.82. They also entail that a repayment period of 63.04 good, non-
crisis years is necessary to compensate for the losses of a single crisis.  
The selection of a method to calculate the precise costs of large financial institutions is 
controversial. Should one consider the costs of a crisis measured by lost economic 
growth, one would have to prove that large banks are the primary cause of a crisis. If 
implicit subsidies are treated as the primary costs, it remains unclear which methods one 
should employ. However, at a minimum, there seems to be consensus that large financial 
institutions are somehow costly. The debate concerns the extent of such costs and how 
to calculate them. The same cannot be said of the benefits of size. Some academics 
have found evidence of economies of scale (Berger and Mester, 1997, Wheelock and 
Wilson, 2009, Mester, 2010). However, others have found that economies of scale 
depend on banks’ capital structures and the risk models (Hugues et al., 2001). By the 
same token, De Nicolo (2000) argued that if the benefits of diversification stemming from 
scale exist, they are more than offset by the greater risk-taking associated with a larger 
size. Haldane (2010) agreed that if there were economies of scale, they would be 
obtained below a critical size of $100 billion of assets under management, perhaps much 
less. In a similar vein, consolidation in the commercial banking sector is only beneficial up 
to a certain point. In other words, economies of scale follow a U-shaped pattern with a 
minimum at approximately $10 billion (Amel et al., 2004). Thus, the benefits of size are 
far from clear.  
Moreover, complex environments and their degree of connectedness can drive 
diseconomies of scale. Larger is not necessarily better in complexity economics. The 
number of interdependencies grows exponentially relative to the number of nodes. As the 
number of connections increases, so does the probability that a positive change in one 
segment of the network will have a negative effect somewhere else. The denser a 
network, the less adaptable it is. There is a ‘‘clear trade off between the benefit of scale 
and the coordination costs and constraints created by complexity” (Beinhocker, 
2006:151) 
This causes us to consider not only the size but also other parameters, such as 
connectedness and correlation, and not only banks but also the financial sector as a 
whole. An evolutionary economics perspective suggests that one should consider the 
financial sector as an organism in an environment. If TBTF arguments were valid for 
banks in the financial sector, similar arguments would apply to the financial sector within 
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society at large. Therefore, let us attempt to extend this perspective and consider the 
benefits that complex finance has delivered, before considering its costs.  
Chapter one mentioned certain advantages of complex finance, which relate to two 
features exhibited by market-based financial systems: 1) the spread of information and 2) 
the transfer of risks.  
1) The informational efficiency of financial markets has received substantial 
academic attention, as the question of whether prices reflect fundamental 
economic efficiently is a crucial issue that lies at the core of the operation of 
financial markets. Once the notion of informational efficiency is accepted, financial 
markets have numerous advantages. As mentioned in the first chapter, the 
incentives to search for information are greater because it is easier to profit from it 
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). Markets play a positive role in aggregating diffuse 
information and transmitting it to investors (Boot and Thakor, 1997). The way in 
which information is spread is fundamental to the price formation mechanism. A 
key characteristic of financial markets is that the equilibrium generated by markets 
provides valuable information that will be considered in firm decision making. 
Bank-based systems lack this so-called ‘‘information feedback” (Tadesse, 2002). 
This feature, combined with the technological progress,  has allowed for reduced 
transaction costs and time for financial market participants. The development of 
High Frequency Trading (HFT), mentioned in chapter one, is the most visible 
result of this combination. Findings indicate that HFT positively affects market 
quality, as measured by short-term volatility, spread and the depth of the limit 
order book (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2011), and aids in price discovery by providing 
improved bid and offer quotes (Brogaard, 2010). By the same token, Algorithmic 
Trading (AT) improves liquidity and information display (Hendershott et al., 2011; 
Hendershott and Riordan, 2009). That HFT strategies entail that securities should 
be held for a very brief time is typical of the risk management feature of financial 
markets. These are characterized by a short-term perspective on time, which is 
also due to the various market participants and their strategies. 
2) Risk management is closely related to risk transfer and the possibility of 
transaction and diversification. The prevalence of “transactional” over “relational” 
finance stems from the use of hard information. Hard information can be reduced 
to a series of numbers, while soft information “cannot be directly verified by 
anyone other than by the agent who produces the information” (Stein, 2002:1892). 
Due to organizational diseconomies, large banks are better positioned to exploit 
hard information, whereas small ones are advantaged in the treatment of soft 
information. Against the background of financial innovation, it is unsurprising that 
financial innovations, which were accompanied by this hardening of information, 
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have benefited large firms. This hardening of soft information increased large 
banks’ ability to process data and eventually led to greater bank productivity. This 
process is the cause of the increase in distance between small firms and their 
lenders in the U.S., according to Petersen and Rajan (2000). Therefore, the 
hardening of soft information provides for increased credit availability for SMEs by 
reducing the distance between borrowers and lenders or making new lending 
technologies that are appropriate for opaque firms available. The development of 
securitization is a case in point. It creates a secondary market for loans, which 
provides increased liquidity. It enhances risk management by unbundling credit 
risks, thereby allowing them to be more efficiently distributed. The transfer of risk 
releases capital that can be reused for loans to other SMEs. Moreover, it provides 
investors with additional diversification opportunities (Kraemer-Eis et al., 2010). 
Finally, one cannot overlook financial globalization, which benefited the 
development of financial systems in emerging countries. It produced more efficient 
banking sectors and developed financial markets, which in turn positively affected 
economic growth (Levine, 2001). However, it also afforded international investors 
additional diversification opportunities. If the most important function of capital 
markets at the domestic level is the pooling of savings to be efficiently allocated 
elsewhere, at the international level, the function of capital markets is the pooling 
of risks assured by a diversity of financial instruments (Obstfeld and Taylor, 
2004:6).  
Therefore, it is undeniable that financial sector development is beneficial. However, 
chapter one also provided numerous arguments questioning the theoretical basis and the 
practical operation of capital markets. These arguments suggest that there might be limits 
to the development of financial sectors; some recent papers have addressed these 
issues (Philippon, 2012; Arcand et al., 2012) but failed to account for the institutional 
costs implied by large and complex financial sectors. The following section considers the 
formal institutional costs, namely regulatory costs, and the subsequent one focuses on 
informal institutional costs (norms and habits).  
3.2. Formal Institutional costs: Regulation 
3.2.1. Costs of regulation 
Regulations are not a free good, and there is a trade off between providing protections for 
investors and the costs of financial services. Regulations are directly and indirectly costly 
and introduce distortion costs into the market (Briault, 2003). Thus regulatory costs 
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cannot be reduced to the operational costs of operating regulatory agencies alone (the 
direct cost of regulation). These are the easiest to calculate in transparent and open 
countries, but this presupposes a well-developed institutional system, which is more 
expensive in developing economies. The indirect and distortion costs of regulation should 
be added to these operational costs. Indirect costs - activities that financial institutions 
would not undertake absent regulation - are the incremental cost of compliance, for 
example, compliance staff and record-keeping expenses. It is very difficult to accurately 
measure the direct and indirect costs of regulation, but a 1998 estimate indicates that the 
US banking industry pays approximately 6-14 percent in non-interest expenses (Franks 
et al., 1998). More recent figures that would allow for a comparison are not available. 
Such information would also provide us with a measure of the transition toward risk 
management. Ellihausen and Lowrey (2000) demonstrated that start-up compliance costs 
are insensitive to the extent of changes required to implement the regulation, meaning 
that it is less costly for financial institutions to implement large, sporadic changes 
(Ellihausen and Lowrey, 2000:165). Thus, a policy of frequent, minor changes, perhaps 
more appropriate to the continuous flow of new financial products, would be very costly. 
The indirect costs of regulation could be well illustrated by the recent decision to require 
over-the-counter derivatives activities to pass through a clearing house. This entails hiring 
additional staff at clearing houses. Soffex (a former Scoach market) employed 2 persons 
for clearing activities. Eurex now employs 8. The clearing house requirement necessitates 
a staff of 25-30 mathematicians and experts in financial strategies (Garessus, 2012). The 
evolution of the financial sector toward increased complexity was answered by greater 
regulation requiring additional staff. While once there was one regulator for every three 
banks in the U.S. in 1935, there are now three regulators for every US bank (Haldane, 
2012).  
Finally, distortion costs are the altering the nature of markets by regulating firm entry, 
competition rules, and products. Regulations establishing a limit on the speed of 
transactions, for example, would create distortion costs. These costs are very difficult to 
assess but represent the most important type of costs. Among such costs, one can 
distinguish distortions to competition, increased supply shortages, increased moral 
hazard, and increased pro-cyclicality and systemic risk (Nebel, 2004). The remainder of 
this section addresses pro-cyclicality and systemic risk to demonstrate the paradoxical 
nature of a complex financial sector. In essence, one can see that complex finance 
demands complex regulation, which increases regulatory and systemic risks. This 
becomes counterproductive, as the function of regulation, from an institutional 
perspective, is to reduce uncertainty. The emergence of concerns such as “complex 
financial instruments” and “legal risks” during the 2000s until the onset of the credit crisis 
is a striking example of this paradox. The regulatory burden represented the most 
frequently cited risk in financial markets in 2005 and 2006 until the uncertainty that 
emerged in 2007 completely altered the risk landscape (CSFI, 2003, CSFI, 2006, CSFI, 
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2008, CSFI, 2002). The proliferation of rules and agencies, combined with increasingly 
sophisticated regulation, amplified regulatory risks. This ambiguous concept is not 
precisely defined but ranges from adverse government intervention to the risk of a 
regulatory breach (Ngo, 2006). Keith Hawkes, head of network support at HSBC, in the 
Bananas Skins 2002, observed that banks were “facing growing risks simply from the 
pressure to keep abreast of the volume of regulation, and implement it without making 
mistakes or alienating customers” (CSFI, 2002:14).  
At the international level, the debate over whether international regulation is reducing or 
exacerbating risks is even more complex. Some experts feared that the Basel II 
framework would be a fiasco and that “banks will end up managing Basel II rather that 
managing risk” (Ngo, 2006:3). Regulation can have the perverse effect of aggravating 
instability. The market-sensitive risk management encouraged by regulatory measures 
considers the uncertainty of asset returns to be exogenous and estimates risks using 
historical data. This assumption leads to a failure to address the importance of feedback 
effects stemming from the use of these risk management techniques (Danielsson et al., 
2002). The 2007-2009 crisis revealed that the international regulatory framework not only 
failed to protect the financial system but that it also contributed to it. The Basel II 
framework linked Capital Asset Requirements (CARs) to the ratings of external agencies, 
whose added-value has yet to be proven (White, 2001, Ferri and Liu, 2005, Posen and 
Smick, 2008) and which are inherently pro-cyclical (Ferri et al., 1999). Moreover, 
combining mark-to-market accounting with risk-based capital standards only aggravated 
the pro-cyclical character of the regulatory framework and exacerbated systemic risks 
(Kling, 2009). Additionally, a homogeneous regulatory framework creates an environment 
in which all actors have the same taste for indicators and information, which increases 
the risk of herd behavior. This highlights the inherent contradiction of financial regulation: 
“No degree of greater sophistication in the modeling of the price of risk will get around 
this fact. In this world, where falling prices generate more sell-orders from price-sensitive 
risk models, markets will not be self-stabilising but destabilising”  (Persaud, 2008:2).  
Moreover, international financial regulation has been further criticized because its 
necessity is debatable. Oatley (2001) claimed that international regulations emerge as a 
result of political motivations to level the playing field, but they might not be necessary 
from an economic perspective because international financial markets do not create new 
market failures that could not be addressed at the domestic level. The result is not a 
regulatory framework intended to protect the financial system but, instead, one with the 
purpose of minimizing the distributional consequences of various national regimes.  
Thus, the harmful and unintended consequences of harmonization are advanced as a 
defense of regulatory diversity. Diverse environments in which redundancies and 
duplications are possible will better serve the cause of financial innovation (White, 2009). 
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However, such an environment is costly, and in practice, the process of financial 
regulation is already very complex; it is a “hydra-headed monster due to problems of 
imperfect information, legal issues surrounding the allocation of responsibilities and 
powers, difficulties in design of incentive structures and accountability arrangements, and 
the ongoing evolution of the financial system” (Davis, 2008:1).  
Thus the shift to market-based financial systems improved liquidity in quiet times, but it 
also made the tasks of regulators more difficult. Institutional ownership, 
internationalization and computerization can be considered three contextual factors that 
dramatically increased all aspects of securities trading. The SEC’s staff, however, has not 
grown substantially since 1980, whereas between 1980 and 2000, all financial sectors 
increased in size and sophistication. Accounting became increasingly complex, for 
example, but it was well known that the SEC’s lack of interest in and resources for 
accounting prevented it from retaining expertise in that field (Berenson, 2003:55). The 
Levitt Chairmanship of the SEC was a constant struggle for resources. Under Levitt, its 
budget grew from $ 253.2 million to $ 382.4 million between 1993 and 2000, or an 
average of 6 percent per year. Staff positions grew at an average of 1.4 percent annually 
(Seligman, 2003:630). To make matters worse, more than 30 percent of the SEC’s 
employees quit between 1998 and 2000, meaning that the Commission was becoming 
inexperienced and understaffed and therefore unable to meet even modest objectives: “In 
2001 the division reviewed only 2,280 of the 14,000 annual reports it received. In other 
words, more than 80 percent of all annual reports were released to investors without any 
review” (Berenson, 2003:133). The difficulties that developing countries face are even 
greater. The regulatory model applied in developed countries is highly dependent on 
accurate information, highly skilled technicians and an impartial bureaucracy. However, 
regulation alone is thus insufficient and relies on other institutional elements to work 
efficiently. This is why scholars have argued for sequenced liberalization (Brownbridge 
and Kirkpatrick, 2000) and against the exportation of developed countries’ regulatory 
models (Caprio, 1996). If the case has been made that financial liberalization has 
triggered a series of crises in developing countries and its pace should be aligned with 
institutional development, by the same token, there is a case to be made for “financial 
innovation sequencing” in developed countries. If the pace of financial liberalization 
should be measured against the capacity of developing countries’ regulatory and social 
institutions to adapt, then why should financial innovation be viewed in absolute terms? If 
the relationship between financial liberalization and the broad institutional framework 
must be considered to avoid high levels of instability in developing countries, it is also 
necessary to account for the relationship between financial innovation and the broad 
institutional framework in developed countries. In other words, financial innovation should 
be treated akin to financial liberalization with respect to its relationship with institutions.  
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3.2.2. Evolution of regulatory frameworks  
Over the past 30 years, financial regulation has adapted to the shift from a bank-based to 
a market-based financial system. The functional shift from capital allocation to risk 
allocation, as exposed in the first chapter, has and continues to pose two fundamental 
challenges for regulators.  
First the frontier between financial institutions and the financial instruments they offer is 
no longer as clear-cut as it once was. Non-banks entered the banking industry, and while 
this delivered numerous benefits, it nonetheless altered the subtle equilibrium between 
the privately and socially acceptable levels of risk.  
Second the growing complexity of financial systems implied a paradigm shift, the 
effectiveness and efficiency of which has to be examined. It other words, in the face of 
ever more complex financial systems, one has to ask whether regulations are serving 
their intended purposes and how costly they are.  
Regulation in the banking sector was based on the understanding that the charter value 
could be used to align a bank’s appetite for risk with the social goal of a stable banking 
system. The goal of regulation is not to eliminate risk taking or fraud, but to reconcile the 
private missions of individual banks with the social purpose of a banking sector. 
Restrictions on the entry of competitors provided banks with an incentive to limit their 
risks because the charter value was high. Regulators sought to limit risk taking via 
incentives, such as restrictions on entry to the banking sector or interest-rate ceilings on 
liabilities.  
These types of subsidies compensated for regulatory burdens such as capital 
requirements, prohibitions against certain types of activities and reporting. The 
effectiveness of both the restrictions and the subsidies depended on limiting entry to the 
banking sector (Gorton, 1994). Once non-banks are able to perform the same activities 
as banks, the charter value is reduced and banks are driven into more risky activities. In 
other words, once the central bank and commercial banks were no longer a closed “club”, 
the rules of the game on which regulation was based also changed. “Thus there is a 
tendency for the regulatory framework to expand by creating an ever-increasing set of 
rules, regulations, and fire walls which rely on regulators for enforcement rather than on 
the creation of incentives for limiting risk-taking” (Gorton, 1994:108).  
The shift in the regulatory paradigm was inaccurately termed “deregulation”, which does 
not mean fewer rules but quite the opposite. Vogel (1996) illustrated this paradox through 
The British financial revolution of the 1980s. The Financial Services Act (FSA) was 
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passed on November 7 1986 after the Big Bang gave birth to myriad regulatory agencies. 
He also noted a change in “regulatory culture”: The FSA may have revolutionized life in 
the City even more than the Big Bang, for in matters of regulation it replaced the informal 
with the formal, the flexible with the rigid, and the personal with the legalistic” (Vogel, 
1996:93). This demonstrates that financial regulation is also embedded in broader social 
and cultural structures that evolve over time.  
However, academics, regulators and practitioners lack a theoretical framework for 
regulation that accounts for the embeddedness of financial regulations into the social 
economic structure. Curries’ words remain valid: “There are no well developed theories of 
regulation that provides guidance as to the optimum regulatory mix for an economy at a 
certain stage of political, economic and social development given limited economic 
resources and infrastructure” (Currie, 2005:3).  
Early advocates of financial liberalization also failed to account for the social economic 
structure, and the implementation of financial liberalization was not consistently a 
success, to say the least. It led to financial fragility, and the emergence of crises following 
financial liberalization generated strong criticisms (Demirgu ̈c-̧Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 
Rodrik, 2000, Allegret et al., 2003). However, these advocates then conceded that there 
were two prerequisites necessary for financial liberalization: The existence of a sound 
domestic financial system resting on prudential regulation. Returning to the root of the 
problem, Arestis et al. (2005) contended that financial liberalization à la McKinnon and 
Shaw, occurring in an institutional vacuum, is doomed to fail. The McKinnon and Shaw 
model “is abstracted from the complexities of money as a social institution. In reality, 
money is by nature socially embedded. The holding of money even in the simple rural 
setting discussed by McKinnon (1973), is subject to social obligations and constraints, 
and not simply driven by investment needs, the productivity of capital and real return on 
holding money” (Arestis et al., 2005:5). The initial assumptions influenced economic 
reforms that were established without accounting for the economic and social realities of 
countries. While sound regulations are undoubtedly necessary, they are by no means 
sufficient. The need for an institutional approach that accounts for informal rules, local 
practices and knowledge is increasingly infrequently debated (Rodrick, 2000).  
These considerations strengthen the argument for considering institutions in the design of 
economic reforms in developed economies. As developing countries need an appropriate 
regulatory structure to benefit from financial liberalization, developed countries must also 
ensure that they have the institutions needed to mitigate the costs of financial innovation 
while maintaining its benefits. Once institutions are included, what matters is not the 
sophistication of the financial sector and its regulation, but whether they are well suited to 
the rest of the social structure on which they rest.  
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3.2.3. Tensions between legal and financial systems  
Ill-suited regulation can be reflected in frictions between law and finance (Macey and 
O'Hara, 2000). The financial functions of markets are market driven, whereas the legal 
structures surrounding them are an historical artifact. “An interesting facet of [the 
interaction between financial markets and legal systems] is that while both the legal and 
financial aspects of markets evolve over time, they do so at different rates. That is, the 
legal structure of markets often involves political considerations, whereas the financial 
function of markets is typically market-driven. For example, the derivatives markets today 
are largely a product of financial innovations in the 1980s, but their legal structure is 
largely defined by laws and regulations promulgated in the 1930s. This divergence can 
create difficulties, or frictions, in how the markets operate, and these frictions can be 
exacerbated by uncertainty over how the legal framework actually applies in certain 
settings. Conversely, the existence of an exogenous set of rules, unaffected by market 
forces at least in the short run, can reduce other frictions in the market by removing some 
of the uncertainty surrounding the agency conflicts that arise in market settings. Thus, the 
interaction of the legal and financial both hinders and abets the efficient functioning of 
markets” (Macey and O’Hara, 2000:113).  
High Frequency Trading and the flash crash of May 2010 illustrate this point very well. 
Technological advances combined with financial innovation generate both advantages 
(Hendershott et al., 2011) and numerous concerns regarding stability, transparency and 
fairness. In this relationship, regulation is the tortoise running after the high frequency 
trading hare (Clark, 2011). “With the growth of HFT”, Clark writes, “the equity market goal 
of raising capital for corporations seems to have been significantly diminished. This is 
evidenced, among other ways, by the lack of new listings in the market” (Clark, 
2011:285). This reminds us that regulation protects a social function of capital markets: 
Raising capital that is then allocated. Investor participation is conditioned by fair, 
transparent and understandable rules of the game.  
The tension between legal systems and the functioning of modern financial markets is 
evident when one examines the classic legal genealogy of securities regulation in English 
law (Walker, 2008). The classic rationale, emphasizing the prevention of fraud via 
disclosure to protect investors, remained unchallenged from the emergence of stock 
markets (security regulation is an outgrowth of corporate law) until the development of the 
Efficient Financial Market Hypothesis (EFMH).  
EFMH, in its weak and semi-strong forms, holds that the prices of securities reflect 
historical prices or all publicly available information. As prices themselves protected 
investors, attempts were made to adapt the regulatory framework accordingly. However, 
 97 
the increasing complexity of financial markets began to pose challenges for the regulatory 
framework and its legal system. Walker argued that financial centers under the English 
legal tradition have to reclaim the classical genealogy of their legal systems when 
revising securities law Walker, 2008). New rationales for regulation are emerging from 
behavioral finance that provide for a paternalistic approach to investor protection 
(because investors are irrational, they have to be protected against themselves) 
(Zingales, 2004). Complexity and fraud seem to occur in tandem. It is easier to divert 
resources within a maze of complex transactions. Moreover, the benefits of fraud, in other 
words, its effect on market evaluation, also increase, thus providing greater incentives to 
engage in fraudulent behavior. While one dollar of fraud resulted in a seven dollars 
increase in market valuation in 1980, in 2001, it resulted in a thirty-five dollars increase in 
market valuation (Zingales, 2004:39). “There is a balance between market integrity and 
complexity, and the U.S. market, lately, seems very complex to us” said Mr. Riess, 
managing director of Deutsche Börse in a 2010 interview.2 The massive fraud illustrating 
this point is the LIBOR scandal that made headlines in 2012. The regulatory system 
applicable to reporting the rate relied on discipline and the assumption that integrity and 
reputation were more valued than the potential benefits of cheating. As the LIBOR 
scandal demonstrates, this assumption, derived from a regulatory framework in which 
financial authorities and financial institutions were collaborating, was false.  
Waves of rapid and brusque financial liberalization in low-income countries have revealed 
the importance of a well-developed institutional framework. However, implementing 
sound and safe banking practices is not simple because institutions are composed of 
rules, procedures and norms that frame the decisions of economic and political actors. It 
is now clear that regulation alone is not sufficient and requires that institutional elements 
operate efficiently (De Capitani and North, 1994). As noted above, the need for an 
institutional approach that accounts for informal rules, local practices and knowledge is 
becoming increasingly accepted in the context of financial liberalization (Rodrik, 2000). 
The literature on financial liberalization, however, while recognizing the importance of the 
informal aspects of institutional development, has not, to our knowledge, extended this 
argument to financial innovation and complex financial sectors. Just as financial 
liberalization is an excess of complexity that institutions cannot absorb, the same is true 
of financial innovation. The very concepts that Western governments encourage their 
emerging partners to embrace (good governance, transparency, financial literacy, 
establishment of the rule of law) should find their way back into the economic policy 
arenas of developed economies. The LIBOR scandal demonstrates the urgency of 
rethinking the relationship between institutions (formal and informal) and complex 
financial systems. These systems engender costs far beyond the formal costs of 
regulation. The next section attempts to go beyond regulations and formal rules to 
                                                
2 Interview by Jonathan Spicer for Thomson Reuters, available on the World Federation of Exchanges 
website http://www.world-exchanges.org/insight/views/globally-flash-crash-no-flash-pan 
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consider the “social damage” that complex finance could inflict. Politicians and scholars 
insist on the importance of “trust” for the financial industry, but there are few 
investigations of the social elements that constitute “trust”. What are the social costs of 
complex finance? “Bankers”, notes S. Strange, “used to be thought of as staid and sober 
men, grave-faced and dressed in conservative black pinstripe suits, jealous of their 
reputation for caution and for the careful guardianship of their customers’ money. 
Something rather radical and serious has happened to the international financial system 
to make it so much like a gambling hall” (Strange, 1986:2). Strange’s comment highlights 
a change in the “culture” upon which financial systems are built.  
Thus, the functions of financial systems, the ways in which these functions are regulated 
and their “culture” all evolve. Because it is a broad term that could imply many different 
things, the following section draws upon institutional economics and concentrate on 
“informal constraints” (norms, habits, customs). Informal practices in Western financial 
systems can evolve in manners that are discordant with the rest of society’s 
understandings of the formal rules of the game, akin to how the informal practices of 
Russian society are at odds with the formal rules of the game that apply in financial 
sectors. As the third chapter demonstrates, the banker-client relationship in Russia 
follows human-devised, not generic, rules. In essence, the inertia in Russian society 
affects the operation of its financial system. The informal norms that continue to affect the 
behavior of many economic actors in Russia impact the development of the country’s 
financial sector. However, what about the reverse relationship? What are the social 
consequences of allowing financial market participants to devise their own rules that 
diverge from the generic rules of the rest of society? In other words, informal institutions 
in Russia affected the structure of the financial system. The “finance-society nexus” is 
examined in light of the transition process in chapter three. However, in the next section, 
we attempt to discern how the specific, informal norms of financial sector could affect 
society at large. We explore the “finance-society nexus” in light of the financial revolution 
in high-income countries.  
3.3. Informal institutional costs: Socio-economic costs  
There are numerous studies on modern financial markets that emphasize the role of 
social factors. Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2008) examined the disturbances hindering 
the flow of information and could, in turn, affect in the allocational efficiency of stock 
markets in the Middle-Eastern North African region (MENA). They found that stock 
market size and liquidity are the main factors with positive effects on efficiency, but 
parameters such as a lack of transparency and the absence of a culture of equity must 
also be considered. Bos and Kool (2006), studying the domestic banking sector in the 
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Netherlands, attempted to identify variables that could capture local conditions. They 
sought to demonstrate the effects of social factors on cost and profit efficiency and found 
that these factors play a role, albeit to a limited extent. It has also been shown that in 
regions with high social capital, that is, where economic agents exhibit high levels of trust, 
financial markets are more developed (Guiso et al., 2004). Public trust can substitute for 
incomplete law and is thus crucial for economic growth in contexts where participants do 
not interact repeatedly (Carlin et al., 2009). Trust also increases the probability of 
investing in stocks and raises the share of the population investing stocks (Guiso et al., 
2008:2558). There is a rich literature on the role of trust and social capital in economic 
development, spurred by Putnam and Helliwell’s study (1995) on economic growth in 
Italy. While the importance of trust in economic transactions is not debated, much less 
attention has been devoted to how social capital and general trust die off. Is there an 
inverse relationship between the level complexity of financial products and the level of 
trust between economic agents? Financial markets, perhaps more than other markets, 
must rely on a “chain of trust” linking the various players from the end clients to the prime 
brokers. Could this mechanism be damaged by a complex financial sector? Guiso (2010) 
explored the impact of the financial crisis on public trust, using the Financial Trust Index 
Survey from the University of Chicago, conducted in several waves after the crisis on a 
sample of American households. Traditionally, Americans trusted banks and financial 
markets 50 percent more than they trusted a random person, which is understandable 
because individuals do not rely on a random person to manage their savings. However, 
this measure experienced a complete reversal: The decline in trust following the crisis 
was so substantial that respondents exhibited greater trust in a generic, unknown 
individual than in a bank or a banker, that is, in those institutions and persons that should 
be trusted the most given the role they play as the custodians of our savings. Guiso also 
aptly distinguished confidence in an institution’s ability to repay its debt, which implies 
intrinsic riskiness, which differs from trusting that one will not be cheated when entering 
into economic relationships. That second notion entails a social risk and is much more 
difficult to rebuild than the former. The trust measures below, taken from Guiso’s study, 
“reflect the greater perceptions of an increased social risk that has deteriorated the 
relation between investors and financial intermediaries” (Guiso, 2010:7).  
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Figure 9. The collapse of trust in the US financial market 
The sharp decline in trust depicted in figure 9 above is due, according to Guiso, to the 
emergence of a series of frauds. He cautions that these frauds will affect demand for 
equities and other financial instruments. In other words, the social cost of fraud is a 
decrease in investor participation. In an earlier paper, he wrote that the “the decision to 
invest in stocks requires not only an assessment of the risk return trade-off given the 
existing data, but also an act of faith (trust) that the data in our possession are reliable 
and that the overall system is fair” (Guiso et al., 2008:2557). Three elements guarantee 
investors participation: The data, trust in the data, and trust in the fairness of the system, 
as follows:  
DATA + FAIRNESS + TRUST = INVESTOR PARTICIPATION  
The above relationship, we contend, must be refined and detailed. Guiso’s paper did not 
explain the source of trust in the data and the fairness of the game and seems limited to 
the influence of distrust during crisis periods. Overall, many factors seem to have been 
overlooked due to a lack of theory on the relationship. The increasing occurrence of 
fraud, for example, is not the only aspect of modern financial markets that jeopardize 
investor participation. To broaden the framework, we propose the use of an institutional 
economic perspective. One must abandon the key assumptions of classical economics 
and financial economics that demonstrate the estrangement between finance and 27
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 Figure 1. The collapse of trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Guiso, 2010:27)
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society. Money, for instance, is considered neutral and simply a mean of facilitating 
exchange. This atomistic view of financial markets, on which Bachelier relied, gave birth 
to the Efficient Financial Market Theorem. It also abstracted from the social and 
psychological elements of financial markets. Institutional economics, by contrast, accepts 
the complexity of economic phenomena and approaches them in a manner much more 
akin to biology. It employs a few general principles and then analyzes specificities. The 
result is a more operational discipline than all-embracing theories - however, it raises the 
concern of over-description.  
Thus, we regard finance as part of the socio-economic fabric. The assumption that 
market exchanges are embedded in interpersonal relations and social structures is a 
notion that dates to Polanyi. His concept of “embeddedness” (Polanyi, 1944, Polanyi, 
1957) means that markets are not autonomous and necessarily subordinated to politics, 
social relations and religion. He used this term to analyze the radical break induced by 
classical economics’ notion of self-adjusting markets. He emphasized that a 
disembedded economy could not exist and was a dangerous, utopian notion, as it leads 
to spontaneous and unplanned responses from society itself. 
The concept of “embeddedness” helps us acknowledge the specificities of the context in 
which economic actions occur. Habits and rules are necessary for human action and this 
clearly depart from the assumptions of individual rationality. For example, institutionalism 
considers prices to be social conventions, embedded in specific institutions and thus in 
part dependent on ideas and habits.  
In figure 10 below, we propose to consider institutions defined as “the humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions” (North, 1991:97) or 
as “a way of thoughts or action of some prevalence and permanence which is embedded 
in the habits of a group or the customs of people”, following Hamilton’s definition 
(Hodgson, 1998:179). Defined in this manner, financial sectors are embedded in 
institutions. These can be formal (constitutions, legal structures) or informal (norms, 
behaviors, world views). 
 
Figure 10. Institutions to support investor's participation 
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The purpose of institutions is to “create order and reduce uncertainty” (North, 1991:97). 
They do so by fulfilling three functions (Dequech, 2002) or “pillars” (Peng, 2003). 
1) A restrictive function (the regulative pillar): Imposing constraints on individuals. 
These are the formal rules of the game enforced and sanctioned by the state. 
2) They also fulfill a motivational function, that is, they influence the goals that 
individuals establish for themselves. This is the normative pillar, which “defines 
legitimate means to pursue valued ends” (Peng, 2003:276). 
3) Finally, they fulfill a cognitive function, which can take two forms. They provide 
information to individuals and influence the perceptions that these individuals have 
of reality. This cognitive pillar can refer to imposed or internalized values and 
beliefs.  
Thus institutions provide information and instructions on how to use it. Institutions belong 
to a different economic reality in which uncertainty is not equated with risk. This 
distinction was first made by Knight: “The practical difference between the two categories, 
risk and uncertainty, is that in the former the distribution of the outcome in a group of 
instances is known (either through calculation a priori or from the statistics of past 
experience), while in the case of uncertainty, this is not true, the reason being in general 
that it is impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a 
high degree unique” (Knight, 1921:247). This view of uncertainty expresses the inability to 
link an uncertain future event to history. Risk can be measured because a class of past 
events is sufficiently homogenous to be probabilistically attached to a future event; it is 
thus a question of the “degree of assimability of classes securable or, stated inversely, 
the degree of uniqueness of various kinds of business contingencies” (Knight, 1921:247). 
However, if separated from the notion of risk, to which probability can be assigned, the 
notion of uncertainty, as viewed by Knight, is not unambiguous.  
Institutions thus play a role in economic systems because of uncertainty. According to 
Dequech (2004), the cognitive function of institutions, which provide information and 
influence individual perceptions of reality, help reduce uncertainty. Learning occurs within 
institutional structures. Institutions are a store of knowledge and reduce uncertainty 
through rules, habits and routines. “Institutions are formed as durable and integrated 
complexes of customs and routines. Habits and routines thus preserve knowledge, 
particularly tacit knowledge in relation to skills, and institutions act through time as their 
transmission belt” (Hodgson, 1998:180). 
Early institutionalists, who were influenced by Darwinian biology, placed “habit” at the 
core of human action and belief. According to Hodgson, “habit can be defined as a largely 
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non-deliberative and self-actuating propensity to engage in a previously adopted pattern 
of behavior” (Hodgson, 1998:178). Habits, in that perspective, play a role in facilitating the 
interpretation and understanding of information and are thus one of an individual’s 
cognitive tools. As such, they provide the foundation necessary for individuals to make 
choices and decisions. Individual choices, the cornerstone of classical economics, are 
thus replaced by habits in Hodgson’s perspective on evolutionary economics. Choices 
are possible and explained by relying on habits, lodged between instincts and 
preferences (Hodgson, 2010). Habits aid individuals in addressing complex problems 
because they store information in a crude manner that economizes cognitive resources. 
Habits, in this light, serve the same economic function for individuals that Orléan’s 
convention does for groups (Orléan, 1989). Similarly, to speak of habits at the collective 
level, one could use the concept of routines, defined as “organizational habits” (Hodgson, 
2003:356). 
Institutional Economics (IE) recognizes the function of conventions, routines and habits 
(these various concepts differ from one another in IE, but a discussion of these 
distinctions is outside the scope of this section), which in simple terms, is to allow 
institutions to transmit and interpret information. Agents require these mechanisms to 
process data into information and knowledge. This process is ultimately connected to 
cooperation and trust.  
For Boisot and Canals (2004), a reflection on the distinctions among data, information 
and knowledge has much to gain from evolutionary and institutional economics. Data are 
a stimulus that originates from differences in state-of-the-world that are registered. 
Information is the significant regularities within the data. Routines, habits and conventions 
establish a threshold above which regularities are so significant that they become 
objective information. Information, they wrote, “sets up a relation between in-coming data 
and a given agent. Only when what constitutes a significant regularity is established by 
convention, can information appear to be objective - and even then, only within the 
community regulated by the convention. [...] Knowledge is a set of expectations held by 
agents and modified by the arrival of information (Arrow, 1984). These expectations 
embody the prior situated interactions between agents and the world - in short the agent’s 
prior learning” (Boisot and Canals, 2004:47). 
This distinction is quite useful because it reflects two important characteristics of 
information and knowledge. First, the stability of data, resting on convention, is necessary 
to transform data into objective information. This reminds us that new knowledge is 
dependent on old knowledge and the element of stability underlying this path-dependent 
process is vital. As Loasby (2001) wrote: “If everything is changing, or even liable to 
change at any moment, then nothing can be relied on - for making decisions, interpreting 
information, for constructing new knowledge. Any process of variation and selection is 
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meaningless unless both the variants and the selection environment persist for a time” 
(Loasby, 2001:405). Stability is crucial for knowledge because human cognition is less 
about logic than pattern-making.  
Stability 
This question of the stability of data and information is essential and suggests that data 
need to be stable to become information that an agent can use to develop a set of 
expectations that becomes knowledge. One of the greatest advantages of market-based 
over bank-based financial systems is the transparency and price signals the former 
provide. However, if these are perceived as too volatile, valuable information will be 
difficult to extract and decisions difficult to make. In algorithmic and high-frequency 
trading, the task of identifying regularities in the behavior of asset prices (a task that 
humans cannot perform rapidly) is outsourced to computers. The contradictions 
examined in chapter one contribute to undermining the conditions necessary for stable 
and reliable data. The shift to market-based financial systems broke the link with 
fundamental economic parameters. When prices reflect economic fundamentals to a 
progressively lesser extent and seem to be set by the market’s “mood” of the day, it is 
more difficult to understand what drives prices up or down. The shortening of time 
investment time horizons is a means of managing risk but has serious implications for the 
strategy, organization and planning in real economic sectors. By the same token, 
international financial liberalization might be beneficial for the development of the financial 
sector. However, earnings forecasts made by local analysts are more precise than those 
of global analysts (Bae et al., 2008). There also seems to be a positive relationship 
between local investment and performance, thereby suggesting that distance and 
information are related (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001, Dvorak, 2005, Teo, 2009). Finally, 
while decision processes and financial instruments are increasingly based on hard 
information, that is, information that can be reduced to a series of numbers, it has 
become clear that financial markets provide rumors with a voice, which the financial news 
industry amplifies. The interdependency, feedback loops and other biases of the media 
and financial actors identified by behavioral finance are evidence of information that is, by 
definition, unstable. The recent developments in financial markets thus blurred the 
distinctions between news and rumors and between market reality and market potential.  
Thus, while the development of financial sectors into large and highly complex markets 
might have spurred beneficial financial innovation for enterprises and reduced transaction 
costs, the effects that it has on the way information is processed and how it affects 
investors’ knowledge and trust has yet to be examined. The internationalization of 
finance, its market-type structure and the shortening of time-horizons are detrimental to 
the conditions necessary for the production of stable data and, by consequence, 
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information. From this perspective, the proliferation of intermediaries is unsurprising. 
They are in the business of providing stable data, information and knowledge. Reducing 
transaction costs and increasing public information is not sufficient for investors to 
participate in the game. In other words, transparent data are useless if they change 
consistently and do not allow for the accumulation of knowledge.  
Modern financial markets are premised on the notion of informational transparency. In 
practice, however, market participants must associate hard data with social content. 
Traders’ calculations include providing social context to these ambiguous numbers that 
they have to analyze. Solid numbers that are stable with respect to time and meaning 
acquire a certain status and perform certain functions: “1) they establish expertise and 
authority, 2) make knowledge impersonal, 3) portray certainty and universality 4) 
contribute to resolving situations of doubt, conflict and mistrust” (Zaloom, 2003:359). The 
problem, Zaloom adds, is that the volume and speed of financial transactions undermine 
this stability. The numbers produced by financial markets are actually “temporary 
assessments of market conditions, momentary markers of approximate valuation” 
(Zaloom, 2003:259). 
Universality 
The stability of information is closely linked to objectivity within a community regulated by 
convention. Informal institutions such as conventions allow for the validation of 
information. In other words, conventions confer legitimacy on information and knowledge, 
legitimacy that makes information more trustworthy. However, the data and information 
produced by developed financial sectors only seems useable for a limited group of 
individuals. Conventions, indeed, are informal norms. That is, they do not have the 
universality component that characterizes formal rules. Thus the non-universal aspect of 
conventions suggests the possibility of a clash between informal and formal norms.  
As complex finance develops its own sets of rules, it also processes data and information 
in a manner that is not accessible to the rest of society. The informal norms that it has 
developed conflict with the regulations and formal rules of the rest of society. Financial 
information circulates among financial journalists and market participants, who know one 
another, and only reaches outside investors after passing through a series of feedback 
loops (Oberlechner and Hocking, 2004). Thus, certain groups of market participants have 
access to different data and information from that available to outsiders. This is an ironic 
development because one of the primary initial advantages of financial markets over 
banks was the more efficient spread of information. Conflicts of interest and continual 
instances of scandals and frauds among listed firms and a series of informational 
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intermediaries (ratings agencies, financial analysts, the financial media, auditing firms) 
indicates that information is being manipulated. 
The 2012 scandals in the financial industry are telling. The trading desk of JP Morgan 
London attempted to cover a $2 billion loss, which ultimately was found to be a 7 billion 
loss. Barklays and UBS were fined $450 million and $1.5 billion, respectively for their role 
in the manipulation of the LIBOR benchmark. Standard Chartered Bank was fined $667 
million for having facilitated $250 billion in transactions with Iran. HSBC was fined $1.9 
billion for having laundered $7 billion for drug cartels and terrorist groups. Outright 
prosecution could have forced the bank to close, thereby damaging employment in the 
U.S.; this option was rejected, hence the expression “too big to jail” (Economist, 2012). In 
2013, JPMorgan to agreed to a $ billion settlement with U.S. authorities over overstating 
the quality of bad mortgages.  In May 2014, Credit Suisse paid a $2.6 billion in fines for 
having helped U.S. taxpayers cheat on their taxes. After settling the LIBOR scandal for 
$1.4 billion in 2012, UBS is now talking with U.S. Department of Justice over the FOREX 
manipulation, which also involves Barclays, Citigroup, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase and the 
Royal Bank of Scotland. BNP Paribas was prosecuted of breaching U.S. sanctions 
against Sudan, Iran and other countries for wiring billions of dollars there. On the first of 
July 2014, it announced that it would plead guilty and pay an $8.9 billion penalty. The 
same day, its stock rose by 4 percent. It is striking that the reassuring public statements 
of the executives of these banks is always directed at investors and focus on future 
growth and business development. These scandals are symptomatic of a financial 
system functioning with different rules and only represent a small portion of the true scale 
of such malfeasance. Banks settle charges with state authorities as if these were traffic 
road fines, calling it “the cost of doing business”. 3 
Gretchen Morgenson spent her journalistic career exposing abuses and conflicts of 
interest on Wall Street and came to the conclusion that the U.S. financial industry enjoys 
a different set of rules than the rest of society, which signifies a shift in the application and 
perception of the rule of law (Morgenson, 2011). The LIBOR system of reporting rested 
on the assumption that banks valued integrity, but the manipulation that occurred in 
recent years tells us that the financial system has changed, not only with respect to its 
complexity, volume, and speed of transactions but also concerning the moral standards 
of its participants. There is a lack of studies on what financial intermediaries consider 
“cheating”, “fraud”, or “illegal”, but the numerous scandals that emerged from 2008 to 
2012 indicate a normative change. Certain practices and behavior (false signatures within 
the U.S. mortgage industry, cheating clients, the LIBOR scandals in all of the Western 
financial sectors), however illegal, seem to be considered normal in the financial industry. 
                                                
3 For more information on the financial industry’s penalty in 2014, see HALAH, T. BNP is just fine after $9B 
penalty. Are billion dollar settlement effective? FORBES, 01.07.2014. See also VOREACOS, D. Credit Suisse 
pleads guilty in three-year U.S. tax probe, Bloomberg, 20.05.2014, SCANNELL, K., SCHAFER, D., BINHAM, 
C. UBS in talks with DoJ to reach settlement over Forex probe, Financial Times, 16.10.2914 
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The disconnection 
Johnson and Kwak (2010) documented the disconnection of financial sectors from 
society. They demonstrated that the 2008-2010 crisis has socio-economic roots by 
shedding light on the rise of a financial industry oligarchy. The linkages between Wall 
Street and Washington, the “corridor” as they term it, takes the form of campaign 
financing and lobbying and the circulation of elites between giants in the US financial 
industry and government agencies. The case of Henry Paulson, who went from being 
head of Goldman Sachs to Treasury Secretary, is an ideal example of the incestuous 
relationship between finance and politics. A similar two-way street between Westminster 
and the City has formed since the big bang (Augar, 2010). This reflects regulatory capture 
by the financial industry. The City’s lobbying machine spent £93 million to secure policy 
victories in 2011 (Mathiason et al., 2012). In the US, according to figures reported by the 
Senate, the securities and investment sectors alone spent in $96 million in 2012, while 
commercial banks dispensed $61 million (OpenSecrets.org). Igan et al. (2011) argued 
that lobbying by financial institutions contributed to the crisis. The lobbying activities of 
lenders between 2000 and 2007 are linked to increased risk taking and decreased 
performance.  
Financial markets have not emerged from a social vacuum (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003), 
and their operation, while now based on computerized technology, remains socially 
structured because the participants are all subject to bounded rationality and the 
potentially opportunistic behavior of others (Baker, 1984). However, if financial markets 
are not devoid of moral norms and culture, it is fair to ask whether these norms have not 
evolved in a manner that clashes with the rule of law and the rest of society’s norms. It 
can even be said that the relationship between the financial regulatory system and 
modern financial sectors is one of “deep capture”, whereby the interests of financial 
sectors systematically prevail over financial and economic policy processes (Baxter, 
2011). The concept of “deep capture” is useful here to understand that the influences of 
modern financial sectors might not only operate at the surface through campaign finance 
and “revolving doors” but also reach beyond mere connections to influence implicit 
assumptions and perceptions. “Indeed much of the power of deep capture comes from 
the fact that its targets include the way that people think and the way that they think they 
think” (Hanson and Yosifon, 2003:214).  
Deep capture can take the form of cultural capital and is salient in the case of financial 
innovation. That financial innovation is treated akin to technological innovation and 
considered inherently beneficial clearly represents cultural capital for the financial sectors 
(Johnson and Kwak, 2010). In France, it is the “Club des économistes” which represents 
a network of neo-liberalism influence of the French “financial intelligentsia”. They advise 
banks, insurances and politicians and monopolize the debate on financial and economic 
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issues (Mauduit, 2012). This cultural capital is also in part what allowed for the spread of 
the ethos of investment banking into corporate America (Ho, 2009). Is there not there a 
clash between the habits of Wall Street, as examined by Ho, which embraces an 
organizational model of employee liquidity, and the organizational structure, rules and 
norms of the “productive economy”? Crotty’s words on the influence of neo-liberal finance 
on corporate America are worth restating: “It would be almost impossible to imagine a 
vision more at odds with the Schumpeterian and Chandlerian views of the firms than its 
financial conception in agency theory” (Crotty, 2005:91).  
It thus seems that the evolution of the modern financial sector appears to have diverged 
from the formal and informal institutions of the societies to which they are supposed to 
provide services. This statement already requires a correction, as it would obviously be 
misguided to imply that modern financial sectors are a single, indivisible block. Modern 
financial sectors comprise stock markets, investment banks, market-makers and dealers, 
brokers in diverse instruments, mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, funds of funds, 
exchange-traded funds, commercial banks, large and small, cooperative banks and 
insurance agencies. These financial institutions have different desks (front offices, back 
offices, trading departments separated by instruments) managed by different individuals. 
Thus, when speaking of “modern financial sectors”, one should be careful to bear in mind 
that they comprise diverse actors that do not speak with a single voice and do not lobby 
regulatory agencies on behalf of a single interest. However, bearing in mind that modern 
financial institutions do not fall under a single, large roof, chapter one noted similarities in 
the evolution of finance. This chapter attempts to uncover the formal and informal 
institutions underlying this evolution.  
Woodruff’s (2000) distinction between human-devised rules (h-rules) and generic rules is 
useful in this respect. It allows for the possibility of a gap between Western financial 
sectors and the social spheres on which they rely. First, h-rules are embeddable, that is, 
they can be used in various contexts when convenient. Second, they are non-exhaustive, 
leaving some latitude for other possible actions and human creativity. Finally, they are 
violable. Generic rules are abstract, universally applied in the societies in which they 
emerge and form the basis for standardization. The abovementioned studies on financial 
sectors as a socially and culturally structured arena (Baker, 1984, Augar, 2010, Baxter, 
2011) and the continuous series of scandals emerging in the wake of the 2008-2010 
crisis suggest the possibility of a financial sector diverging from the Western set of social 
values, that is, diverging from the values necessary to sustain a certain form of 
capitalism. Economic efficiency, as Schultz brilliantly demonstrated, dating back to Adam 
Smith’s notion of efficient trades, is impossible without normative constraints. He showed 
that economic efficiency requires moral conditions (Schultz, 2001). 
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Figure 11. Formal and informal institutions to support investor's participation 
Figure 11 above attempts to convey the separation of financial sectors from society. It 
attempts to schematize what occurs when bankers ceased to be “thought of as staid and 
sober men, grave-faced and dressed in conservative black pinstripe suits, jealous of their 
reputation for caution and for the careful guardianship of their customers’ money” 
(Strange, 1986:2). Formal regulatory rules no longer have an effect. They seem 
ineffective in providing transparency and protecting investors; in other words, they seem 
ineffective at reducing uncertainty. Because trust and regulation are complementary, 
distrust creates a public demand for government regulation (Carlin et al., 2009, Agarwal 
et al., 2011). The regulatory response in the form of strict prudential requirements (Basel 
III, stress tests, the Financial Stability Board) is a good example of the complementary 
relationship between trust and regulation. For Guiso (2010), these measures target 
confidence in the solvency of financial institutions and not broader “social trust”, which is 
negatively affected by fraud and cheating. Social trust is captured by the definition 
provided by Gambetta, “as the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that 
another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action” (Gambetta, 2000:217). It 
is closely related to knowledge and required in all situations in which “others know 
something about themselves or the world, which the person in question does not, and 
when what that person ought to do depends on the extent of his ignorance of these 
matters” (Dasgupta, 2002:8). There is a strong link between trust and information, and it 
then unsurprising that geographical distance seems to play a role in the development of 
trust. Local knowledge is an important element (Guiso et al., 2004). This chapter will add 
one ingredient - fairness - to the recipe for social trust.  
There is a lack of studies examining the linkages between information and knowledge 
and perceived fairness in detail, but it seems intuitive that fairness is essential to ensure 
the players’ participation and cooperation. Fairness is accompanied by the notion that 
rules apply to all, not only to some privileged group. “If there’s one thing about fairness, it 
is fundamentally an impartial notion, an idea that restricts us from privileging one group 
over another. When asking about fairness, we cannot ask whether X policy is fair for me, 
or whether Y policy is fair for someone with a yacht and two vacation homes. We must 
ask whether Z policy is fair, full stop. What we must ask here is whether the policy could 
be applied to all; whether it is the sort of system with which we could live, if we were to 
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end up in one of the many socioeconomic groupings that make up our diverse 
community, whether most-advantaged or least-advantaged, fortunate or unfortunate” 
(Hale, 2012). Unreliable information makes it difficult for the common investor to perceive 
the game as fair. If other players seem to play by different rules with different information, 
the natural tendency would be to stop playing. It is useful to stress the adjective “natural”, 
as Brosnan and de Wall’s (2003) research reveals that this is precisely what Capuchin 
Monkeys do when they observe their counterparts receiving greater rewards for 
expending equal effort. They cease cooperating. However, cooperation is at the center of 
the process of wealth creation (Beinhocker, 2006).  
The way in which modern financial sectors produce, analyze and spread information is 
another important element of wealth creation. As observed in chapter four, the Russian 
banking sector is not serving its intermediary function because the banking sector partly 
reflects old social structure that can still be perceived in the relationship between SMEs 
and banks in Russia. Information is contextual, as if it were constrained by social norms. 
What characterizes transitional economies in general and Russia in particular is that 
information is insufficiently codified and remains personal and contextualized. The line 
between soft and hard information in transitional countries is never particularly clear, as 
society’s informal norms conflict with formal ones. Nonetheless, information is an abstract 
commodity that forms the foundations on which market economies emerge. According to 
Boisot and Child (1996), the transition from feudalism to centralized economies and 
market economies can be followed along a continuum of information codification. 
“European experience of modernization entailed, first, a shift in the transactional center of 
gravity from an institutional order based on feudal fiefs to one based on bureaucracies 
and, second, from there a decentralization toward markets. The move required both an 
ability and a willingness to codify. The very act of selection entailed by codification, 
however, leads to the suppression, or even the rejection, of data not selected and, hence, 
to the sacrifice of contextual data.”(Boisot and Child, 1996:603).  
While Western societies now benefit from codified data and impersonal transactions, the 
financial sectors in these countries are blurring the distinction between soft and hard 
information. In other words, some characteristics of Western financial sectors also 
characterize transitional countries such as Russia, as observed in the next chapter. There 
are similarities between the social patterns underlying these societies and the social 
patterns underlying advanced financial sectors. In both cases, there is an institutional 
incompatibility between the financial sector and the rest of society. While the complex 
Russian institutional environment maintained informal social norms that are at odds with 
the impersonal mode of transaction required to develop an efficient financial sector, the 
complex environments of Western financial sectors led to the emergence of informal 
norms that are at odds with the rest of society. That observation forces one to reconsider 
the process of financial sector development and relativize it. In other words, it forces one 
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to ask: Relative to what are financial sectors developed? What are the characteristics of 
developed financial sectors? These questions should enter the political arena just as the 
debate over sustainable growth. There should be a shift from mere development in the 
financial sector to the sustainable development of the financial sector.  
Conclusion 
A historical examination of the emergence of stock markets indicates that an important 
ingredient in their formation is learning. Formal and information institutions are the 
custodians of learning processes in Institutional Economics (North, 1994, Dequech, 
2002). Stable and universal information (within a community) are the preconditions for its 
codification and diffusion. It was shown that these conditions are under pressure in the 
wake of rapid development in the financial sector. Thus, while Western societies have 
developed to benefit from codified data and impersonal transactions (Boisot and Child, 
1996), their financial sectors seem to diverge from the rules of the game followed by the 
rest of society. In other words, the normative and cognitive constraints of financial sectors 
appear to differ from those upon which the rest of Western societies rely. We concede 
that this conclusion oversimplifies the relationship between finance and society. As stated 
previously in this chapter and chapter one, financial sectors comprise numerous different 
actors working in diverse financial industries. These actors have different backgrounds, 
educations, worldviews, work practices and work ethics. Establishing more solid evidence 
of a general separation of developed financial sectors from their societies would require a 
research agenda centered on the sociology of finance. One could criticize the Institutional 
Economics approach applied here that assumed the financial sector to be a single 
institution. However, it has the advantage of placing a coherent theory behind scattered 
empirical evidence of frauds, rumors, and poor ethics. Such an approach allows one to 
demonstrate that these are part of a “habitus” à la Bourdieu, which are most visible on 
Wall Street (Ho, 2009) and distinguish finance from other economic activities. Johnson 
and Kwak (2010) revealed the political consequences of a large and complex financial 
sector in the U.S. that is transforming itself into an oligarchy. This chapter attempted to 
shed light on the social consequences of this process. It presented the foundations for 
questioning financial development. Dembinski (2008) asked whether financialization 
made finance a servant or deceiver with respect to society. In a similar vein, and 
employing an Institutional Economics perspective, this chapter attempted to provide an 
answer by highlighting institutional gaps between society and the financial sector.  
It is these gaps that inform us that financial sectors are performing poorly as 
intermediaries. These gaps can exist either because finance developed too rapidly or 
because society is too slow. In both cases, institutional gaps render financial sectors less 
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efficient than they could be. As observed in the following chapter, certain characteristics 
of Western financial sectors also characterize transitional countries such as Russia. 
There are similarities between the social patterns underlying these societies and the 
social patterns underlying advanced financial sectors. In both cases, there is an 
institutional incompatibility between the financial sector and the rest of society. While the 
complex Russian institutional environment has maintained informal social norms that are 
at odds with the impersonal mode of transaction required to develop an efficient financial 
sector, the complex environment of Western financial sectors led to the emergence of 
informal norms that are at odds with the rest of the society that they are supposed to 
serve.  
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CHAPTER 4 
The “finance-society nexus”: When finance is too slow 
SMEs are a sorely missing element of the Russian economic landscape: “But the costs of 
inaction are likely to be significant over the longer term, as sustainable economic growth 
founded on a diversified economic base with a dynamic small and medium-sized 
enterprise sector will only be realized through a deepening of the financial system that 
can efficiently intermediate between savings and investment” (Robinson, 2003:122). 
More than 10 years after this was written, Russia still has the same problem to solve.  
Medium-sized enterprises represent only 1 percent of SMEs, account for 13 percent of 
the SME workforce and represent 14 percent of total SME turnover. Thus, when speaking 
of SMEs in Russia, one should bear in mind that the Russian economic landscape 
comprises MSEs (Micro and Small Enterprises) and large enterprises and that this group 
of MSEs is primarily active in trading. Innovative SMEs, which are playing a more active 
role in promoting value-added economic growth, are quasi-absent from the economic 
scene. At present, one can conclude that the reforms designed to advance Russia’s 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy have had little impact 
on SMEs. The loan value to SMEs as percentage of GDP was 7.6 percent in 2012. 4 
Despite over a decade of development in the financial sector, the dividing line between 
those served by the commercial banking sector (approximately 25 percent of enterprises) 
and those that lack access to finance (75 percent) has not moved (Kuvalin and Moiseev, 
2011:2011). Although the number of enterprises reporting improved cooperation with 
banks doubled between 2009 and 2010, the separation between firms with access to 
external finance and firms without has been stable over the past 10 years. “At the same 
time, the current improvement in the relationships between enterprises and banks has not 
                                                
4 It was 5.23 in 2010; the figure was obtained from the CGAP database at http://www.cgap.org/ but is 
apparently no longer available. The 2012 figure is calculated based on the value of the SME lending portfolio 
estimated by the European Investment Bank (2013:26) at 112 bln EUR. 
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led as yet to any qualitative shifts. The responses to the question about the character of 
cooperation between enterprises and banks are indicative in this sense. The cumulative 
share of the enterprises that received bank credits for financing short and long term 
investment projects was not observed to increase during 2010 and lingered at a level of 
24-25 percent. This means that banks that work with enterprises of the real economy are 
still unready to act beyond the frames of the established circle of borrowers” (Kuvalin and 
Moiseev, 2011:207). Robinson’s conclusion in 2003 regarding the general inability of 
banks to lend beyond their respective networks seems verified by Kuvalin and Moiseev’s 
findings.  
Although the percentage of credit to the private sector has increased since 2002 
(according to World Bank data), the efficiency of intermediation in Russia ‘s banking is 
more similar to that in the central Asian former Soviet republics than to that in former 
communist countries from eastern Europe, let alone Western European countries. 
Fungacova and Solanko (2009) noted that the banking sector in Russia seems divided 
into two sub-sectors, with one part dominated by large banks serving large firms with 
international activities and another part supporting the local economy. This chapter 
demonstrates that an enormous number of small banks provide loans to approximately 
40 percent of SMEs.  
There are a number of studies on SME finance in Russia, and they can be separated in 
two streams of the literature depending on the level of analysis that they employ. At the 
individual firm level and banking sector level, the Ease of Doing Business indicator (EDBI) 
and the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) attempt to capture the success of reforms 
and the quality of the business environment. Russia performs relatively poorly on both of 
these measures (it ranks in 123rd and 63rd place, respectively). A number of studies 
address issues specific to finance, such as the rate of loans, the collateral needed to 
secure a loan, the maturity of loans, the risk of lending to micro and small businesses, 
and the use of credit rating agencies (Barre, 2005, Shironin, 2007, ExpertRA, 2008). By 
the same token, a lack of finance is an oft-cited barrier to SME growth (Pissarides et al., 
2003; Pissarides et al., 2003; Bessonova et al., 2010), and a low level of investment in 
fixed assets hampers innovation (Kossov, 2011, Gurkov, 2011). These measures and 
analysis tend to focus on barriers to SME development, as opposed to constraints. That 
is, they tend to be ahistorical and omit institutional and social variables. Barriers to the 
development of SMEs are less pervasive and structural than constraints. Therefore, if 
constraints can foster or hinder economic development depending on their design, 
barriers consistently prevent growth.  
At the structural level, constraints stemming from the overall economic structure such as 
the Dutch disease - the decline of the manufacture sector due to natural resource exports 
- (Dobrynskaya and Turkisch, 2010) and the presence of entrepreneurs (Buttrick and 
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Moran, 2005) are analyzed to explain economic development. Political constraints, such 
as the role played by new elites played in the regions (Shurchkov, 2012) or the predatory 
role of the state (Frye and Shleifer, 1997), however, have not been conducive to the 
development of SMEs. According to Kihlgren (Kihlgren, 2002), entrepreneurial resources 
have been inefficiently reallocated in favor of certain interest groups. Walter (2005) failed 
to identify an institutional mechanism that could promote innovative SMEs in 2005, but 
there have been recent developments with the establishment of state funds and 
foundations to support innovation. However, the level of innovation in the Russian 
economy remains very low, and breakthroughs innovation in production and management 
have been rare (Kossov, 2011). Aidis et al. (2008) and Aidis and Estrin (2006) examine 
the influences of formal (the rule of law) and informal (networks) institutional constraints 
on entrepreneurship. Information asymmetry is a well-known characteristic of 
relationships between SMEs and creditors in mature financial markets, and this is 
exacerbated in the Russian context. A report on micro finance in Russia concludes that 
the primary concern from the perspective of the banking sector is the poor transparency 
exhibited by borrowers (Chapalova, 2011). As noted above, the accounting system’s 
purpose was not investment but meeting of production target. Business plans also 
followed this logic. “All these well-known problems are even more acute in Russia. 
Information asymmetry is general and the opacity of financial statements is well-known” 
(Walter, 2005:27). Using the concept of blat, thoroughly analyzed by Ledeneva (1998), 
Hsu (2005) notes that Russia exploited social capital differently than Chinese businesses 
that relied on the similar practice of Quanxi. If Guanxi practices helped individuals reach 
out and create networks characterized by trust, blat evolved into defense mechanisms 
and failed as an instrument for extending one’s networks and developing trust with 
strangers. Gréen (2009) analyzed entrepreneurship from an historical and sociological 
perspective and demonstrated how entrepreneurship in contemporary Russia can be 
traced back to notion of the Soviet manager.  
To date, no study has examined the social fabric in depth to determine how it could shape 
the financial sector in Russia and explain why the banking sector has not been able to 
“act beyond the frames of the established circle of borrowers”, to borrow Kuvalin and 
Moiseev’s phrase. The very few studies to approach this topic are dated. Cook (1999) 
studied firms obtaining trade credit from non-financial firms based on existing 
relationships and networks. Trade credit thus signals banks and thereby mitigates 
information asymmetry. Rehn and Taalas (2004) demonstrated how blat, understood as 
mundane activity, was at the center of the economics of everyday life and is the form that 
entrepreneurship took in Russia. Batjargal (2003) analyzed social networks and how they 
affected entrepreneurial performance in Russia. These studies suggests that the use of 
networks and informal institutions might affect the financial sector but do not directly link 
them to SME finance. Figure 12 below depicts the gap in the literature that this chapter 
intends to fill.  
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This seemingly permanent inability of Russian banks to reach potential borrowers seems 
to reflect much more than simple barriers. Deeper constraints are at work. They could 
also explain why local Russian banks are unable to translate their informational 
advantage into lower loan spreads when underwriting syndicated loans (Fungacova et al., 
2009). Local players are typically able to alleviate informational asymmetries better than 
foreign banks and provide better loan terms for borrowers. However, in Russia, “the 
apparent inability of local banks to exploit their advantages may result from their lack of 
experience in acquisition of information about borrowers, the international sophistication 
of Russia’s syndicated loan-taking community, as well as the harsh impacts of corruption 
on local banks, particularity domestic-owned banks, relative to foreign banks based in 
low-corruption countries” (Fungacova et al., 2009:15).  
 
Figure 12. Review of the literature on SMEs in Russia 
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The asymmetric information with which Russian banks seem to struggle needs to be 
contextualized. Regarding opacity and information asymmetries as if they were simply 
administrative barriers to be removed would render them bereft of their contexts and only 
tell half the story. In other words, enhancing transparency and providing additional 
information is the formal aspect of the banking-SME relationship. 
Obsolete accounting standards, or new ones that are implemented with difficulty, and 
laws strengthening corporate governance and protecting property rights are formal 
institutions. However, in addition to formal institutions, numerous informal ones (routines, 
informal norms, mindsets) that might contribute to structuring the relationships between 
SMEs and banks.  
Thus, SME finance in Russia offers an interesting case study for an examination of the 
importance of informal institutions in the relationship between the productive and financial 
sectors. Informal institutions exist in every society and have varying degrees of influence. 
We believe that this is an underestimated aspect of the connection between finance and 
the real economy.  
This chapter traces the contours of the informal side of that relationship, using SME 
financing in Russia as a case study. First, the methodological approach is explained. 
Then, the case study is examined, proceeding from the most general aspects to the most 
detailed ones. The second section provides a definition of institutions and explains the 
approach employed. It also presents a review of studies using an institutional approach in 
the context of transition. The third section presents a picture of the SME sector and of 
SME finance in Russia. The fourth section describes the structure of the financial and 
banking sectors. Section five demonstrates the influence of informal institutions on issues 
similar to SME finance, such as entrepreneurship. It also presents the historical 
background, which partly explains the nature of the relationship between SMEs and 
banks. Finally, we complete this analysis using the results of interviews conducted in 
Moscow and St Petersburg among 30 SMEs and business associations. 
4.1. Methodology 
The variables that this study is attempting to identify - informal practices - demand a 
qualitative approach. It is most appropriate to, first, better describe and identify these 
informal constraints and, second, determine their roles within the SME - bank 
relationship.  
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This study attempts to identify independent variables and ask a “how” question: How do 
informal institutions (or cognitive and normative constraints) affect financial sectors and 
their relationship with the “real economy”? To answer this question, a case study 
research design employing ethnographic research was selected. Case studies present a 
number of advantages and are defined “as an in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively 
bounded phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of a larger class 
of similar phenomena” (Gerring, 2004:341). The intensive study SME financing in the 
Russian context, with a focus on informal constraints, perfectly qualifies as a case study. 
He adds that “virtually any intensive study of a relatively bounded topic qualifies as a 
case study in this minimal sense, so long as it can be linked to with some larger topic via 
a key word” (Gerring, 2004:345). The key words are this case “finance - real economy 
relationship”. He concludes, “the narrowest terrains sometimes claim the broadest 
extensions. Studies of a war are studies of war” (Gerring, 2004:345). Studying the 
linkages between finance and the real economy in Russia is, from this perspective, useful 
for understanding the “finance - real economy” nexus everywhere.  
What makes case study research an appropriate methodology for this study? To identify 
how the financial sector is linked to the real economy, the example of transition countries 
seems expedient, due to the profound and severe institutional change they faced. 
Institutional Economics is well positioned to capture the formal and informal institutional 
changes occurring in transition economies, the process of which is historically and 
socially defined (Van de Mortel, 2002). Case study methodology allows social and 
historical factors to play a role and was therefore selected for this reason. Using a case 
study offers the possibility of discovering neglected variables and new hypotheses 
through a combination of induction and deduction (Bennett, 2004). Russia appears to be 
a relevant example, among the many transition countries that could have been 
considered, because of its uniqueness. The country’s financial sector developed very 
rapidly, and its social norms followed a unique path. The terrain for an exploration of the 
possible links between the two is rich. By selecting Russia, one can moreover rely on a 
much more extensive literature than for other CIS countries.  
We are thus employing the “logic of discovery” (Bennett, 2004:21). The adoption of such 
a methodology stems from an ontological and epistemological consideration that needs to 
be expressed. The complex nature of the phenomena that we seek to understand - the 
relationship between the financial sector and the real economy in the context of transition 
- dictates the methodological choices. Hall (2003) argued that political scientists have 
moved “toward theories, such as those based on path dependence or strategic 
interaction, whose conceptions of the causal structures underlying outcomes are at odds 
with the assumptions required for standard regression techniques and conventional 
comparative method to provide valid causal inferences” (Hall, 2003:375). If the world is 
conceived as a messy and chaotic place, then our epistemological and methodological 
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approaches must be coherent with that reality. This ontology employed here is similar to 
that of the critical realism school, which views the world as composed of complex 
processes, structures and mechanisms (Yeung, 1997). Critical realism, differentiating 
between different domains of reality, allows for different notions of causality. That, in turn, 
implies another conception of how we come to know that reality. In other words, it allows 
for a different epistemology. Thus, at the epistemological level, one can conceive of 
another mode of generalization: “Generality does not refer to generally occurring 
empirical events, but to constituent, fundamental properties or mechanisms. It is not 
statistical generalization, but analytical generalization that we can draw from case 
studies” (Korf, 2006:469). 
The purpose of this research is to understand the mechanisms of the informal practices 
between banks and SMEs in detail to obtain a richer view of how institutions emerge or 
are locked into a sub-optimal equilibrium. We thus proceeded with a causes-of-effects 
qualitative methodology. In other words, we moved backward from effects to causes, in a 
manner similar to a detective searching for the “smoking gun” (Mahoney and Goertz, 
2006). In this approach, the effect is already known, and the case study is chosen 
accordingly. Russia was selected as the case study because the relations between the 
financial sector and SMEs have been unchanged for more 10 years and, more 
importantly, because a proper financial sector never existed in the country. The case 
study of Russia offered the perfect “scene of the crime”. Our goal here is not to discover a 
universal law concerning the relationships between the financial and economic sectors to 
explain this type of stalemate in all contexts. That would require a quantitative 
methodology of an “effects-of-causes” methodology, i.e., moving forward from causes to 
effects (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006).  
The data were gathered during two stages: The first stage was the exploratory phase, 
during which the secondary data were studied. It contributed to establishing the main 
dimensions and formulating the hypothesis (Cooper and Schindler, 2001). These 
secondary data were gathered in Russia while  working for a Swiss consultancy active in 
structured products in St Petersburg from 2008 to 2010. Moreover, a 9-month immersion 
(from September 2011 to May 2012) working as a consultant for a medium-sized 
enterprise helped to formulate the issues and refine the questions considered here. This 
immersion allowed for the complete maturation of the research questions through the 
gathering of primary data. The ethnographic method of participant observation functioned 
as a check of the relevance of the research question.  Whitehead’s comments were 
considered concerning the methodological similarities between ethnographers and 
children: Observations, interviewing, participating, and making interpretations” 
(Whitehead, 2005:10). Working as a part-time consultant for a chain of acupuncture 
institutes operating in Russia and Europe was an opportunity to observe how a small 
Russian enterprise was organized and operated. It appeared that the issue at hand 
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demanded an ethnographic approach. The interaction between financial sector 
participants and enterprises perfectly corresponds to the attributes of human interaction 
that ethnographic studies help to capture: “As socio-cultural beings, humans are users 
and producers of culture, which include the creation of routinized patterns or rules of 
behavior and interaction. Any human social setting or encounter (social situations) may 
have routinized patterns or rules of behavior and interactions. The rules or routinized 
patterns of social situations are functionally oriented toward the provision of order, 
regularity, and predictability to social interaction. Communication breakdowns occur when 
one or more of the actors in the situation do not know the rules for the situation, or the 
actors are attempting to interact utilizing more than one set of rules” (Whitehead, 
2005:15).  
Thus, for the second stage of the fieldwork, a series of qualitative, semi-structured 
interviews was conducted. This genre is a common in qualitative studies. There is a 
debate between standardized and non-standardized interviews concerning which allows 
for more precise and reliable data. Standardized interviews with questionnaires eliminate 
human intervention, which is a source of bias and subjectivity. However, interviews 
without any human intermediation are impossible, not because the technology does not 
exist but because some type of human interaction is necessary for respondents to 
participate. In other words, one must choose between an operationalization that 
guarantees a uniform behavior on the part of the interviewer - the standardized interview - 
or a uniform understanding of the questions - the non-standardized one. Respondents 
can interpret the same questions differently. Thus, in atypical situations, conversational 
interviewing has more benefits than costs (Conrad and Schober, 2000). The present 
research question is specific and rests on a concept that needs to be explained to 
respondents. Moreover, questions concerning the influence of informal practices can be 
very intrusive and require a level of trust that only non-standardized or semi-structured 
interviews can secure (Beatty, 1995). In the context of this study, one of the costs implied 
by this type of survey, namely time, was irrelevant. As I was living in Moscow and had 
been in Russia for 4 years, I had the time to become acquainted with or referred to 
respondents to better conduct these interviews.  
Semi-structured interviews were selected because they combine the freedom that non-
standardized interviews allow with a prepared list of questions that need to be covered 
(Whitehead, 2005:17)). Thus 25 SMEs, 3 banks, 3 business associations and several 
experts and academics were interviewed between October 2012 and March 2013.  
It was difficult to systematically audio record these interviews because the topic at hand 
remains sensitive, although the practices examined here are not illegal. By seeking 
permission to tape record conversations, one runs the risk of receiving less interesting 
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material. However, the transcripts can be returned to the interviewees for review and 
clarification if necessary (Mero-Jaffe, 2011). 
4.2. Institution in transition 
According to North (1990), institutions are humanly devised constraints that can be formal 
or informal. If barriers are nearly always understood to be detrimental to business and 
should be consequently removed, constraints are neither positive nor negative per se and 
are necessary for the operation of a market economy, however inefficiently it might be 
structured. Institutional arrangements can be locked into a sub-optimal equilibrium 
(Pierson, 2000). 
From that perspective, the strength of institutions and their potential for universal 
applicability are important. Presenting the process of liberalization in the former Soviet 
Union framed only in terms of reforms is misleading, not because it prevents one from 
recognizing the necessity of gradualism but because it prevents one from recognizing that 
strong institutions are fundamental (Popov, 2002). At present, it seems uncontroversial to 
assert that simply reforming the old system by applying a Western blueprint has proven a 
naive understanding of the functioning of market economies. In that sense, the “hard 
versus soft medicine”, or fast reforms versus sequencing, is equally misleading because 
it does not differentiate between market liberalization and market creation. Once the 
obfuscating language of reform is dropped, one can recognize the importance of the 
presence (or absence) of institutions when constructing a market economy from nothing 
(Freeland, 2000).  
The institutions of a market economy were absent, but this does not imply there was a 
complete absence of institutions. Transitioning to a market economy is not a smooth and 
linear process, as actors tend to rely on old routines when faced with increasing 
uncertainty. The waves of privatization must be considered in this light because 
privatization does not simply constitute the transfer of ownership from state-owned 
enterprises to private ones (Zahra et al., 2000). At the micro institutional level, in the 
context of transition, privatization is a process of institutional change (Johnson et al., 
2000) whereby the managers of firms must internalize a private sector “template”. By the 
same token, the phenomenon of entrepreneurship, absent which privatization would be 
meaningless, must also be considered in the context of transition. The structure of 
incentives within which entrepreneurs in transition evolve “encompasses the onslaught of 
rapid changes and the resulting uncertainty, a wide range of opportunities thrown up by 
the restructuring of formerly planned economies, imbalances between supply and 
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demand, fragile or only partial market institutions and a variety of informal rules and 
behaviors which are remnants of the communist past” (Aidis and Estrin, 2006:5). 
Thus, it is unsurprising that there is an intensive reliance on informal institutions because 
they are the only stable form of institutions upon which transitional economies can rely to 
reduce uncertainty. They are repositories of knowledge. “Institutions are formed as 
durable and integrated complexes of customs and routines. Habits and routines thus 
preserve knowledge, particularly tacit knowledge in relation to skills, and institutions act 
through time as their transmission belt” (Hodgson, 1998:180). Informal institutions do not 
necessarily favor market economies. Communist norms and routines can be quite 
persistent and, according to Granville and Leonard (2010), account for the differences in 
regional technological development. Social structures organized through networks and 
clans are another strong informal institution in Russia. Such informal norms allowed 
Russia to survive the application of ‘shock therapy’ (Cuddy and Gekker, 2002) but are not 
conducive to the emergence of efficient markets. Thus, information is non-codified and 
undiffused in general, as it is only codified and diffused through networks and clans 
(Puffer and McCarthy, 2007). It might not be efficient, but it is resilient. 
Against this background, it becomes clear that there is no blueprint for a legal framework 
for economic development. Cultural receptiveness - the ability to anchor formal 
institutions to beliefs and norms – allows for smooth institutional change and is thus less 
costly (Greif and Laitin, 2004:635). However, exported formal institutions that are not 
rooted in the deeper informal institutional layer are likely to encounter resistance (Shirley, 
2005). 
Woodruff (2000)’s thorough analysis of two borrowed market institutions - the Joint Stock 
Company and the Monetary System - clearly demonstrates the normative clash. These 
two institutions functioned poorly (and arguably continue to) because of the tension 
between so called “g-rules”, for game theoretic rules, and “h-rules” for humanly devised 
rules. H-rules are embeddable; that is, they can be applied in different contexts when 
convenient. They are non-exhaustive, leaving a certain degree of latitude for other 
possible actions and human creativity. Third, they are violable. Woodruff concluded that 
“therefore, though phrased abstractly, they never deal with abstract individuals” 
(Woodruff, 2000:442). The evolution of h-rules into a set of g-rules is thus far from 
automatic, and the preconditions for this evolution are sociological. The interchangeability 
and standardization of abstract commodities (money and stocks) facilitated tacit 
coordination. Once the entire community adopts this vision, it is “possible for tacit 
coordination based on abstract commodities to be adequately described by g-rules of 
game theory” (Woodruff, 2000:445).  
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Woodruff’s point is that there is a gap between the culture of world markets and the social 
preconditions in Russia. There is a clash between the imported template for the 
organization of exchange, the sovereignty of transactions that nation states are expected 
to control, and a vision of society. Thus, any analysis focusing on formal institutions only 
would only tell half of the story. It would not capture these tensions within the institutional 
structure. Pistor (Pistor, 2000) demonstrated that there is a remarkable divergence 
between corporate governance in transitional countries despite a trend towards legal 
convergence. “Weaknesses in the governance structure that are noted today are often 
attributed to weaknesses in the law, which in turn leads to new proposals for improving 
statutory law. The evidence of the quality of the law on the books, however, suggests that 
this is at best a partial story. The level of shareholder and creditor rights protection in 
transition economies today is higher than in many other countries” (Pistor, 2000:47).  
If this only represents a partial story, the remainder of the explanation must be found 
elsewhere, and one has good reasons to examine the opaque layer of informal 
institutions: The country’s formal institutions were entirely destroyed. The only types of 
institutions remaining to anchor social and economic interactions were social norms, 
conventions, and habits, which are encompassed by our understanding of informal 
institutions (Van De Mortel, 2002). The empirical literature suggests that the use of 
informal norms and networks to obtain financing, while being beneficial for firms at the 
micro level, might be inefficient at the structural level. This chapter contributes to the 
literature demonstrating the links between social embeddedness (trust and social capital) 
and finance (Uzzi, 1999, Dasgupta, 2002, Guiso et al., 2008). In the Russian context, 
trust is a concept that takes two forms: General trust and interpersonal trust, which are 
also termed “bridging” and “bonding”. In Russia, the level of the former is low and that of 
the latter high, which creates a trust system that distinguishes between the “ours” and 
“not ours” (nash vs. ne nash) (Schrader, 2004). Investigating the effects of this “Russian” 
social feature on socio-economic development, Menyashev and Polishchuk (2011) used 
data from a major, nation-wide survey administered throughout Russia. At the systemic 
level, they found that bonding social capital had negative effects on development, as 
measured by socio-economic conditions, and local government performance, while 
bridging social capital had positive ones. This is the most recent empirical finding 
confirming the argument that social capital has adverse effects (Portes and Landolt, 
1996). For instance, the informal practice of “blat”, examined by Ledeneva (1998) and 
consisting of an economy of favors within one’s social network and shaping 
entrepreneurship, is anti-systemic (Rehn and Taalas, 2004). By the same token, former 
Soviet economies have hybrid banking sectors that have developed in phases (Dow et 
al., 2008). Moreover, the way in which financial sectors develop also reflects a broad 
social contract. Searching for a well-functioning financial sector entails searching for an 
efficient system for the transmission of capital and, thus, control over firms. The state has 
played and continues to play a different role in former communist countries than it has in 
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Europe (Borak, 2000). However, how are borrower-lender relationships determined by the 
clash of these different institutional rules? Because homo sovieticus is still alive (Gogin, 
2012), how does he obtain a loan?  
To understand how the institutional mix affects relations between banks and SMEs, the 
next sections provide an overview of both sectors and briefly expose the role of the 
banking sector in the Soviet regime to reveal how the understanding of the role of banks 
persisted through the liberalization reforms and into the present. 
4.3. SMEs in Russia 
Studies of SMEs have experienced increased interest since Birch’s claim that these 
organizations are important in generating employment Birch (Birch, 1981). There is a 
tremendous amount of literature on the economic benefits of small firms and 
entrepreneurship (Van Praag and Versloot, 2008, Henrekson and Johansson, 2010), and 
certainly one must take care not to take their advantages for granted (Davis et al., 1993, 
Biggs, 2002). It is now accepted that SMEs play an important role not only in terms of 
economic growth but also with respect to innovation and their ability to adapt to volatile 
market conditions. SMEs are sorely lacking on the Russian economic landscape.  
Prior to 2008, there was no formal definition to distinguish small and medium-sized 
businesses in Russia. Moreover, the only existing definition did not account for financial 
criteria. This should make one cautious when comparing current data with those in the 
literature on SMEs in Russia produced before 2007. Nevertheless, Rosstat’s (the Russian 
Federation Federal State Statistic Service) definition is now based on three criteria 
(employment, finance and independence).  
Thus, a medium-sized business in Russia is an enterprise:  
• That employs on average 100 to 250 employees  
• That generates a turnover of max. 1,000 million RUB (approx. 25 million EUR)  
• In which a legal entity that is not an SME does not own more than a 25 percent share  
A small business:  
• Employs on average 16 to 100 persons  
• Generates a turnover of 400 million RUB (approx. 10 million EUR) or less 
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• Is a firm in which a legal entity that is not an SME does not own more than a 25 
percent share 
A micro-enterprise:  
• Employs no more than 15 persons  
• Generates a turnover of up to 60 million RUB (1.5 million EUR)  
• Is a firm in which a legal entity that is not an SME does not control more than a 25 
percent share  
As figure 13 below indicates, individual entrepreneurs and micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises accounted for approximately 40 percent of total private sector turnover, which 
is considerably less than in most developed countries. The figures below are somewhat 
dated, but they are the most recent available that provide a complete picture and include 
individuals and micro enterprises. Nevertheless, the most recent data on small and 
medium-sized firms demonstrate that little has changed and the sector remains 
substantially underdeveloped (European Investment Bank, 2013).  
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Figure 13. SME turnover in Russia 
Furthermore, SMEs generated 38 percent of all private sector employment. 
Unsurprisingly, the activity responsible for most of the turnover (70 percent) among SMEs 
in 2009 is wholesale and commission trade, which is the activity that generates the least 
added value. Manufacturing, which is generally considered the cornerstone of economic 
growth, accounted for 9 percent of SMEs’ activities. Examining the geographic distribution 
of SME turnover demonstrates Moscow’s (and the surrounding region‘s) importance, 
generating 28 percent of that turnover.  
However, the Russian case offers a good example of why regarding SMEs as a unified 
block (which is typically compared to large firms) can be highly misleading. Medium-sized 
firms in Russia account for only 4 percent of total firm turnover. The remainder - 36 
percent - is generated by self-employed individuals and micro and small enterprises. 
Thus medium-sized firms are nearly nonexistent in Russia, in terms of both turnover and 
employment. If one disaggregates the category of SMEs, the picture is clear. Medium-
sized firms represent only 1 percent of SMEs, accounting for 13 percent of the SME 
workforce and 14 percent of total SME turnover. Thus, when considering SMEs in Russia, 
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one should bear in mind that the Russian economic landscape is composed of MSEs 
(Micro and Small Enterprises) and large enterprises and that this group of MSEs is 
principally active in trading. This likely explains why current assets decrease as the size 
of the enterprise increases, as shown in figure 14 below. Statistics on SMEs’ added value 
could not be found; hence, we can only cite Komkov’s figures for the added value of small 
businesses (his definition of this term is unclear) of approximately 10 percent (Komkov et 
al., 2011). In any event, whether we consider the matter from the perspective of 
employment or attempt to deduce the value added, these figures are still low, even in 
comparison to other economies in transition (see figure 14 below)
 
Figure 14. The missing middle 
The small, innovative firms that disproportionately contribute to a Western economy’s 
GDP are not present in Russia. Innovative SMEs, which play a more active role in 
promoting value-added economic growth, are quasi-absent from the Russian economic 
scene. Despite being constantly mentioned in political discourse as the key to economic 
diversification, the number of innovative SMEs in Russia has actually decreased (Komkov 
et al., 2011). Only 2.6 percent of Russians constitute a new pool of potential 
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entrepreneurs. This measure fell by 6 percent and 24 percent relative to the levels of 
potential entrepreneurs in 2009 and 2006, respectively. By the same token, the proportion 
of “necessity-driven” entrepreneurs to “opportunity-driven” entrepreneurs, which was 
formerly stable at 70 percent, is now rising (Verkhovskaya and Dorokhina, 2011). 
Thus while Russia has improved with respect to a “business environment indicator”5, the 
majority of the entrepreneurs interviewed by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor in 2011 
(Verkhovskaya and Dorokhina, 2011) felt that conditions for start-ups had worsened, and 
only 21.7 percent of respondents believe that conditions for business development are 
favorable. 
Internal finance accounts for approximately 84 percent of investment, while in upper-
middle-income countries, that figure is 60 percent. However, there are two impressive 
differences between Russia and developed countries. The percentage of firms with bank 
loans and lines of credit, 21.6 percent against 46.3 percent, and the percentage of bank 
finance allocated to investment, which is 6.3 percent in Russia and 23.7 in developed 
countries (IFC, 2012). 
As the next section notes, this difference is linked to the particular structure of the 
financial sector in Russia and problems of asymmetric information. However, that does 
not mean that SMEs are absent due to of the difficulty of accessing finance. It is here 
argued that the difficulties experienced in the Russian financial sector when attempting to 
finance SMEs is not the cause of their underdevelopment, but rather a symptom of 
deeper institutional malfunction. Indeed, the “missing middle” argument creates a black 
box in the finance-SME relationship, contending that SMEs would flourish in the presence 
of a more developed financial sector. This chapter instead attempts to demonstrate that 
the problems of asymmetric information and the difficult relationship between the financial 
sector and SMEs also stem from the particular informal institutions cultivated in 
transitional economies such as Russia. 
4.4. The Financial sector 
As figure 15 below indicates, while the percentage of credit provided to the private sector 
has increased since 2002 (World Bank data), the efficiency of intermediation in Russia’s 
banking sector (based on that indicator alone) is more similar to figures for former Soviet 
                                                
5 The Ease of Doing Business Indicator (EDBI) http://www.doingbusiness.org/ and the Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI) http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2013-2014 
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republics in central Asia than to former communist countries from Eastern Europe and still 
further from those for Western European countries.  
A brief overview of the banking sector reveals that its structure is not conducive to the 
establishment of long-term relationships with the SME sector. It is characterized by 
segregation, inefficiency and the domination of Sberbank. 
 
Figure 15. The Russian financial sector 
Styrin’s division of Russia’s banking sector into four categories remains valid (Styrin, 
2005): 
1) State Owned Banks (SOBs) are the banking arm of the government and play a 
technical role in the allocation of capital. In that sense, they are not true financial 
intermediaries. Additionally, they enjoy certain unfair competitive advantages such 
as government or central bank financing and bailouts in difficult periods. SOBs 
control 50 percent of the banking sector’s total assets (CBRF, 2013:26). 
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2) The largest private banks control approximately 27 percent of total assets (CBRF, 
2013:26). They are the “pocket banks” in large Financial Industry Groups (FIGs) 
and act as the banking arms of their respective FIG. They tend to limit their 
lending to external borrowers and redistribution within their FIGs, and their role as 
true financial intermediaries is thus also limited. 
3) The foreign banks operating in Russia initially specialized in international trade but 
now offer loans and control approximately 18 percent of total assets. They offer 
short-term trade loans and foreign exchange transactions. 
4) The numerous “dwarf” banks, of which there are approximately 900, control no 
more than 5 percent of total banking sector assets. Their primary source of 
revenue is fees from grey services such as tax evasion, money laundering, and 
illegal capital exports. These “dwarf” banks, along with medium-sized banks, 
provide 40 percent of the volume of loans extended to SMEs. 
The influence of the state extends beyond the level indicated by equity ownership 
because in this “multi-tier vertical structure”, a state-owned or state-controlled mother 
company in turn owns or controls several banks at lower levels of the hierarchy. This is 
the case for the third-largest bank, the state-controlled Gazprombank, and the second-
largest bank, the government-owned VTB bank (Glushkova and Vernikov, 2009). 
Therefore, private banks may be considerably influenced by public authorities and 
individual officials at all governmental levels. “Such influence is executed via control over 
banks’ decision-making on credit allocation, and involvement in politically motivated 
activities like acquisition of assets, providing services to priority industries, sectors or 
types of borrowers, etc. Dozens of Russian banks face a trade-off between profit-
maximization and the desire to retain loyalty to public authorities in order to ensure from 
the state consequent support of both financial and non-financial nature” (Glushkova and 
Vernikova, 2009:4).  
Thus capital is allocated according to a chain of influence in which g-rules (the formal 
rules of the game in banking) and h-rules (humanly devised rules) are combined. 
Vernikov (2009) concludes that the hidden hand of the state in the Russian banking 
industry is eroding the private banking sector, which is not found to be more efficient 
(Karas et al., 2010). This confirms the double-edged functions served by Sberbank in the 
banking system and noted by Robinson: On the one hand, it provides stability and key 
government services, while on the other hand, its monopoly status prevents the 
emergence of a competitive banking system (Robinson, 2003:147). Fungacova and 
Solanko (2009) noted that the Russian banking sector appears to be divided into two sub-
sectors, with one part dominated by large banks serving large firms engaging in 
international activities and another part supporting the local economy. Moreover, 
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Fungacova et al. (2009) indicated that Russian banks provide no informational added 
value to syndicated loans. It seems, then, that the informational asymmetries are 
exacerbated in Russia, rendering even local banks (or especially local banks) useless in 
that regard.  
Nevertheless, certain general improvements can be noted: The banking asset/GDP ratio 
has grown twice between 2000 and 2008, reaching 65 percent in 2008 and 79.1 percent 
in 2012 (CBRF, 2011, CBRF, 2013), and the ratio of credit provided to the private sector 
over GDP has also improved but is now stagnant at 37.5 percent (World Bank data). 
However, figure 15 above shows that this indicator remains below the levels exhibited in 
other Eastern European countries such as Estonia, Hungary or Bulgaria and is more 
similar to the figure for Azerbaijan. Moreover, the figures on lending to SMEs are not 
encouraging. Loans to SMEs as a share of GDP are at 5.4 percent, which is far below the 
average of the G20 countries (approximately 14 percent). However, competition has 
become fiercer since 2012, and increasing numbers of large banks are innovating 
through various programs and platform, streamlining their procedures to capture that 
segment of loan market. This subject is worthy of a more detailed examination.  
In Figure 16 below, one can note the importance of Sberbank among the 88 banks that 
lend most to SMEs. Sberbank dominates the SME segment, providing 48 percent of the 
loans when considering the 88 largest lenders. However, if we consider the totality of the 
banking sector, 956 institutions (CBRF, 2013:17), the picture of SMEs lending is very 
different. Not only does it become clear that the largest banks are capturing Sberbank’s 
market share as a result of strategies employed by large banks to participate in that 
segment, but more interestingly, it shows that an enormous quantity of small banks also 
provide loans to SMEs.  
 132 
 
Figure 16. The SME loan market in Russia 
This pool of small banks provides 40 percent of the loans to SMEs. Thus, while one 
should welcome the increased competition between Sberbank and the top 30 banks, it is 
important to recall that 40 percent of the market is served by an “unobserved” part of the 
financial sector: The “dwarf” and medium-sized banks (see Figure 16 above). 
This “unobserved” part of the banking system that serves 40 percent of the SME sector is 
the result of the reforms to the financial sector that occurred at the beginning of the 
transition to a market economy and the institutional battle between the central bank 
(Gosbank) and the specialized banks. Specialized banks were created in 1987 to serve 
certain sectors of the economy, but without the appropriate institutional framework for the 
central bank to oversee these specialized banks. The spetsbanks and Gosbank rapidly 
began to blame one another for the numerous problems arising from this situation, which 
had consequences for short-term lending. However, in 1988, the Law on Cooperatives 
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authorized the creation of completely private cooperative banks. Gosbank had an 
institutional incentive to support the development of these private banks because it could 
assert its authority over them and break the monopoly of the spetsbanks. It was very 
generous with respect to licensing and declared that any former Soviet entity had the right 
to form a bank (a provision that was not included in the Law on Cooperatives). Many 
economic organizations quickly understood that owning a bank offered multiple 
advantages. The Russian banking system was not servicing the economy and was highly 
unpredictable. Creating a bank was a defensive response by enterprises. Thus, banks 
not only could implement survival techniques but also had the potential to make their 
shareholders immensely wealthy (they could open offshore accounts, convert non-cash 
assets into cash and thus privatize money by transferring it out of a government account). 
A “natural” relationship of mutual dependence between Gosbank and the private banks 
developed rapidly. Gosbank’s interests were to issue enough licenses to limit the 
influence of the “spetsbanks”, and Gosbank officials received bribes or other informal 
propositions to facilitate the license-issuing process, while enterprises could have their 
own banks and lend to their shareholders, suppliers and clients (Buyske, 2007:108-11). 
Thus, this pool of banks that provide grey services and money laundering operations also 
plays a role in economic and social policies concerning economic diversification in 
Russia. Economic and social ties link these banks to the SMEs they serve. As such, this 
is the source of micro-efficiencies in the financing of 40 percent of SME loans. That 
corresponds to the defensive reflex of businesses. Measures that benefit firm survival, 
however, do not imply efficient growth. The Russian social fabric that produces these 
linkages, which are useful to firm survival, might also prevent the formation of others that 
are essential to the functioning of healthy market economies. Insider lending is prevalent 
in Russia (Laeven, 2001, Maternovsky, 2011). Numerous respondents consider their 
businesses to be parts of the various business ecosystems that comprise the Russian 
market. Even at the level of SMEs, banks tend to favor firms within their ecosystems.  
This situation can also be perceived by examining the portfolios of the banks that lend the 
most to SMEs in figure 14. Some banks specialize in loans to SMEs, as over half of their 
entire lending portfolios are composed of SME loans. However, these are very small 
banks, as measured by assets. None of these banks were among the 30 largest banks, 
apart from “Vozrozhdenie”, which was in 27th place. This confirms that large banks are 
not specialized in SME lending and SME lending is primarily pursued by small, regional 
banks. 
A survey of the 300 largest banks found that 42 percent of them consider the 
requirements on the financial status of enterprises as the largest impediment to SME 
financing (Vedev and Grigorian, 2011). Double or grey accounting prevents banks for 
accurately evaluating risks. As a result, banks shift their focus to collateral requirements, 
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approximately 116.5 percent (IFC, 2012), which are considered excessively severe by 31 
percent of banks. According to this analysis, opaque accounting is thus at the root of a 
vicious cycle (Vedev and Grigorian, 2011). Russian SMEs have inherited the accounting 
practices of the Soviet system, in which accounting was not designed for investors but 
state planning. Transparency has thus never been a widespread notion in Russia. This 
might change as a result of a new law implemented in January 2013. This law does not 
concern accounting standards per se but instead updates how accounting should be 
organized. In any case, accounting in Russia remains tax driven. Double accounting is 
the norm. The interviews conducted reflect that SMEs do not consider accounting a tool 
to determine the performance of a business, but rather to conceal it. For the same 
reasons, firms are also divided into numerous legal entities that are frequently renamed 
and re-registered. 
Loans to SMEs are generally of a short-term nature, and the first half of 2012 presents an 
increase in short-term loans relative to 2011. Among the 88 banks surveyed by Expert 
RA, 1-year credit and overdrafts for SMEs comprise over 50 percent of loans. Only 15 
percent are loans with maturities of more than 3 years. Techniques for rating small 
businesses can be applied to SMEs, as this shifts the focus from the SMEs to the 
personal credit history of the owner. However, this demands objective and standardized 
measurements of risks and increased automation in decision making (Snyder and 
O'Brien, 2011). These techniques were only recently introduced in the financial sector of 
Russia. The interviews with the bankers revealed that providing credit to SMEs is a new 
segment of the banking market. It was only recently that providing credit to SMEs began 
to be considered possible and profitable. Moreover, that lending technology is best suited 
for small loans that account for a small percentage of portfolios because it is based on 
risk correlation and diversification. In Russia, such lending should target the micro loan 
segment Automated procedures could be applied to loans of up to 1 million RUB 
($30’000), which is not sufficient to finance medium-sized firms’ investments. 
Leasing and factoring, which are appropriate in weak legal environments because risk 
management is focused on the performance of the transaction instead of the quality of 
the borrower’s balance sheet (OECD, 2011), has been growing in Russia. However, 
leasing, which is an affordable instrument for SMEs to finance investments, is used by 
large firms for substantial transactions. The structure of factoring deals is similar. For both 
of these instruments, Expert RA observed a low number of transactions but substantial 
ones by large firms (see figure 17 below). 
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Figure 17. Structure of leasing and factoring deals 
Thus, while there have been developments in the Russian financial sector in recent 
years, the choices in terms of lending technologies for SMEs have remained very limited. 
Venture capital, angel investors and micro-finance can provide some financing for start-
ups, but these vehicles have yet to become popular in Russia. They are not particularly 
developed in former Soviet economies because there are few innovative, fast-growing 
enterprises. Institutional factors such as a reluctance to dilute ownership and capital 
gains taxes constitute a barrier to the development of venture capital. By the same token, 
the lack of exit strategies for equity investors and the chronic deficit of confidence in 
business relationships make equity investment very risky (OECD, 2011:171). 
When they are not underdeveloped, the instruments to finance SMEs are lacking. Figure 
16 below from Naïm (2008) visualizes the problem. 
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Figure 18. The MSME finance landscape 
The structure of SMEs provides few investment opportunities to Russian banks. The 
limited number of medium-sized firms and innovative companies does not trigger financial 
development. The structure of the financial sector is also not conducive to SME financing. 
Large banks belonging to industrial conglomerates and state-owned financial institutions 
are poor financial intermediaries for independent SMEs. Thus the state of SME finance in 
Russia appears to represent a vicious circle. SMEs require financial means to develop, 
while the financial sector waits for the SME sector to become developed before providing 
financing. This echoes the chicken-and-egg debate on whether finance precedes 
economic development. After 20 years of transition, the economy has not become 
diversified, and the financial sector does not perform its allocative function (Pagè, 2011). 
As noted earlier, there have been some improvements, but these have not influenced 
SME financing. 
Kuvalin and Moiseev (2011) arrived at a similar conclusion: “The cumulative share of the 
enterprises that received bank credits for financing short and long term investment 
projects was not observed to increase during 2010 and lingered at a level of 24 - 25 
percent. This means that banks that work with enterprises of the real economy are still 
unready to act beyond the frames of the established circle of borrowers” (Kuvalin and 
Moiseev, 2011:207). 
Formal laws and regulations do not automatically cause banks to act “beyond the frames 
of the established circle of borrowers”. This is the difficulty in the emerging markets and 
demands breaking with old habits and social structures. In other words, “these 
established circle of borrowers” are social spaces filled by informal institutions. These are 
Source: (Naïm, 2008:1)
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worth exploring to obtain a complete picture of relationship between SMEs and the 
banking sector. The intuition is that part of what constitutes the Finance-SME relationship 
is influenced by the humanly devised rules underpinning social relations in Russia. To our 
knowledge, there are no studies considering aspects beyond the usual information 
asymmetry problems to analyze the nature of the relationship between banks and SMEs 
in Russia. The social element resulting in the peculiarity of this relationship in Russia is 
due to the role that banks formerly occupied in the Soviet Union. 
4.5. Historical background 
Monetary policy and the financial system were entirely integrated within the system of 
central planning. From a historical perspective, one can trace the relationship between 
banking and the government to Tsarist Russia. During the period before World War I, 
Russia represented the unique example of a central bank that was entirely dependent on 
the Ministry of Finance. The central bank was clearly a tool for the government to 
implement official policy. Shaparov, 20 years before the revolution, had already advanced 
the concept of “absolute money”, which would merely be a unit of account. This was very 
similar to what the Bolshevik revolution attempted to implement. The notion of a state 
monobank began to appear at approximately this time. 
In Lenin’s view, the banking system was “the skeleton of socialist society” and was 
therefore considered a component of the state apparatus needed to transform society. 
“Lenin saw (the banks) potential for central control and direction of dispersed industries in 
a country where regional and local units of the government’s administrative apparatus 
were inadequate to deal with economic problems. He was impressed with the technical 
functions performed by the extensive branch networks dominating the scene in Germany, 
the United Kingdom, France, and indeed Russia itself, rather than with the possibility of 
using monetary and credit policy as a tool for restructuring the economy and achieving 
adequate growth and stability” (Gavry, 1977:22). 
One can observe that the Soviet revolution regarded banks as administrative tools rather 
than financial intermediaries. It was thus only logical to completely integrate the banking 
system into the state apparatus. However, the organizing principle of the Soviet regime 
did not indicate how resources were to be allocated. Thus, if in capitalist economies, the 
primary function of financial sectors is the efficient allocation of resources, the primary 
function of the Soviet financial system was to prevent inflation and advance the aims of 
physical planning (Gregory and Tikhonov, 2000). 
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In a world in which money is exclusively considered a numeraire, a mere unit of account, 
it then follows that banks should be the accountants of the central plan. This was known 
as “control by the ruble”, whereby Gosbank could observe every transaction (DeMaris, 
1963). For example, the flour delivered by a farm as output would be used by a bread 
factory, which would send a letter of confirmation to the farm that the flour had been 
delivered. This document would then be delivered to Gosbank, which would credit the 
account of the farm and debit the account of the bread factory by a like amount of 
“bookkeeping money”. The bread factory would then deliver its bread to a state store, and 
the same process would apply. When a household would purchase the bread with cash, 
the state store would deposit the cash with Gosbank and be given a credit of equal value. 
Thus, as the transfer of physical output was reflected in a financial transfer, Gosbank 
could theoretically monitor the plan “by the ruble”. 
Financial intermediaries cannot exist in this type of environment. Credit only exists as an 
input required to fulfill a production plan. “[The] Monobank system did not distinguish 
between central banking and commercial banking, and its role was limited to the 
organization of the payments system for the enterprise sector and pumping short-term 
credits to this sector to facilitate inter-enterprise trade as well as to smooth out any 
imperfections unforeseen in planning. Because all enterprises held their accounts with 
banks, banks controlled their financial flows, monitored their performance, and supplied 
all necessary information to the authorities. Notions such as market-determined interest 
rates, liquidity preference, cost of funds, collateral, and creditworthiness were irrelevant to 
soviet banking practices. The banking sector was used as an effective but neutral conduit 
in the government’s resource allocation policy” (Dow et al., 2008:9). 
Banks thus were never a bridge between savers and investors, but quite the opposite: 
They were instead the guards of the border between cash and non-cash transactions. 
Enterprises would settle their transactions in non-cash assets, while the household sector 
would use cash. The conversion of non-cash assets into cash was restricted. Figure 19 
below depicts this Soviet system of separation between cash and non-cash transactions. 
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Figure 19. The soviet financial system 
Woodruff (1999) provided a gripping account of the monetary reforms that occurred 
before money regained its universality. The Ruble lost its universal value after the 1930s 
and was partitioned. Its value was subordinated to the status of its owner. Money in the 
Soviet system was considered no more than the “lubricant of production”. However, when 
market liberalization occurred, the origin of economic value was still located in production, 
as the entire Soviet economic system preferred production to monetary stability.  
The system soon became a barter economy because enterprises were unable to satisfy 
the prices of a monetary economy and Russia’s governmental arrangement caused the 
barter economy to shift from the interregional level to the federal level. The barter 
economy reached 50 percent of the total in 1998. Understanding how demonetization 
occurred is crucial to understanding why the reforms were not as successful as 
proponents of rapid liberalization believed they would be (Yakovlev, 2000). 
Non-monetary forms of payment emerged because of institutional weakness in the 
financial sector (Noguera and Linz, 2006). Moreover, this indicates the non-universality of 
Russia’s formal legal system. Because the Soviet system only regarded money as a unit 
of account, its intermediation function was eliminated. Money was only necessary to 
settle transactions; it was a means of payment only, not a medium of exchange. 
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Developing a market economy would require not only formal laws and, more importantly, 
state sovereignty to reform the role of money beyond an exclusive means of payment but 
also formal and informal institutions to establish money as a medium of exchange. The 
notion of credit risk was absent from the previous financial systems, and credit was 
therefore considered an input, on the same level as other inputs that were necessary to 
fulfill the plan.  
This understanding of the role of the banking sector can be perceived in SMEs’ decisions 
to create banks for themselves during the reform period. “Almost any group can organise 
a bank owing to the lack of regulation. “Wildcat” banks primarily accept deposits from 
members and borrow on the cheap interbank credit market to fund their own enterprises. 
These banks apply for credits at subsidised rates from the Central Bank and use this 
money to make loans to the designated enterprises” (Johnson, 1994:979). The way the 
banking sector interacts with SMEs is partly the result of the Soviet legacy and the 
institutional struggle between the central bank (Gosbank) and the specialized banks (e.g., 
Sberbank for savings, Vnesheconom bank for external trade). Specialized banks were 
created in 1987 to serve certain sectors of the economy, without the appropriate 
institutional framework for the central bank to oversee these specialized banks. The 
“spetsbanks” and “gosbank” rapidly began to blame one another for the numerous 
problems arising from this situation, which had consequences for short-term lending. 
However, in 1988, the Law on Cooperatives authorized the creation of completely private 
cooperative banks. Gosbank had an institutional incentive to support the development of 
these private banks, as it could assert its authority over them and break the monopoly of 
the “spetsbanks”. It was very generous with respect to licensing and declared that any 
former Soviet entity had the right to form a bank (which was not stipulated in the Law on 
Cooperatives). Many economic organizations quickly came to understand that owning a 
bank offered numerous advantages. The Russian banking system was not serving the 
economy and was highly unpredictable. Thus, creating banks for themselves was the 
defensive response of enterprises. Moreover, in addition to these survival techniques, 
banks also offered the potential to make their shareholder extremely wealthy. They could 
open offshore accounts, convert non-cash assets into cash and thus privatize money by 
transferring it out of government accounts. A “natural” relationship of mutual dependence 
rapidly developed between Gosbank and private banks. Gosbank had an interest in 
issuing enough licenses to limit the influence of the “spetsbanks”, and its officials 
received bribes or other informal proposition to facilitate the issuing process, while 
enterprises could have their own banks, lending to their shareholders, suppliers and 
clients (Buyske, 2007:108-111).  
Thus, two processes were at work in the creation of the banking sector, neither of which 
had anything to do with efficient allocation of capital. On the one hand, private banks 
were converting non-cash assets into cash, without any reference to market prices, and 
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employing dubious and occasionally illegal methods, which poses a social and political 
problem. On the other hand, it seems that enterprises replicated the financial structure to 
which they were accustomed by creating banks that would serve the shareholders of a 
club of enterprises to allow for the continued operation of these businesses. These newly 
created private banks played, on a smaller scale, at the level of networks of enterprises, a 
similar role to the one that Gosbank formerly served in the country. They could control 
transactions and ensure that output was produced. The efficiency of capital allocation 
was not the primary consideration.  
This is not to suggest that the Russian banking system has not evolved since the early 
transition period. However, as noted above, a lot of very small banks control 40 percent of 
the market for loans; these “dwarf banks” are the result of the defensive decisions of 
SMEs or groups of SMEs to create banks as a source of liquidity for their network. This is 
not the type of financial intermediation upon which developed market economies can rely. 
Moreover, the large banks have only recently come to recognize that SMEs are a 
potential market (circa 2006-2007, based on the interviews with bankers working in SME 
departments). From privatization onward, they had other opportunities for profit than 
simply serving “their function” as intermediaries. “Spontaneous products of the decaying 
command economy, the Russian private banks were deformed by birth. They grew out of 
a system in which the skills and structured of conventional banking hardly existed. Then, 
from 1988 on, the opportunities for quick gain lay everywhere for the daring and 
unscrupulous” (Gustafson, 1999:83). They first exploited inflation. The Russian central 
bank, captive and unsophisticated, agreed to maintain ruble deposits at low interest rates, 
while prices increased 10’000-fold between 1991 and 1995. Banks could thus convert 
low-interest ruble deposits into dollars and then lend dollars at high-interest rates to 
finance short-term commodity exports. After the “stabilization shock” of 1995-1996, which 
reduced inflation, banks turned to the GKO and OFZ (government bonds) debt market 
until the 1998 default. 
The Russian banking system did not begin the transition, nor did it emerge from the 1998 
default crisis, with a clean institutional slate. Thus figure 20 below, introduced in chapter 
two, can be used here to describe the SME-Banking sector relationship in Russia. One 
can observe the importance of informal institutions in the two processes cited above in 
the creation of the banking sector. 
These informal institutions took precedence over formal ones. Data, information, and 
knowledge, here, are tied to these informal institutions and only allow those who share 
the same norms to benefit from them. Trust is strong between individuals who are already 
acquainted. In such an environment, formal rules cannot be considered fair by the 
broader society and do not spur the cooperation that impersonal transactions require. 
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Figure 20. Informal and formal institutions to support investor's participation 
The following section details the informal norms and habits that are prevalent in the 
Russian sociological landscape and that have affected how SMEs secure financing from 
the banking sector. Thus, the structure of banking sector in Russia reflects a sort of 
institutional inertia. However, if the former institutional regime affects the banking sector’s 
development, this is also because of more modest, quotidian habits. By adopting a 
sociological, “bottom-up” approach, one can observe that if the banking sector never 
developed a tradition of financial intermediation, this is also because of these informal 
institutions. 
4.6. Informal institutions of the banking-SME relationship in 
Russia 
The interviews conducted reveal that habits and routines affect borrower-lender 
relationships. To maintain conceptual clarity, this dissertation uses North’s definition of 
institutions as formal and informal constraints and consider informal norms, habits and 
routines to be the elements constituting informal institutions. The concept of blat, aptly 
described by Ledeneva (1998), illustrates the nature of the phenomenon that this chapter 
attempts to capture using the concept of an “informal institution”. The purpose of this 
chapter is not to ponder theoretical considerations regarding the relationship between 
informal practices and informal constraints. Ledeneva struggled with different concepts to 
define blat as an informal practice. In this context, this dissertation uses the notions of 
informal practices, informal norms and informal constraints as equivalent concepts, all 
describing the informal social material that comprises institutions. The central question is 
how this social material influences the SME-bank relationship. Given the widespread use 
of blat and substantial influence of informal norms and networks in Russia and all CIS 
countries and the inability of the Russian banking sector to finance SMEs, it is surprising 
that this question has never, to our knowledge, been raised before. However, there are 
empirical studies on similar topics that allow us to deduce that informal practices might 
not be conducive to efficient financial intermediation.  
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This analysis attempts to contextualize these informal institutions within the framework of 
the SME-banking relationship. It that sense, it is similar to Uzzi’s study of how social 
relationships and networks help the “midmarket” obtain financing (Uzzi, 1999). He 
employed the concept of social embeddedness, defined as “the degree to which 
commercial transactions take place through social relations and networks of relations that 
use exchange protocols associated with social, noncommercial attachments to govern 
business dealings” (Uzzi, 1999:482). At the relationship level, firms that conduct their 
transactions through a lender reduce their cost of capital. At the network level, however, 
firms are more likely to obtain financing and a lower interest rate if they have a mixed 
network of arm’s-length ties and embedded ties. Uzzi explains that this “network effect” 
with arm’s-length ties facilitates access to public information and market prices.  
This chapter adopts a different stance, in that it considers other environments, such as 
Russia, in which arm’s-length ties have never really existed and embedded ties, the 
informal constraints captured by the concept of blat mentioned above, are exclusive. How 
does this social structure affect SME finance? Rehn and Taalas (2004) demonstrated 
how blat, understood as mundane activity, was at the center of the economics of dally life 
and is a form of entrepreneurship in Russia. Understood as such, “entrepreneurship can 
be subversive and anti-systemic. Even though (entrepreneurs) might be helpful to those 
who partook in these dealings, particularly those who could use their opportunities best to 
their advantage, they struck a blow against the strive (however shoddily implemented) 
towards equality among Soviet citizens, and were thus highly anti-social from this 
ideological perspective” (Rehn and Taalas, 2004:247). Blat is an informal practice that 
lies at the center of an economy of favors. A favor implies an act of exclusion. If it can be 
given to everyone, it is no longer a favor. Using the concept of blat, Hsu (2005) notes that 
Russian businesses used such social capital differently than Chinese businesses, which 
relied on the similar practice of Guanxi. While Guanxi practices were helpful in the 
development of trust-based networks, blat evolved into a series of defensive mechanisms 
and failed as an instrument of extending one’s networks and build trust with strangers. In 
other words, blat is not the sort of social capital identified by Putnam and Helliwell (1995) 
as a component of economic growth. It is not interpersonal trust. Blat, on the contrary, 
favors trust within the group and is the cement of the nash/ne nash chelovek (us versus 
the others) dichotomy described by Schrader (2004). Bonding at the expense of bridging 
is not conducive to economic development.  
This argument is further reinforced by Batjargal’s empirical study on social networks and 
entrepreneurial performance. “Structural embeddedness is the structure of the overall 
network of relations. The structural properties of ego-centered networks such as network 
size, density and diversity are dimensions of structural embeddedness. Relational 
embeddedness is the extent to which economic actions are affected by the quality of 
actor’s personal relations. [...] Resource embeddedness (is) the degree to which network 
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contacts possess valuable resources” (Batjargal, 2003:537-538). Among the 75 
entrepreneurs interviewed, relational and resources embeddedness are found to have 
direct positive impact on firm performance, while structural embeddedness has no direct 
influence. These findings confirm Rehn and Taalas’ (2004) perspective on entrepreneurial 
activity as a means of survival. It might be helpful for individuals but entail negative 
effects for the system. While it allows agents to survive, it might compromise 
macroeconomic efficiency. Menyashev and Polishchuk (2011) reinforced this argument 
using data from a major, nation-wide survey administered in Russia in 2007. At the 
systemic level, they found that bonding social capital had negative effects on 
development, as measured by socio-economic conditions, and the performance of local 
governance, while bridging social capital had positive ones. “Thus, what is known as 
“bonding” social capital upholds collective action within narrow confines of smaller 
isolated groups providing “club goods” for group members. The impact of such activities 
for broader social welfare could be detrimental, if smaller “Olson groups” are engaged in 
socially wasteful rent-seeking, or if they divert their resources and energy from eliminating 
root causes of social and economic problems. On the other hand, “bridging” social capital 
facilitates the creation of broad society-wide coalitions (“Putnam groups”) which advance 
social welfare by producing public goods, such as efficient public sector governance” 
(Menyashev and Polishchuk, 2011:3). Thus, in a capitalist environment, employing 
survival tactics, based on a socially exclusive structure developed to protect persons and 
individual firms against a predatory state, comes at the expense of economic efficiency.  
The interviews conducted with SMEs confirmed this analysis. Numerous SMEs and 
experts described the Russian market for financial services as being composed of a 
“network of influence”, or “cartels”. Some SME owners admitted that if it were not for their 
ties with certain banks, they could not have obtained the loans that they had. They 
described the Russian market for financial services as composed of various smaller 
markets that do not communicate with one another. If a person is outside this group of 
influence, he or she has no opportunity to obtain loans or other financial instruments. 
Recommendations and reputation appear to serve as a sort of currency in these circles. 
Numerous respondents underlined that recommendations were nearly obligatory to 
communicate with individuals belonging to a different “group of influence”. It appears then 
that Russians’ “insider-outsider” reflex affects the way in which financial services are 
provided. Some respondents cited a famous proverb that emphasizes how trust is 
socially structured in Russia: “our groups are good, but our people not”. The network is 
thus a resource that can be substituted for leasing. This was the case of one interviewee. 
Lacking the necessary funds to purchase machinery to produce certain pieces of steel 
and other equipment, he contacted former colleagues from the Soviet era. They 
concluded a ten-year contract that has allowed him to use equipment and machinery in 
exchange for a fee. 
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Financial information is exchanged, and financial issues are resolved not between the 
financial sector and economic units but within the group. The group provides the social 
spaces in which trust can be improved and serve as the intermediary that financial 
institutions never have become. There are numerous associations of small and medium-
sized enterprises in Moscow and St Petersburg. Some are only for businesswomen, 
some are for SMEs in the construction sector, and others are active in industrial projects. 
The interviews conducted with these associations demonstrated that their functions were 
to provide a platform for crafting solutions, including financial ones. Grouping businesses 
can be a lucrative activity as the platform “mnogobiz”, which means “a lot of business”, 
demonstrates. Mnogobiz provides accounting services and legal advice for its clients and 
has the necessary connections with the banks (due to the owner of mnogobiz, who has 
“friends” working in banks). Informal networks can then serve as a resource to establish a 
formal business, though their practices seem to occupy a legal no man’s land. Mnogobiz 
admitted that it occasionally “polishes” the books of some of its clients to obtain better 
access to financing. It has economic incentives to do so because it adds 2-3 percent to 
the interest rates of the loans that it obtains for its clients. 
The above example describes a mafia-like system, but this does not imply that the entire 
Russian economy functions in this manner. However, one can characterize the Russian 
economy as being composed of numerous business ecosystems, on the words of one 
survey respondent. In the numerous business ecosystems to which banks belong, the 
latter can suggest partners ranging from insurance to cleaning services and customs 
administration networking. Thus, businesses are not necessarily members of a value 
chain but are instead linked by existing in the same ecosystem. The reflex to develop 
interactions within groups simply implies that economic efficiency and transparency are 
not the primary concern. 
The primary concern seems to be survival and not growth. It is mentioned above that 
survival tactics must be considered in relation to the predatory behavior of the state, 
which has not evolved substantially since the Soviet era, despite that the economy was 
privatized. The interviews conducted clearly revealed that relationship between state 
authorities and enterprises is a serious issue in contemporary Russia. None of the 
businesses interviewed contended that the government was supporting the growth of 
SMEs in any manner. All of the respondents complained of the unpredictability of the tax 
department, which is as much of a state within the state as the famous customs 
department. According to some interviewees, opening a bank account is the first step 
toward transparency that will also jeopardize their business. In that regard, the nature of 
the state-private sector relationship affects the structure of the private sector and is 
another piece of evidence that formal privatization cannot be effective if a deeper 
institutional transformation does not occur. 
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This particularity of the Russian market must be considered if one wishes to better 
understand information asymmetries. Asymmetric information thus not only describes a 
relationship between an agent possessing more formal information than his or her 
counterparty but also the difficulties of transacting when economic actors value contextual 
information to a greater extent than they do transparent, coded information. The literature 
mentioned above and the empirical materials gathered from the interviews conducted 
suggest that Boisot and Child’s (1996) analysis remains valid. According to them, 
different stages of economic development correspond to the degree to which information 
is codified. Thus, information is placed within the framework of various institutional 
characteristics. Viewed in this manner, transacting parties might have identical amounts 
of formal information, but the transaction can still be characterized by asymmetric 
information because the parties “belong to different worlds”. Rules are highly dependent 
on context, and networks render the spread of information difficult; it is thus equally 
difficult for information to become knowledge. These substantial information asymmetries 
increase the costs of financial services and capital. 
Conclusion 
The above considerations show the need to refine the typical view of transparency and 
opaqueness concerning SME financing. As the frontier between soft and hard information 
disappears in the face of informal and formal mechanisms, distinguishing lending 
technologies based on the categories of soft and hard information (Berger and Udell, 
2006) becomes irrelevant. Indeed, such a distinction fails to account for the various forms 
that information can take, which depend on its institutional basis (formal or informal). As 
this chapter attempted to argue, informal practices occasionally overrule formal 
requirements, thereby affecting the interplay between formal and informal norms that 
allow for efficient relationships between the financial sector and the economy. For 
example, the value of hard information, such as financial statements, is low in an 
environment with pervasive double accounting such as Russia. Borrowers need to obtain 
preferential access to the internal functioning of an enterprise to evaluate its potential and 
risks. Western economies have developed formal institutions, such as accounting 
standards, auditing, and certified accountants, to ensure that investors and creditors 
analyze information that corresponds to the real value of the firm to the greatest extent 
possible. These institutions are intended to ensure that the external image of an 
economic unit corresponds to reality. In former Soviet economies, such institutions are 
very young. The interviews conducted confirmed the prevalence of informal institutions 
and corresponding mindsets. The accounting software used by most SMEs in Russia is 
actually a tax declaration software that SMEs are required to use to file tax documents 
every quarter. The value of an enterprise given by the tax software has to be 
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complemented by “management accounting”, which also records transfers of cash that do 
not appear on the first accounting document. The fieldwork revealed that Russian SMEs 
have two types of accounting practices and continue to regard accounting as a 
government tool to tax business. In that environment, hard information is de facto soft and 
thus requires the filter of informal institutions to be decoded. The frontier between the 
internal and external aspects of an enterprise is not fixed by corporate governance 
norms, which, consequently, are difficult to implement. 
The case study of Russian SME financing reveals how social practices can alter the 
structure of a market, i.e., the market for financial services. This chapter details how 
these practices are part of the Russian social fabric, which prevents the emergence of an 
efficient market for financial services. Moreover, these social arrangements exhibit inertia. 
Bluntly, one could say that society is too slow for a well-developed financial sector. As 
chapter three attempted to demonstrate that the reverse is also possible: Financial 
sectors could be developing too rapidly for societies. Overall, the second part of this 
dissertation attempted to show that financial sectors are not immune to social 
arrangements and that these arrangements are not immune to the evolution of financial 
sectors. 
Indeed, Dembinski (2009) explored the social and ethical consequences of the 
financialization process, and paradoxically, there are numerous striking parallels between 
these and the characteristics of planned economies. The growing complexity of finance 
introduces a distance between market actors and the consequences of their actions. 
Financialization is “totalizing” in the sense that the actors involved are part of the mass of 
financial markets insulated from the rest of the economy and society, akin to the way in 
which Soviet workers were part of a large, centrally planned economy that was out of 
touch with economic reality and insulated from economic systems that might operate 
differently. Dembinski’s following phrase, describing the diffuse sense of responsibility 
induced by financialization, could easily apply to the ethical consequences of Soviet 
planning. “Ultimately, no-one feels responsible for the overall result, but everyone feels 
an exaggerated technical responsibility for his or her particular segment. No longer 
knowing why they are doing what they do, they become mere operatives who simply 
obey their superiors rather than using their common sense and their instincts” 
(Dembinski, 2009:12). 
Second, the process of financialization favors transactions over relationships, just as 
Soviet economies did. In that case, the only economic relationship possible were purely 
technical, previously planned transactions. One of the greatest challenges facing former 
Soviet economies is to rebuild cooperation and trust, which central planning destroyed. 
There is no need for cooperative, long-lasting relationships in communist economies. 
However, these sorts of relationships are precisely what financialization is destroying. 
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Could it be that economic systems in which finance is all important and those in which 
finance is meaningless actually impose the same costs on societies: Fewer long-term 
relationships based on cooperation rather than procedures, growing distrust, and ethical 
alienation?  
Asking these questions is a means of broadening the scope of analysis of to the 
problems faced by the financial sectors and policy makers. Just as the debates over 
sustainable growth or financial liberalization were enlarged, there should also be a shift 
from financial sector development to sustainable financial sector development. Economic 
systems in which financial crises are recurrent are simply not sustainable. 
Discussing the design of financial structures in Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Stiglitz wrote that “they should know that the choices they 
make now may not be easily undone. Institutions once established are not easily or 
costlessly altered” (Stiglitz, 1993:8). Arguing that this warning concerns transitional 
countries would imply that the financial sectors of developed countries benefit from the 
inalterable advantage of having begun on the right track. Is there no risk that the financial 
sectors of developed countries might evolve in the wrong direction?  
This dissertation argues that financial sectors evolve and that the way they do so is a 
political issue. Former command economies were and in some instances remain in 
transition from communism (or even feudal economic structures) to market economies, 
but high-income countries are also in transition. The destination is, however, unknown. 
Developed market economies have created a form of capitalism that was under control 
since the Great Depression. But global finance arose from the ashes of the depression 
(Cohen, 1996), and traditional capitalism evolved into financial capitalism (Albert, 1991). 
The beginning of this thesis introduced the concept of financialization in light of the 
growing importance of financial sectors. Financialization refers to “the increasing role of 
financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of the domestic and international economies” (Epstein, 2005:3). This 
dissertation tried to show the economic contradictions of financialization and the political 
economic dilemma it poses in chapter one and tow. Chapter three and four explored the 
social consequences of the evolution of Western financial sectors and based on the 
Russian case study, tried to show that it is institutions, formal and informal, that are the 
bedrock on which efficient financial sector can develop. If the Russian transition bred a 
“Russian style” capitalism (Gustafson, 1999), what characterizes contemporary “Western 
style” capitalism? 
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Conclusion: Is financial capitalism sustainable? 
What characterizes contemporary “Western style” capitalism? This dissertation showed 
that financial systems were growing in importance in developed economies, with 
consequences reaching far beyond the economic sphere. The different chapters identified 
the characterizing features of this evolution, which can be summarized as followed: Risk 
allocation is now the defining feature of financial sectors. It leads to a waste of capital and 
to the emergence of specific interest groups. This new market for risk allocation is costly 
in term of regulation and from a societal point of view because the actors in this new 
market devised a new set of informal rules contradicting the formal existing ones. 
Indeed, chapter one concluded that by allocating risks, financial sectors lost their capacity 
to correctly reflect economic fundamentals. The combination of several phenomenon tend 
to separate assets prices from their economic fundamentals. Stock markets are now at 
the center of financial systems, but their functioning not conducive to correct pricing of 
economic fundamentals. Financial intermediation is now based on transactions and less 
on relations, which is a form of intermediation ideal to manage risks, but less so to 
allocate capital. Lastly, these financial transactions take place at the international level 
and on a short-term time scale. It is a financial system better equipped to manage risk 
than to allocate capital. 
That finance does not serve the real economy does not mean that no one profits from it. 
This new market for risk allocation serve certain interest groups as chapter two 
mentioned. The business of spreading risk can be viewed as a value chain with liquidity 
and information as the primary input used to supply other actors and clients with 
sophisticated financial instruments. Alternative Trading Venues sell data to brokers able 
to profit from it. Traditional exchange rent their space to High Frequency Traders and 
other firms able to trade at the speed of light. Investment banks, hedge funds and High 
Frequency Trading supply High Net Worth Individuals and other wealthy clients with high 
returns while earning growing fees.  International short-term transactions through 
financial markets is an ideal form of financial intermediation for this market. The “originate 
and distribute” model of finance which replaced the more traditional “originate and hold” 
illustrates that very well. It could not exist without that form of intermediation. By the same 
 150 
token, the “downsize and distribute” model of management also requires information and 
liquidity. Listed firms are being constantly evaluated by financial markets which expect a 
certain return. This evaluation, whether it reflects the real economic potential of an 
enterprise or not, advantage the short-term shareholders, who can always exit the 
“investment” at any time, because the market is liquid enough. Compensation schemes 
implemented originally to align CEO’s interest with those of shareholders might have 
backfired. As chapter two mentioned, shareholders are diverse in their expectations and 
risk appetite and their time horizon are short or long. To what kind of shareholders are 
CEO’s interests tied? The dominance of the “downsize and distribute” model seems to 
suggest that short-term shareholder give their blessing to CEOs who are able to 
legitimize their revenue by taking managerial decision in the name of the sacrosanct 
“shareholder value”. The practice of stock repurchase is a telling example of managerial 
decisions that align interest of CEO and interest of short-term shareholders. Stocks 
buyback improves financial ratios and reduce dilution. It thus drives stock prices up. The 
company, by claiming to invest in itself, distributes in fact money to shareholders when 
that money could be spent on innovation or job creation. It has also been used over the 
past three decades to manipulate stock prices under the cover of “maximizing 
shareholder value”.  
The political economy analysis of the linkages between finance and the real economy 
shows that financial system can indeed favor some interest groups among others. 
Financial globalization is said to benefit mobile capital in the first place, while fixed capital 
tend to gain from it in the long term (Frieden, 1991). But the biggest winners are actually 
financial intermediaries at the service of short-term and mobile capital who are able to 
extract fees while widening the gap between productive capital and the real economy.  
The second part of this dissertation takes an institutional economic perspective at the 
separation between finance and the real economy. There is a need to examine the 
institutional bedrock upon which this separation takes place. From that point of view, it is 
an analysis of the separation between finance and society. Chapter three notes how 
modern complex finance has the potential to erode formal and informal institutions of 
Western economies.  
Much like banks, financial sectors are today not only too big to fail, but also too big to 
regulate. Regulation implies direct and indirect costs, but also distortion costs and its 
unintended consequences. The multiplication of rules and agencies complicated the 
regulatory landscape and amplified regulatory risks. Complex financial sectors led to 
complex regulation when it should actually be simple. The key is therefore to write simpler 
rules of the game, and not more of it.  
 151 
The rapid development of financial sector these past 30 years put pressure on informal 
institutions also. Under the layer of formal, written rules of regulation, there is a hard-to-
grasp layer of implicit conventions and unwritten laws. Conventions, routines and habits 
allow institutions to transmit and interpret information. Agents require these mechanisms 
to process data into information and knowledge. Formal and informal institutions are not 
necessarily tied together harmoniously and indeed, the financial crisis and its myriad of 
scandals showed how informal rules within financial spheres grew apart from formal 
regulations. Financial markets are socially structured  and not devoid of moral norms and 
culture. But these norms evolved in a manner that clashes with the rule of law and the 
rest of society’s norms. 
Indeed, the relationship between the financial regulatory system and modern financial 
sectors is one of “deep capture” whereby the interests of financial sectors systematically 
prevail over financial and economic policy processes (Baxter, 2011). The “secret tape of 
Goldman Sachs” by Ex-Fed employee Carmen Segarra reveals the overwhelming cultural 
capital of Wall Street over regulators and policy makers (Lewis, 2014). 
That formal and informal institutions underlying economic systems be tuned in is crucial. 
It is one of the lessons of the market reforms in former command economies. That is why 
chapter four takes the example of SMEs finance in Russia. It shows how the interactions 
between formal and informal institutions shapes the SME lending market of Russia. The 
imported formal institutions that are intended to ensure that the external image of an 
economic unit corresponds to reality - accounting standards, auditing, and certified 
accountants – are not supported by informal institutions. Economic transactions tend to 
take place within one’s own network. Rules are highly dependent on context, and 
networks render the spread of information difficult. The costs of financial services and 
capital are thus increased by these information asymmetries. It is hard to conclude that 
the Russian financial market works efficiently. It is liberalized, but it is liberalized “Russian 
style”. 
So what characterizes contemporary “Western style” capitalism? The dissertation 
advances that it is misallocation of capital, the rise of financial capitalism oligarchies, and 
economic inequality. Overall it also shows that the evolution of financial markets is a 
political issue, because it is through financial markets that the distribution of economic 
wealth is organized. Financial institutions distribute risk throughout society when it once 
used to hold it and enterprises distribute wealth to their shareholders when it once used 
to invest for innovation. It might sound too simplistic and describe the picture of a past 
that never truly existed. Of course, a financial system where institutions allocate capital 
efficiently while holding on to risks while letting enterprises free to choose how to use 
their cash flow is the ideal type of a financial system that serves the common good. 
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But that would be a true liberal financial system and this dissertation contends that the 
current one is very far from it.  As Chesney (2014) argues, Western financial systems 
today are at the opposite of what Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek and Milton 
Friedman would define as liberal. It is not structured to serve the common good but to 
work at the profit of particular coalitions. As Amato and Fantacci noted (2012), what was 
asked of the old capitalism was simply to be a more efficient system of production. Now 
that the competition for the best system of wealth production ended, what is asked of 
financial capitalism is the redistribution of that wealth. The rules of the game of that new 
capitalism clash with those of the old “productive” capitalism and seem to be, at least 
currently, incompatible with the notion of fairness. Political movements against the 
financial world such the Occupy Wall Street that happened in the US and Spain in the 
wake of the crisis can be seen through those lenses. Recent Swiss referendums trying to 
establish a ceiling for CEO’s revenue can be analyzed from that point of view too. The 
rise of inequality in Western societies is much debated, but what we should really ask is 
whether wealth redistribution through financial capitalism is fair.  
The growing importance and complexity of financial sectors, the pressure they put on 
formal institutions and the subsequent rise of “financial” oligarchies are new elements that 
the political regimes of democratic societies will have to take into account to save liberal 
market economies and capitalism from the post-1989 version of capitalism. Political 
institution will have to find new ways of arbitraging between different interests groups and 
make this game of wealth redistribution through financial markets fair for all participants 
or Western economies might endure the risk of becoming “Russian style”. 
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Annex: Notes on the field work and interviews with SMEs in 
Russia  
The last chapter of this dissertation tried to illustrate how informal institutions weight in 
the relationship between finance and the real economy. It tried to contextualize the gap 
between finance and society introduced in chapter three. The analysis of the  bank-SMEs 
relationship in Russia is enriched by a series of interviews with SMEs, banks and 
enterprises associations. The present annex will give more information about this 
empirical part.  
25 SMEs, 4 bank representatives, 3 business associations and several experts and 
academics were interviewed between October 2012 and March 2013. 14 interviews were 
conducted in Moscow and 18 in St-Petersburg. These were face-to-face, semi-structured 
interviews that lasted from 45 minutes to two hours. In order to get access to these 
entrepreneurs, I applied to the several business associations and attended different 
conferences on the subject of SME finance in Russia. Two associations were particularity 
useful: The European Business Angel Network in Moscow and the Small and Mid-sized 
Business Association of St-Petersburg. Becoming a full member of these associations 
and attending the frequent meetings planned for members allowed me to convince some 
entrepreneurs to share their views on and personal experience with the Russian banking 
sector. 
The size of these firms varied greatly. The smallest firms interviewed employed 15 
people, while the biggest about 200. If the respondents had no problems indicating the 
number of people employed, it was very hard to receive any information on the turnover 
and revenue of the enterprise. In fact, owners and CEOs of mid-sized firms, because of 
their size and turnover, are the least accessible. These are also the one that fear the 
state and the corporate raiders most and therefore the most reluctant to provide any kind 
of information.  
The sectors in which these firms were active varied equally. It ranged from consulting 
services to construction material and machinery manufacturing to food industry and 
pharmaceutical. Bank‘s representatives in charge of loans to SME were also interviewed.  
This sample of enterprises interviewed was not randomly chosen and is therefore not 
representative. A handful of respondents are part of my own network of acquaintances. 
The rest are members of these association mentioned above. For practical reasons, I 
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was able to interview firms in Moscow and St-Petersburg only. SMEs active in peripheral 
regions of Russia would have provided more details and would certainly have underlined 
even more the fractured aspect of SMEs finance market in Russia composed of a lot of 
small ecosystems that do not communicate with one another.  
Thus, on the one hand, the enterprises interviewed are all small and middle-sized 
companies belonging to business associations in the biggest two cities of Russia. But on 
the other hand, if these enterprises, located and active where the banking sector in 
Russia is the most mature, confirmed the prevalence of informal institutions such as blat 
and other network arrangements between banks and SMEs, one can safely assume that 
these informal bargains are even stronger in the periphery, where the financial sector is 
not as developed as in Moscow.  
These interviews revealed that informal institutions structure these bargains and influence 
SME finance in three kinds of relationships:  
1. Relationships between the SME and its own network in the private sector 
2. Relationships between the SME and the banks 
3. Relationships between SME and the state 
SME and their networks 
The firms interviewed active in manufacture (mainly machinery for food industry and 
construction) started their business at the fall of the Soviet regime. Their business rests 
on the use of a technology that was developed by the communist regime. These plants 
and factories continued to produce and some of them are exporting their production in 
some former Soviet countries, but one fails to see how they can be competitive at the 
international level. 
The use of old Soviet technology and infrastructure is a reminder that market economies 
are not built from scratch. By the same token, these enterprises rely on their old network 
of partners to solve all sorts of problems. Those who are able to exports in Ex-Soviet 
republics do so thanks to their network of “friends” with whom they used to work before. 
Others use their address book to solve problems with the administration or to rent some 
machinery. The unpredictability of the Russian environment, which is the responsibility of 
the state, as argued later, pushes people to gather in groups. The group is the unit where 
information is exchanged and problems are solved, because it is the only civil space 
where one can trust others. A lot of respondents, conscious that the level of trust between 
individuals in Russia is very low, replied with the following proverb: “Хорошый человек, 
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это не проффесии” (being a honest man is not a profession). It is a very interesting 
proverb, as it gives the measure of what the state has not been able to do: Forcing 
dishonest people out of business. 
The function of the group then is to reduce the uncertainty of the Russian environment 
and financial issues, as well as all sorts of other problems, are sorted within that social 
space. Money is lent and machinery is leased from individuals to individuals, bypassing 
the traditional banking intermediation. Thus one the one hand, a lot of financial 
interactions escape the intermediation of the banking sector. On the other hand, since 
many of these associations have banking representative as their member, they can also 
facilitate financial intermediation, as they provide a platform where information and 
knowledge about each other business activity is shared. Facilitating informal exchanges 
between bankers and entrepreneurs is valuable, because most of the respondents from 
each side viewed the other as being “from another world”. 
SME and banks 
Indeed, enterprises and banks do not understand each other business and concerns. 
They do not speak the same language. Bankers tend to think that SMEs are ignorant 
about business planning and management. On the other hand, lots of entrepreneurs tend 
to complain that Russia is now a country of bankers and lawyers with less and less 
engineers. It is common to hear them expressing a sense of nostalgia for a country that 
used to manufacture. 
The low level of interpersonal trust and the “cultural” clash between bankers and 
entrepreneurs exacerbate information asymmetries due to the SME sector low 
transparency. The bankers interviewed admitted that this was an important element 
preventing efficient financial intermediation. 
Nearly all SMEs have two accounting systems. A white one and a black one and SME 
loan officers insist on examining both sorts. The fixed cost for examining one set of 
accounting document for a simple credit without guarantee is 350 USD, which is why 
banks tend to be reluctant to even engage in any relationship with small enterprises. 
Moreover, it is hard to have information and data representing the whole business since 
its creation. A lot of firm have multiple filials and have changed name several time. It is a 
survival strategy for them to hide their business activity from the state. In other words, 
enterprises choose to stay non-transparent.  
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It is thus very hard for the banking sector to assess the risk of lending money at the level 
of the enterprise. Most of the time, SMEs credit are attributed to individuals who pledge 
real estate to guarantee the loan. 
What these problems of bank-SMEs intermediation reveal is that the formal institutions of 
well-functioning state are not established properly. Asymmetric information tends to be 
attributed in economic literature to problems of market failure. These interview revealed 
that in the case of Russia, it seems to be a problem of state failure. 
SME and the state 
The state has not succeeded in establishing the fundamental formal institutions that are 
supposed to reduce uncertainty. The Russian state is unable to tax people and 
corporation efficiently and fairly. Entrepreneurs fear the abusive power of state officials 
and prefer to have the least possible interaction with any kind of administration and the 
banking sector is one of them. Opening a bank account is viewed as the first step toward 
transparency that might put a business at risk. The nebulous structure of the SME sector 
is due to the fact that firms change constantly their name and have lots of filial.  
Enterprises have several lives, which last 1 year on average according to several respondents. 
Thus it is very hard for banks to have good database and credit history. 
If the level of tax is the problem is other countries, in Russia, it is the unpredictability of the 
institutions that is the issue. Some firms active in exports and imports prefer finding complex and 
costly solution abroad to avoid dealing with the Russian state. 
By the same token, the formal institution that recognizes and protects legal entities is not 
predictable enough, so that the banking sector can secure lending to enterprises themselves, and 
not their owners. 
Altogether, these interviews allowed to enrich one’s understanding of the issues of 
asymmetric information. In fact, the problem lies not only with the quantity of information, 
but with the nature and the value of information, both of which are determined by formal 
and informal institutions. The Russian state has not succeeded to implement universal 
and stable formal institutions. Indeed, many respondents noted the very specific social 
space that exists in Russian between legality and illegality. An expression describes that 
space very well: “Вор в законе”, which means literallly “thief in the law” or legal thief. 
These “thieves” are not outlaws, but act according to their own rules. The Western 
understanding of the rule of law cannot accept diverse interpretation by different 
individuals, which would be in direct contradiction to the very idea of the rule of law. Yet, 
the expression accepts plainly that contradiction and shows that the problem is not one of 
economic reform, but of state building.
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